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while the assets of the industry  were growing. On the asset side, the 
industry  has lost market  power over many of its large borrowers,  who 
can now choose among many alternative  sources of finance. On the 
liability side, the industry has evolved from a position of protected 
monopsony, in which banks purchased  deposit funds at regulated,  be- 
low-market  interest rates, toward  a market  setting in which they must 
pay more competitive prices in order to raise funds. With respect to 
individual consumers, electronic interfaces such as automated  teller 
machines and on-line banking have altered the way in which many 
customers  deal with their banks. 
These changes raise policy concerns  because  the banking  industry  is 
an integral  part  of the U.S.  economy. Banks pool and absorb  risks for 
depositors  and  provide  stable sources  of investment  and  working  capital 
funds  for nonfinancial  industries.  In addition,  banks  provide  a smoothly 
functioning  payments  system that allows financial  and  real resources  to 
flow relatively freely to their highest-return  uses. Through  its access to 
the discount window, the banking industry  is also a backup  source of 
liquidity  for any sector in temporary  difficulty. Similarly, open market 
operations  that  are  essential to the monetary  control  mechanism  involve 
interventions  that alter the balance sheets of banks. Finally, banks are 
a particularly  important  source of funds for small, information-proble- 
matic borrowers who often have limited access to other sources of 
external  finance. Thus in addition  to affecting overall macroeconomic 
performance,  shocks to the banking  system can have significant  distri- 
butional consequences across a wide range of nonfinancial  firms and 
industries. 
This paper  summarizes  and  quantifies  past changes in the U.S. com- 
mercial banking industry and forecasts what the future may hold. It 
emphasizes  regulatory  changes and technical and financial  innovations 
as the central  driving forces behind  the transformation  of the industry. 
Changes  in the regulatory  environment  include the deregulation  of de- 
posit accounts, several major  changes in capital requirements,  reduc- 
tions in reserve requirements,  expansion of bank  powers, and liberali- 
zation of geographic restrictions  on intrastate  and interstate  banking. 
Important  technical innovations  that  have affected  the banking  industry 
include  the advances  in information  processing  and  telecommunications 
technologies that facilitate the low-cost, rapid  transfer  of information 
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finance  include those that have allowed the securitization  of many tra- 
ditional  bank  assets and have expanded  the scope and volume of finan- 
cial derivative  activity. Many of these regulatory,  technical, and finan- 
cial changes have altered the way in which banks compete with each 
other and have brought  about substantial  external  competition  to U.S. 
banking  organizations  from foreign banks and from nonbank  financial 
intermediaries. 
To document and assess the effects of these different forces, we 
examine the evolution over time of the balance sheets, off-balance 
sheet activities, and income statements  of all insured  U.S. commercial 
banks. Our  sample period begins in 1979, shortly  before the deregula- 
tion of bank  deposit accounts, the formalization  and  tightening  of bank 
capital requirements,  innovations in off-balance sheet activities, and 
many of the important  advances in information  and financial  technol- 
ogy. Our  sample period  ends in December 1994, shortly  after  the large 
spate  of bank  failures  of the mid-  1980s and  early 1990s, the implemen- 
tation of risk-based  capital standards  and prompt  corrective action by 
regulators,  and  the so-called bank  credit  crunch  of the early 1990s. The 
1980s and  the first  half of the 1990s, a period  which some have dubbed 
"the decline of banking," is undoubtedly  the most turbulent  period in 
U.S. banking  history  since the Great  Depression. Moreover,  it leads us 
to the brink  of the next era in banking-nationwide banking,  including 
coast-to-coast  branching  networks-which  is being implemented  over 
the 1995-97 time period. We hope that the facts and figures  presented 
in the tables, many of which are difficult to obtain outside the federal 
regulatory  agencies, will provide useful reference material  for others 
wishing to teach, research, or simply learn more about  banking. 
The most novel aspect of our analysis derives from our estimation 
of the patterns  of bank  lending  to borrowers  of different  sizes over time. 
Large  banking  organizations  tend to lend to medium  and  large  business 
borrowers,  whereas  small banking  organizations  more often specialize 
in lending to small businesses. A key question is how the well-known 
reduction  in bank  commercial  and industrial  lending  of the early 1990s 
affected different sizes of borrowers. Based on a sample of over 1.6 
million individual loans to domestic businesses by U.S.  banks over 
time, we estimate  that  there  was a 34.8 percent  real contraction  in loans 
to borrowers  with bank credit of less than $1 million during  the first 
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substantial  decline in lending to large borrowers,  whereas lending to 
medium-sized  borrowers  appears  to have recovered  nearly to its level 
before the 1990s. Several hypotheses are put forward  to explain these 
findings. 
After reviewing the evidence of the past, we turn  to the future  and 
the effects of the impending  shift to nationwide  banking. We estimate 
the possible impact of this change on the structure  of the industry  and 
on credit  flows to various  sizes of bank  borrowers  by extrapolating  from 
the effects of earlier  liberalizations  of geographic  restrictions.  The es- 
timates suggest that several thousand  banking  organizations  are likely 
to disappear  under nationwide banking, but that the remaining  banks 
will still number  in the thousands.  We also predict  further  contractions 
in the extension of bank  credit  to small businesses, although  these may 
not be as large as the reductions  that have already  taken place, in the 
first half of the 1990s. Perhaps surprisingly, our model projects that 
virtually  all of these changes will occur within the first  five years after 
the implementation  of nationwide  banking. 
We emphasize that at least some of the reductions  in small business 
lending by banks  that have occurred,  or that might occur in the future, 
may represent  improvements  in economic efficiency. Geographic  re- 
strictions  on intrastate  and interstate  banking  have created  barriers  to 
entry  into local markets  and may have reduced  competition  and  allowed 
banks to exploit market power in pricing deposit and loan services. 
Similarly, these geographic restrictions  may have reduced the effec- 
tiveness of the market  for corporate  control in banking  by limiting the 
set of firms that could potentially take over a bank and restrain  ineffi- 
cient or self-serving bank managers  or directors. These limitations  on 
market  discipline in both  the product  and  corporate  control  markets  may 
have allowed some negative net present  value loans to be made. To the 
extent that such loans are reduced  and financial  resources  are freed for 
other  endeavors,  overall economic efficiency is likely improved.  To the 
extent that some positive net present  value loans may also be reduced 
due to consolidation  in the banking  industry,  these loans will likely be 
reissued in the long run, either by other banks  or by nonbank  financial 
intermediaries. 
The paper  is organized  as follows. The second section describes  the 
major  regulatory  changes and technical and financial  innovations  that 
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section shows how these changes have affected  the basic characteristics 
of the industry. The fourth section presents evidence on changes in 
lending to small, medium, and large borrowers  in the first half of the 
1990s. The fifth section displays our estimates of the effects of nation- 
wide banking  on the distribution  of banking  assets between large and 
small banking  organizations,  the number  of organizations  that  will exist 
in the future, and lending to various size categories of borrower.  The 
sixth section gives our conclusions. Appendix  A presents  ten detailed 
data tables, including year-by-year  summary  statistics on the banking 
industry,  balance sheet and income statements, and data on bank  fail- 
ures. Appendix B provides details on changes in bank  regulation, and 
appendix  C gives background  information  for some of our  calculations. 
Regulatory Changes and Technical and Financial Innovations, 
1979-94 
This section briefly  reviews the key regulatory  changes  and  technical 
and financial innovations that have driven the transformation  of the 
banking  industry  over the last fifteen years. The following section ana- 
lyzes the quantitative  effects of these changes. 
The changes in regulation  have had a mixed impact on the profita- 
bility and competitive position of U.S.  commercial banks relative to 
other  financial  intermediaries.  These developments  can be divided into 
five areas: expansion of bank powers, reduction in reserve require- 
ments, formalization  and tightening  of capital requirements,  deregula- 
tion of deposit accounts, and liberalization  of the rules and policies 
regarding geographic diversification. These issues are discussed in 
greater  detail in appendix  B. 
In the most general terms, the changes regarding  reserve require- 
ments  and  bank  powers likely improved  the competitive  position of the 
banking  industry.  Reserve requirements  were reduced  three  times dur- 
ing the sample period; as of  1994 the only reserve requirement  for 
U.S.  banks was a  10 percent requirement  for transaction  balances. 
Bank  powers  also grew, as regulators  allowed banking  organizations  to 
enter  a steadily  growing number  of new product  markets.  Bank  holding 
companies can now have separately capitalized subsidiaries  that of- 
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derwrite various securities, including commercial paper, municipal 
revenue bonds, and some corporate  bonds and equity under limited 
circumstances.  I 
In contrast, the changes in capital standards  were likely costly for 
many  banks, especially the largest  institutions.  At the end of the 1970s, 
capital regulation was relatively ad hoc and depended largely on the 
judgment  and  discretion  of a bank's supervisors.  Starting  in 1981, new 
regulations  required  banks to hold capital equal to a flat percentage  of 
their balance sheet assets (see table B  1 for a complete chronology of 
the major changes in capital requirements  between 1979 and 1994). 
Since banks  were not required  to hold capital  against  off-balance sheet 
items, and  all on-balance sheet assets had  the same  capital  requirements 
regardless of risk or return, these rules may have given some banks 
incentives to reorganize their on-balance sheet portfolios or to shift 
into off-balance sheet activities. 
The Basle Accord risk-based  capital standards,  which were imple- 
mented  starting  in 1990, corrected  some of the problems  with the flat- 
rate standards  by requiring  banks to hold different  amounts  of capital, 
depending  on the perceived  credit  risk of different  on- and  off-balance 
sheet assets (see table B2 for details). Furthermore,  to reduce  discretion 
in the enforcement  of the standards  and  the closure of capital-impaired 
banks,  Congress  included "prompt  corrective  action" provisions  in the 
FDIC Improvement  Act of  1991 (FDICIA). Under prompt  corrective 
action, banks  with capital ratios  below certain  thresholds  are subject  to 
various mandatory and discretionary sanctions. A summary of the 
prompt  corrective action rules is given in tables B3-B5.  As shown 
below, a cumulative effect of the many changes in capital regulation 
between 1979 and 1994 was that banks held much more capital at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. This is especially true of the 
largest banking  organizations,  which began the period with much less 
capital and were hardest  hit by the risk-based  capital provisions. 
The effects of the other  two major  regulatory  changes,  deposit  account 
deregulation  and liberalization  of geographic  expansion  rules, were more 
ambiguous.  Before the 1980s, the interest  rates  that banks  could pay on 
1. A bank  holding company is a separate  legal entity that  owns at least 25 percent 
of a bank, or exercises control of it. In our empirical  analysis we assign each bank to 
the holding company with the largest share to avoid double-counting  banks that are 
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deposits and the types of accounts that they could offer were tightly 
restricted.  As a result, banks  earned  monopsony  profits  by being able to 
acquire  deposit funds at below-market  rates. However, higher market 
interest  rates  and  some market  innovations  in the late 1970s, including  the 
expansion  of money market  mutual  funds (MMMFs),  started  to reduce 
the competitive  advantage  of the banking  industry  over its less-regulated 
competitors.  In the early 1980s these restrictions  were gradually  lifted, 
and by 1986 bank  deposit  rates  were completely  deregulated.  While the 
deregulation  was necessary  to help banks  stop deposits  from flowing to 
unregulated  competitors,  the shift to a competitive  market  for deposits 
meant  that  banks  lost a supply  of funds  that  had  historically  been  available 
to them  at below-market  rates. 
It is important  to recognize that market  factors and innovations, not 
the deregulation  of deposits, were primarily  responsible  for the loss of 
monopsony power. It is not clear whether  banks were made better or 
worse off in the long run  due to deposit deregulation.  Without  deregu- 
lation, banks would have held many fewer deposits, but the deposits 
that they did acquire  might have been much less costly. 
The changes regarding  the ability of banks to diversify geographi- 
cally had quite different  effects on different  parts  of the banking  indus- 
try; in general, favorable  for organizations  that wished to expand  geo- 
graphically and unfavorable  for those whose markets  were invaded. 
The past fifteen years have witnessed a significant liberalization  of 
intrastate  branching  and  the rules for affiliation  with multibank  holding 
companies (MBHCs).2 This period also marks the beginning of the 
modern  interstate  banking  era in which MBHCs have been allowed to 
own banks in more than one state, usually through  regional compacts 
approved  by the legislatures of nearby  states. At the same time, there 
has been considerable  liberalization  of antitrust  policy as it applies to 
banking  organizations.3  Despite these very significant  changes, as of 
2.  A multibank  holding company  owns or controls  more than  one bank. 
3.  From  the late 1970s through  the mid-  1980s a number  of decisions by the courts, 
the Justice  Department,  and the Federal  Reserve  moved policy toward  permitting  merg- 
ers and  acquisitions  that  earlier  would have been denied  (see Rhoades  and  Burke, 1990). 
For example, the Justice Department  and the Federal  Reserve in 1985 began allowing 
bank mergers  in highly concentrated  markets  that raised the Herfindahl  index measure 
of concentration  (the sum of squares of the local market  shares) by as much as 200 
points, rather  than  the 50-point limit applied  to other  industries,  on the assumption  that 
banks  face substantial  competition  from  nonbank  financial  intermediaries.  Other  changes 62  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2.1995 
the end of  1994 MBHCs still could not expand nationwide and all 
interstate  branching  remained  prohibited  under the McFadden  Act of 
1927 and state regulations. 
The Riegle-Neal Interstate  Banking  and  Branching  Efficiency  Act of 
1994 essentially expands the existing regional compacts to the nation 
as a whole and overturns  the McFadden  Act's prohibition  on interstate 
branching.  Under Riegle-Neal, bank holding companies  are permitted 
to acquire  banks in any other state (under  essentially the same condi- 
tions as holding  companies  that  are  already  in that  state)  as of September 
29,  1995. States may act to "opt out" of interstate  branching  before 
this date, or they may act to "opt in" and allow interstate  branching  to 
commence earlier. As of this writing, only Texas has opted out of 
interstate  branching,  while a number  of states have opted in early.4 
Although settled as a matter  of policy, the consequences  of nation- 
wide banking  are still unknown. Standard  neoclassical analysis would 
likely project  that the future  will be driven primarily  by shifts in tech- 
nology, economies of scale and scope, and risk diversification.  While 
these factors are undoubtedly  quite important,  this view ignores the 
fact that  the Riegle-Neal legislation should remove two related  distort- 
ing features of  past rules regarding the ability of banks to expand 
geographically. 
First, past intrastate  and interstate  regulations  prevented  full-scale 
competition  in many local deposit and loan markets.  To the extent that 
some banks were thus allowed to acquire  market  power in the pricing 
include  the use of savings and loan data in computing  the Herfindahl  index for banks, 
the consideration  of possible competition, and the ruling out of sheer size as a reason 
for denying a merger. 
Today, most banking  mergers  are approved,  although  the parties  are often required 
to divest some offices in local markets  with significant  market  overlap. An important 
recent development is that the Justice Department  and the bank regulatory  agencies 
issued information  regarding  some simple screens that  they apply  to determine  whether 
a merger  is likely to be investigated  further  for possible challenge  (see U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of the Comptroller  of the Currency,  and Board  of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve, 1995). It is also notable  that  because  the rules are  couched  in terms  of 
increases  in concentration  from each merger  and do not specify a maximum  level of 
concentration,  they would not necessarily prevent  a situation  in which fewer than ten 
nationwide banking organizations  were the only competitors in every local banking 
market  (see Burke, 1984, and Rhoades, 1992). 
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of deposit and  loan products,  these banks  may  have been able to operate 
inefficiently  or pursue  other  goals. For instance, by using deposit funds 
that are acquired  at below-competitive rates or by using extra profits 
from above-competitive  rates  charged  on other  loans, a bank  with mar- 
ket power can make loans that would have negative net present  value 
(NPV) if evaluated  at competitive market  prices and still remain  prof- 
itable. Such negative NPV investments may be made because bank 
managers  are inefficient or because they are pursuing  goals other than 
profit  maximization, perhaps  without the knowledge of bank owners. 
Similarly, it is possible that negative NPV loans are sometimes issued 
to companies  that are owned or controlled  by the directors  of the bank, 
although  there are legal limits on the amounts  of such "inside.<r"  loans. 
Second, geographic  restrictions  may have inhibited  the functioning 
of the market  for corporate  control  in banking.  In other  industries,  even 
if competition in the product  market  were not possible, some of this 
inefficient behavior might be prevented  if there were an active market 
for corporate  control. That is, competition for ownership  and control 
might  lead firms  with market  power  to be more  efficient  at keeping  costs 
down  and  avoiding  negative  NPV investments.  However, in the banking 
industry  the market  for corporate  control has also been very limited. 
For instance, the separation  of commercial  banking  from other indus- 
tries mandated  by the Glass-Steagall  Act means  that  the only corporate 
entities that can take over, or threaten  to take over, and reform  a com- 
mercial bank that is operating  inefficiently are other banking organi- 
zations (see appendix B for details). Furthermore,  the intrastate  and 
interstate  geographic barriers  to entry have also limited the set of or- 
ganizations  that are eligible to acquire  and reform  inefficient  banks to 
banking  organizations  in the same locality, state, or region. 
The move to nationwide banking should not only help to eliminate 
local market  power by facilitating new competition, but should also 
help to improve  the market  for corporate  control  by giving organizations 
from throughout  the nation the potential to take over and reform an 
inefficient bank. Exactly how the previously protected banks might 
respond to increased competition or the threat of a takeover is not 
known. An extension of arguments  made by Michael Jensen would 
suggest that the regulations  that restrained  competition  may have bred 
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ership interests, so that the opening up of competition  and the market 
for corporate  control may significantly alter the behavior of banking 
organizations  in the formerly  protected  markets.' 
We turn next to the technical and financial innovations  of the last 
fifteen years. Improvements  in information  processing have been im- 
portant  ingredients  in most cases. Automated  teller machines (ATMs) 
have changed the way in which many Americans  do their banking  by 
providing  a more convenient substitute  for human  tellers, particularly 
for cash acquisition. Advances in computing  power and telecommuni- 
cations  have also changed  the back-office  operations  of banks  and  made 
electronic payments significantly more efficient. Similarly, the appli- 
cation of credit-scoring  software has greatly facilitated the efficiency 
and standardization  of credit evaluation. For instance, the recent ex- 
perience  of several  banks  suggests that  reliance  on computerized  credit- 
scoring  models may result  in fewer loan losses than  conventional  meth- 
ods that rely on the judgment  of loan officers.6 
Recent developments in applied finance, along with improvements 
in information  processing technology, have also led to a tremendous 
explosion in the number  of products  that banks  can offer and  hold. For 
instance, the development of  secondary markets for mortgages and 
credit card receivables has given banks greater  flexibility in their op- 
erations. A complete list of new banking  markets  and products  devel- 
oped over the last fifteen years would be excessively long, but it is 
important  to note the tremendous  growth in the use of derivative  secu- 
rities-contracts  with payoffs that are derived from the prices of other 
securities or commodities. Derivatives allow bank  customers  to hedge 
market  risks and exploit their own comparative  advantage  without  the 
banks  having to take on significant  market  risk themselves (that is, as 
long as the banks hedge by maintaining  matched  books).7 
Importantly,  these technical  and  financial  advances  have  often  helped 
nonbanks  more than banks and reduced  the shares  of financial  markets 
supplied by commercial banks. Decreases in the cost of direct access 
5.  See Jensen (1986, 1989, 1993). Some limited  empirical  evidence is provided  by 
Schranz  (1993), who finds higher profitability  ratios  for banks in states with relatively 
liberal  takeover  policies. 
6.  See Saul Hansell, "Company News: Need a Loan? Ask the Computer;  'Credit 
Scoring'  Changes  Small-Business  Lending," New York  Times,  April 18, 1995, pp. DI, 
D4. 
7.  See Merton  (1995) for more discussion of this phenomenon. Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  65 
to financial markets has led some firms that previously would have 
borrowed from banks to issue commercial paper or corporate  bonds 
(although this debt is sometimes backed by bank lines or letters of 
credit). Similarly, nonbank financial intermediaries  have developed 
bank-like  products, such as money market  mutual  funds, and compete 
with banks for depositors' funds. In addition, improvements  in infor- 
mation processing and telecommunications have opened U.S.  (and 
other) markets  to global competition  by allowing external  competitors 
to more  easily transfer  and process information  and move funds across 
international  boundaries. 
The Transformation of Banking, 1979-94 
As discussed in the previous section, both the regulatory  changes 
and  the technical and financial  innovations  have had mixed impacts  on 
banks' profitability  and competitive market  positions. This section ex- 
amines the recent transformation  of the industry  and assesses the im- 
portance  of the underlying  regulatory,  technical, and financial  factors 
behind the transformation.  A goal is to improve the understanding  of 
the role that  these factors are likely to play in the future  transformation 
of the industry  in the nationwide  banking  era. 
Overview of the Data 
Most of the data shown in the tables that follow come from the 
Reports  of Condition and Income ("Call Reports") that all federally 
insured  commercial  banks file with regulators  each quarter.  To remove 
the effects of inflation, all dollar figures and size classes in the tables 
are reported  in 1994 dollars, calculated using the GDP implicit price 
deflator.  For  example, table  A2 shows balance  sheet, off-balance sheet, 
and income statement data for the industry  for each year during the 
period 1979-94,  all in real 1994 dollars. 
For  the empirical  analysis, we treat  each top-tier  bank  holding com- 
pany as a single, integrated  banking  organization.  That  is, we combine 
the assets of all the banks  directly controlled  by a holding  company, or 
indirectly  controlled  through  the ownership  of a lower-tier  holding  com- 
pany, into a single economic unit. There  are good regulatory  and eco- 66  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
nomic reasons for following this convention.8  This treatment  is also 
needed for a pragmatic  reason. We forecast future  bank consolidation 
by extrapolating  from past data on interstate  bank holding companies 
because, due to the prohibition  on interstate  branching,  there are no 
data  on interstate  activity at the bank level.9 
We track the distribution  of gross domestic assets (gross assets in- 
clude loan loss reserves) by five size classes of banking  organizations 
defined  in terms of total assets: under  $100 million, from $100 million 
to $1 billion, from $1 billion to $10 billion, from $10 billion to $100 
billion, and over $100 billion in real 1994 dollars. For brevity's sake, 
some of the tables combine the middle three size classes into a single 
group  with assets between $100 million and $100 billion, even though 
the analysis always uses all five size classes. Also,  for expositional 
purposes we frequently refer to the class with under $100 million 
in assets as "small banks," the middle three classes as "mid-sized 
banks," and the largest class as "megabanks." 
The most striking  fact about the industry  over the last fifteen years 
is the amount  of consolidation  that  has taken  place. Table 1 shows that 
the number  of independent  banking  organizations  has fallen by 4,537, 
8.  For instance, legislation requires  cross-guarantees  whereby all banks within a 
holding company may be held liable for any deposit insurance  funds that are used to 
assist any other bank within the holding company. Similarly, the Federal Reserve's 
source-of-strength  policy requires  the holding company  itself to stand  ready  to provide 
funds when any of its banks become distressed  (see Davies, 1993a). Thus the top-tier 
holding company is effectively made to be the risk-management  unit by regulation. 
Moreover most MBHCs are in fact managed on a consolidated basis: policies and 
procedures  and important  business  decisions are typically made  at the holding  company 
level. 
Finally,  analysis  at the bank  level of a large  holding  company  might  lead  to distortions 
because  holding  company  affiliates  often exchange  portfolio  instruments.  For  example, 
because of legal lending limits, the largest loans are likely to be booked in the largest 
bank in the holding company, even if they are issued to the customer  of one of the 
smaller  affiliates. Similarly, large New York  City banks  often book their  fee-generating 
services at the Delaware  affiliates  of their holding  company  because  Delaware  taxes on 
fee income are relatively low. Thus looking at the holding company  rather  than at an 
individual  bank  within an MBHC  may give a more accurate  description  of the relevant 
economic entity. 
9.  As an empirical  matter,  the use of data at the holding company  level may make 
little difference  in most cases because most bank  holding  companies  have only a single 
bank, and even large MBHCs  tend to be dominated  by a single bank. In 1994, among 
holding companies with more than $100 billion in banking assets,  an average of 
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Table  1. The Transformation  of the U.S. Commercial  Banking Industry 
Units  as indicated 
Item  1979  1994 
Total  number  of banking  organizations  12,463  7,926 
Small  banks  10,014  5,636 
Real industry  gross  total  assetsa  3.26  4.02 
Industry  assets in megabanksb  9.4  18.8 
Industry  assets in small  banks"  13.9  7.0 
Source: Table Al. 
a. Trillions of  1994 dollars. 
b. Percent. 
from 12,463 in 1979 to 7,926 at the end of 1994 (year-by-year  data  are 
shown in table Al).  This 36.4 percent decline in the number  of orga- 
nizations is perhaps  even more surprising,  given the fact that industry 
gross total assets grew 23.4 percent in real terms over the same time 
period.'0 This consolidation was likely fueled by a combination of 
regulatory  changes and  innovations  that  moved the industry  in the same 
direction, specifically,  the relaxation of geographic restrictions on 
branching  and MBHCs, an easier merger  approval  process, and inno- 
vations in information  processing and telecommunications. 
Table 1 also shows that a net total of 4,378 small banking  organi- 
zations  disappeared  during  this period. Thus almost  all of the reduction 
in the number  of organizations  is explained by the disappearance  of 
small organizations. Accompanying  the shift toward fewer organiza- 
tions has been a reallocation of  assets from smaller organizations 
to larger  organizations.  The fraction  of gross domestic assets held by 
the smallest size class dropped  by nearly half, from 13.9 percent to 
7.0 percent, while the fraction held by the megabanks  doubled from 
9.4 percent  to 18.8 percent. 
If it were the case that behavior did not change as the industry 
consolidated  and assets were transferred  from smaller  banking  organi- 
zations to larger  ones, then there would be little purpose  in reviewing 
these past changes and trying to relate them to the industry's future 
under  nationwide  banking. Previous research  has suggested that there 
10. Note that  during  this consolidation  wave, there  was also considerable  new entry 
into  the industry.  Between  the end of 1979 and  the end of 1994, 3, 1  1  1 new insured  U.S. 
commercial  banks  opened for business. Accordingly, the net change shown at the top 
of table 1 understates  the number  of banking  organizations  that exited the industry  due 
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are very few scale economies in banking, and that the mergers  of the 
1980s resulted  in very little cost savings on average."I 
Nevertheless, the data reviewed below strongly suggest that there 
are good reasons to examine the past transformations  in order  to shed 
light on the future. The dismantling  of geographic  barriers  to intrastate 
and interstate  banking  over the past several years has opened the door 
to more intensive competition  in local banking  markets  throughout  the 
nation. This has likely reduced  the exercise of market  power in some 
banking markets and improved the market for corporate  control of 
banks,  making  it easier to uproot  entrenched,  inefficient,  or self-serving 
managers  and directors. Moreover, during  this period there have been 
significant changes in the estimated patterns of bank lending across 
small, medium, and large borrowers. The model of the nationwide 
banking era presented below predicts more of  these same types of 
changes in the future. 
Behind the Transformation: The Role of Technical and 
Financial  Innovations 
As noted above, technical and financial  innovations  have been im- 
portant  to the transformation  of the industry.  Many of the new lines of 
business that  banks  have entered  did not exist fifteen years ago. Deriv- 
ative contracts  such as swaps and some of the futures  and forwards  are 
a few examples. These new products  of financial  engineering  would not 
have  been available  without  advances  in applied  finance  and  computing. 
Table 2 shows that  large banking  organizations  have had  rapidly  grow- 
ing derivative activities since 1983, when derivative data were first 
available on the Call Report. Megabanks  have increased  the notional 
value of their derivatives  positions from 82.3 percent  of assets in 1983 
to more than eleven times the value of assets in 1994.  12 There  has also 
been a corresponding  increase  in reported  "other noninterest  income," 
which  includes  fees from  issuing counterparty  guarantees  and  derivative 
instruments.  For megabanks,  this item rose from 7.0 percent  of oper- 
ating income in 1979 to 20.9 percent  in 1994 (financial  statements  for 
megabanks  are shown in table A3). 13 
1  1. See Berger, Hunter,  and Timme (1993). 
12. Notional values may be rather  poor indicators  of the market  values or risks of 
derivative  activities, but these values are all that  are available  on the Call Report. 
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Table  2. Technical  and Financial Innovations  Affecting  U.S. Banking 
Units  as indicated 
Item  1979a  1994 
Number  of automated  teller  machines  13,800  109,080 
Real  cost of an electronic  deposit"  0.0910  0.0138 
Real  cost of processing  a paper  check"  0.0199  0.0253 
Megabanks 
Notional  value  of derivatives/assets  0.823  11  .45 
"Other  noninterest  income"/operating  incomec  7.0  20.9 
Small  banks 
Notional  value  of derivatives/assets  0.001  0.002 
"Other  noninterest  income"/operating  incomec  3.5  8.3 
Source: Tables Al,  A3,  and A5.  Data on the costs of electronic deposits and processing a paper check are from Bauer 
and Hancock (1995). 
a. Data for notional value of derivatives divided by assets are from 1983 because prior data are not available. 
b.  1994 dollars. 
c.  Percent. 
Table 2 also shows that small banking  organizations  approximately 
doubled  their derivative  positions from  0. 1 percent  of percent  of assets 
in 1983 to 0.2 percent in 1994, and "other noninterest  income" rose 
from 3.5 percent of operating  income in 1979 to 8.3 percent in 1994 
(financial  statements  for small banks  are shown in table AS). However, 
the positions of these organizations  are still minuscule  compared  with 
those of the megabanks. 
Thus the development of these risk management  tools has perma- 
nently changed the business of  banking, at least for large banking 
organizations. Where once mostly liquid liabilities were pooled and 
converted  into mostly illiquid assets, now off-balance sheet activities 
are also of critical importance  and the management  of market  risks is a 
crucial skill. 
Other  products  of technical  change  have also been important  in trans- 
forming  the business of banking. On the consumer  side, table 2 shows 
that  there were 109,080 ATMs in 1994, almost eight times as many as 
the 13,800 available  to consumers  in 1979 (see table Al  for the annual 
data). On the production  side, table 2 shows that between 1979 and 
1994 the real, direct cost of an automated  clearinghouse  payment  (for 
example, the electronic deposit of a paycheck) fell from 9. 10 cents to 
1.38 cents, while the cost of processing a paper  check rose from 1.99 
income to 20.9 percent  between 1993 and 1994 appears  to reflect, in part, a reduction 
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cents to 2.53 cents in 1994 dollars.  14 We discuss below other  important 
technical  and financial  advances, such as improvements  in information 
processing and telecommunications  and the development  of sophisti- 
cated statistical  analysis packages  and credit-scoring  models that  make 
it easier for banks and nonbanks  alike to evaluate credit and monitor 
borrowers. 
The technical and financial  developments  discussed here may have 
had marginal  impacts in encouraging  consolidation  because larger  or- 
ganizations  may be better  able to exploit the scale economies associated 
with these procedures  and products. However, as shown below, regu- 
latory changes have likely been much more important  factors in the 
consolidation  of the banking  industry. 
Behind the Transformation: The Role of Changes  in 
Geographic  Restrictions 
The regulatory  changes affecting  the ability  of banking  organizations 
to expand  geographically  have unambiguously  facilitated  consolidation. 
Both intrastate  and interstate  rules changed  dramatically  between 1979 
and 1994. Because most of the intrastate  restrictions  on branching  and 
affiliation  with multibank  holding companies were lifted several years 
ago and will likely have little further  effect in the future, we focus our 
discussion  on the interstate  regulations  (see table  B6 for a state-by-state 
history of the rules on geographic  expansion). 
Until  1982,  except  for  grandfathering  arrangements,  not  a  single 
state permitted  MBHCs from other states to own banks  within its bor- 
ders. In sharp contrast, by the end of  1989 all but six small states 
accounting for less than 4 percent of gross domestic banking assets 
allowed some interstate  activity, and  by 1993 only Hawaii  did not allow 
any interstate  MBHCs. Before these changes in regulation, there was 
no way for the industry  to consolidate significantly,  nor for the market 
for corporate  control of banks to work well. 
To summarize  these changes, we first calculate the fraction of the 
nation's gross domestic bank assets in states to which an MBHC  head- 
quartered  in each state had access, including  the assets in its home state 
14. See Bauer  and Hancock  (1995). Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  71 
Table  3. Liberalization  of Regulations  Regarding  Geographic  Diversification 
Percent 
Item  1979  1989  1994 
National  assets legally accessible  from  the typical  U.S. state  6.5  29.0  69.4 
Typical  state's  assets  controlled  by out-of-state  multibank 
holding  companies  2.1  18.9  27.9 
Source: Tables A6 and A7. 
(complete annual  data for all states are presented  in table A6).'5 The 
weighted average of the state data, shown in the first row of table 3, 
indicate  a massive expansion of interstate  privileges in the first  half of 
the 1990s. The average potential reach of an MBHC rose from 29.0 
percent  of the nation at the end of 1989 to 69.4 percent  by the end of 
1994. These estimates imply that by 1994 the typical MBHC already 
had the right to operate in states accounting for 69.4 percent of the 
nation's banking  assets. Thus the industry  had already  moved most of 
the way toward  nationwide  banking  privileges by the end of the sample 
period, even though interstate  branching was not yet permitted. 
In addition,  we measure  changes in actual interstate  banking  activity 
by examining  how many  assets were controlled  by out-of-state  banking 
organizations.  The weighted average  data  for the nation  as a whole are 
also reported  in table 3 (full year-by-year  data  for all states  are  presented 
in table A7). In 1979, only 2. 1 percent  of state assets were owned by 
out-of-state banking organizations, all through  grandfathering  agree- 
ments. By 1989 this fraction  had grown to 18.9 percent, reflecting  the 
effects of regional compacts and other reciprocity  agreements.  By the 
end of 1994, 27.9 percent  of U.S. gross domestic  assets were  controlled 
by out-of-state  bank holding companies. 
Taken together, the two measures  in table 3 indicate  that the actual 
spread  of interstate  banking  has lagged noticeably  behind  the progress 
that could have legally taken place. Most of the large banking  organi- 
zations  have chosen to consolidate  in a limited number  of states, usually 
15. To interpret  the data in table A6, consider the case of Alabama.  The entry of 
0.280 for 1994 indicates  that an MBHC headquartered  in Alabama  had the legal right 
to operate banks in states encompassing 28 percent of the nation's gross domestic 
banking  assets (including  its home state). The year in which each state first  permitted  at 
least some interstate  banking  activity is indicated  by a switch to bold characters  in the 
table. As shown, interstate  banking  first  became  possible for Alabama  organizations  in 
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on a local or regional basis. For instance, as of 1994 Norwest Corpo- 
ration held commercial banking assets in fourteen states, the most of 
any MBHC. Six other MBHCs-NationsBank Corporation,  Banc One 
Corporation,  First  Interstate  Bancorp,  BankAmerica  Corporation,  Key- 
corp, and First Union Corporation-also  had commercial  banks in at 
least ten states (these data do not include the savings and loan institu- 
tions owned by some MBHCs). 
The apparent  desire to consolidate on a less-than-nationwide  basis 
in the short  run is important  for understanding  the future  impact  of the 
Riegle-Neal legislation. One possible explanation  is that in the short 
run  it is easier to consummate  mergers  of rivals  who are  nearby.  6 Under 
this scenario, predictions for further  consolidation under nationwide 
banking  based on this historical  experience would substantially  under- 
state the long-run consolidation of the industry. An alternative  inter- 
pretation  is that banking organizations  have already  responded  to the 
options that have become available. Whether  the motivation  is to take 
advantage  of opportunities  to consolidate back-office  or branching  op- 
erations or to gain local market  power in pricing, this interpretation 
would suggest that banks have responded  quickly to the available op- 
portunities  and have decided that  expanding  on a nationwide,  or nearly 
nationwide,  basis is not the most profitable  course  of action. Under  this 
scenario, further  consolidation is likely to be limited in the future  and 
it is unlikely that the industry  will ever converge to a mere handful  of 
banks. 
We return  to the discussion of the alternative  ways to interpret  the 
data in table 3 when we analyze the future. For the purposes  of sum- 
marizing  the past, the table shows that  easing of geographic  restrictions 
on banking  activities has played a substantial  role in the transformation 
of the industry, even though banking  organizations  have not fully ex- 
ploited the interstate  opportunities  that are already  available. 
16. The reasons  given for mergers  among  large  banking  organizations  often include 
improvements  in cost efficiency and greater  geographical  diversification  of risks. The 
evidence to date, which is taken from the megamergers  of the 1980s, suggests that, on 
average, these mergers  did not improve  cost efficiency but may have improved  profits 
through improved  diversification  (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992b; and Akhavein, 
Berger,  and Humphrey,  1996). The evidence from  the megamergers  of the 1990s is still 
being assembled  and could yield different  results because of changes in the economic 
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Behind the Transformation: The Role of External Competition 
Together,  the changes in regulation,  technology, and  applied  finance 
have altered the competitive position of U.S.  banks relative to their 
rivals, often by increasing  the amount  of external  competition  that  banks 
must face in the market.  This subsection  examines the effects of exter- 
nal competition  in transforming  the U.S. banking  industry,  while rec- 
ognizing that the degree of external competition is itself largely an 
endogenous  outcome of the primary  forces driving the industry. 
The literature  on this subject  has typically been couched in terms  of 
whether  or not the U.S.  banking industry  is in decline.'7 Most of the 
arguments  center on a loss of share in the lending market  to direct 
financing, to less-regulated  domestic financial  institutions, and to for- 
eign institutions. As shown below, the data are consistent with the 
notion that these other institutions  have gained market  shares relative 
to U.S.  banks, but this finding does not necessarily imply that the 
banking  industry  is in decline.'8 
We begin by noting that several simple indicators  suggest that the 
banking industry is growing. Table 4 shows that between 1979 and 
1994 the gross total assets of the industry  grew from $3.26 trillion to 
$4.02 trillion, a cumulative increase of 23.4 percent in real terms, or 
an annual  growth rate of  1.40 percent (compounded  on a continuous 
time basis). Similarly, the data  show that  in real  terms  domestic  banking 
assets grew by 29.3 percent, or 1.71 percent  per year (table Al),  and 
17. See, for example, Gorton  and  Rosen (1995), Boyd and  Gertler  (1994), American 
Bankers  Association  (1994), Ettin  (1994), and Edwards  and Mishkin  (1995). 
18. Perhaps  suprprisingly,  the literature  generally  does not look at measures  such as 
Tobin's q or the market-to-book  ratio (Davies, 1993b, is an exception). These ratios 
suggest  whether  market  participants  believe that  resources  should  flow into or out of the 
industry.  It is not possible to measure  these ratios on an industrywide  basis because 
most banking  organizations  are not publicly traded.  There are also measurement  prob- 
lems in obtaining  market  prices for deposits and other debt, even for publicly traded 
firms. Nevertheless, most of the largest bank holding companies  are publicly traded. 
The last row in the top panel of table A 1 shows the average  market-to-book  ratio  for the 
fifty largest  bank  holding  companies  which, in total, control  well over half of the assets 
in the banking system. Over the period 1979-84 the average ratio was consistently 
below 1.0, suggesting that market  participants  did not believe that further  investments 
in bank  holding  company  equity were warranted.  However, for nine out of the ten years 
between  1985 and 1994  the market-to-book  ratio  was above 1.0. Moreover,  the estimates 
are larger  than  the market-to-book  statistics  that  are available  for nonfarm,  nonfinancial 
corporations  from the Flow of Funds  reports.  This evidence is consistent  with the other 
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Table  4. U.S. Commercial  Banks and External Competition 
Units  as indicated 
Item  1979  1994 
U.S. banking  industry  real  gross  total  assetsa  3.26  4.02 
Total  credit  market  debt  of individuals,  businesses,  8.27  17.14 
and  governmentsa 
U.S. banks'  shareb  25.8  17.0 
Total  non-credit  market  debt  of financial  9.06  18.57 
intermediariesa 
U.S. banks'  shareb  22.6  14.4 
Total  nonfarm,  nonfinancial  corporate  debta  1.58  2.75 
U.S. banks'  shareb  19.6  14.5 
Foreign  banks'  shareb  5.6  13.4 
Source: Tables AI  and A8. 
a. Trillions of dollars. 
b. Percent. 
domestic loans and leases grew 36.8 percent, or 2.09 percent  per year 
(table A2),  over the fifteen-year sample period. To put these figures 
into context, real GDP grew by 40.7  percent (from $4.79 trillion to 
$6.74 trillion), or 2.28 percent  per year, over the same period. Thus, 
the banking industry  appears  to be growing at a slower rate than real 
GDP. John Boyd and Mark Gertler show that if off-balance  sheet 
activities and loans by foreign banks to U.S.  firms are included, the 
(combined  domestic and foreign) banking  industry  has actually  grown 
about  as fast as, or faster  than, GDP.  19  Thus  the raw data  on the growth 
of U.S. banks suggest that the industry  has been growing in real terms 
over the long term, but at a moderate  pace. 
An alternative  benchmark  is how the banking industry stacks up 
against  its market  competitors.  We focus on debt  markets  because  banks 
specialize in debt  finance  and  generally  do not make  equity  investments. 
We also exclude off-balance sheet activities from these comparisons 
because  off-balance sheet data  for nonbank  financial  intermediaries  are 
not publicly available, and because the reported  notional  values of off- 
balance sheet activities are often difficult to compare to on-balance 
sheet values.20 
19. See Boyd and Gertler  (1994). 
20.  Given that banks issue large amounts  of most counterparty  guarantees  and de- 
rivative  instruments,  and  given that  these products  have grown  tremendously  since 1979, 
this exclusion implies that we likely understate  the growth of the banking industry 
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To look at competition on the asset side of the banking business, 
table A8 reports  the full pattern  of year-by-year  variation  in total U.S. 
credit market  debt of individuals, businesses, and governments. The 
summary  information  in table 4 shows that this debt grew by 107.2 
percent  from 1979 to 1994, or 4.86 percent  per year in real terms, more 
than  twice the growth  rate  of GDP and the measures  of bank  assets and 
loans. This high growth  rate  undoubtedly  was partially  due to technical 
progress in the fields of applied finance, telecommunications,  and in- 
formation  processing. Such progress has allowed far greater  amounts 
of intermediated  and  nonintermediated  debt  to circulate  because  lenders 
can more easily evaluate and control potential  risks.2' 
Table 4 also shows that the share  of total credit market  debt held by 
U.S. commercial  banks fell from 25.8 percent  to 17.0 percent, a loss 
of about one-third of their share over fifteen years.22  The combined 
effect of the sharp  decline in market  share and the massive expansion 
in the size of the market  was to increase the overall value of domestic 
credit market  instruments  held by banks by 36.5 percent  over the pe- 
riod, about the same as the growth in domestic loans and leases dis- 
cussed above. 
Total non-credit market  debt, which includes most bank liabilities, 
gives a similar  picture, as can also be seen from  table 4. The total non- 
credit market  debt of intermediaries  grew by 105.0 percent over the 
fifteen-year  interval, while the share  held as deposits at U.S. commer- 
cial banks  dropped  by about  a third  (from 22.6 percent  to 14.4 percent) 
from 1979 to 1994, similar to the decline in credit market  debt.23  In 
terms of volume, the doubling of non-credit market  debt outweighed 
the banks' one-third loss  of  share, so that bank non-credit market 
liabilities grew by 30.6 percent  in real terms  over the fifteen-year  sam- 
ple period. 
Finally, table 4 shows data on lending to U.S. businesses, which is 
21.  There was also a tremendous  real increase  in the debt issued by the U.S. gov- 
ernment, government-sponsored  enterprises, and federal mortgage pools during this 
period,  but  even after  removing  these items  the remaining  debt  still grew by 4.42 percent 
per year in real terms. 
22.  It is interesting  to note that  table A8 shows an 8.8 percentage  point  loss of credit 
market  share  by commercial  banks, almost  as great  as the 10.0 percentage  point loss by 
the essentially collapsed thrift  industry. 
23.  Table A8 shows that the largest proportional  gains in share were by mutual 
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the bailiwick of the banking  industry  and  the financial  product  that  may 
be most important  to the health of the macroeconomy.  Real lending to 
nonfarm,  nonfinancial  corporate  business grew by 74.1 percent, from 
$1.58 trillion to $2.75 trillion, over the period, somewhat  less than  the 
other debt aggregates but still much more than the 40.7 percent real 
growth  in GDP. The share  of this debt that was issued as loans by U.S. 
banks fell by about one-quarter,  from 19.6 percent to 14.5 percent.24 
The annual data, broken out in lower panel of table A8, reveal that 
most of the decline in share (3.9  percentage points of the total 5.1 
percentage  point fall) occurred  in a period  of only three  years, between 
the end of 1989 and the end of 1992. This amounts  to a 21.5 percent 
real decline in the dollar volume of corporate  lending  by U.S. banks  in 
just three years. Moreover, banks had recovered  very little of this lost 
share  by 1994. The absence of a rebound  in lending after 1992 (which 
is explicitly documented  in subsequent  tables) suggests that  the lending 
slowdown of the early 1990s may be more long term than was at first 
believed. 
More than offsetting the decline in loans by U.S.  banks was an 
increase  in lending to U.S. corporations  by foreign banks, which grew 
by 7.8  percentage points, from 5.6  percent to  13.4 percent of U.S. 
corporate  debt from 1979 to 1994. The detailed data in table A8 show 
that  almost all of this growth  came from offshore, rather  than  onshore, 
lendiing.25  Perhaps more surprising  is the fact that as a result of the 
24.  The lower portion  of table A8 shows that  the biggest shifts in corporate  lending 
were in commercial  paper, which approximately  tripled  in dollar  volume from 1979 to 
1994;  corporate  bonds, whose share  of financing  slid from  41.2 percent  in 1979 to 36.4 
percent in  1984 and then more than recovered to reach 45.6  percent by  1994; and 
mortgage  indebtedness  for corporations,  whose share  declined  from 15.4 percent  in 1979 
to 5.7 percent  in 1994. The evidence on bonds  and  commercial  paper  is consistent  with 
the findings  discussed below regarding  financing  patterns  for large  bank  customers  (see 
Calomiris,  Himmelberg,  and Wachtel, 1995, for more  details on the commercial  paper 
market).  The change in mortgage  indebtedness  likely reflects changes in tax law that 
made it more lucrative to undertake  commercial property  development  as a limited 
partnership  than  as a corporation. 
25.  Onshore lending by foreign banks consists of  loans issued by agencies and 
branches  of foreign banks  operating  on U.S. soil. We exclude from foreign lending  the 
loans of separately  capitalized  subsidiaries  of foreign  banks  that  have U.S. charters  (for 
example, the Bank  of California).  Instead,  we treat  these as U.S. banks  that are owned 
by foreigners, since they are subject to essentially the same regulatory  and economic 
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more-than-doubling  of their share of lending to U.S.  corporate  busi- 
ness, foreign banks are now almost on par with U.S.  banks, with an 
estimated  48.0 percent share of total bank nonfarm,  nonfinancial  cor- 
porate  loans.26  There are a number  of potential  reasons for the rise of 
foreign  bank  lending  to U.S. corporations,  including  technical  advances 
in credit scoring and securitization  that have allowed foreign banks to 
purchase, participate  in, or originate loans that would have been too 
difficult or expensive to research  and monitor  in the past.27 
However, there  are several reasons  to believe that  the substitution  of 
foreign for domestic bank loans is not neutral  with respect to the dif- 
ferent size categories of borrower,  and that the 48.0 percent share of 
bank corporate  lending may overstate the importance  of foreign lend- 
ing. First, Allen Berger  and Gregory  Udell show that  foreign  banks  are 
much  more likely than  domestic banks  to buy loans originated  by large 
banks (which tend to be large loans). Second, Charles  Calomiris and 
Mark  Carey find that the average customer  of a foreign bank is more 
highly rated  and receives lower loan spreads  than  the average  customer 
of a domestic bank. Third, James Ang finds that small businesses are 
more likely to borrow  from local lenders  with whom their  owners have 
personal  relationships-lenders that  are much  more  likely to be domes- 
tic rather  than foreign institutions.28  Finally, much offshore lending is 
ment in other  studies, such as Boyd and Gertler  (1993, 1994) and Nolle (1994, 1995). 
Offshore lending by foreign banks to U.S. corporations  includes direct loans from 
foreign banks in their home countries  and loans arranged  by agencies and branches  of 
foreign banks located in the U.S.,  but booked at their own offshore offices (usually 
located in the Caribbean).  Thus some of the growth in offshore lending may be due to 
the activities of onshore  foreign agencies and branches  that are booked  offshore  to take 
advantage  of tax or regulatory  differences. Following McCauley  and Seth (1992), Seth 
(1992), Boyd and Gertler  (1993,  1994), Nolle (1994), and DeYoung and Nolle (1995) 
among  others, our figures  for offshore lending  for the period  reflect  the replacement  of 
the Flow of Funds  data on offshore lending by what is considered  to be more accurate 
data  from the Bank for International  Settlements'  (BIS) international  banking  statistics 
(beginning  in 1983, when the BIS data  were first  available). 
26.  Although  some studies use slightly different  assumptions  and arrive  at different 
figures, most obtain  a similar  share, in the range  of 40 to 50 percent. 
27.  Many foreign banks initially entered  the U.S. market  to service home country 
clients that were starting  U.S.  operations  (see Budzieka, 1991; Grosse and Goldberg, 
1991; Seth and Quijano, 1993; and Terrell, 1993). In addition,  growing  differences  in 
regulation  between the United States and Japan  in the early part  of the sample period 
may have spurred  some Japanese  banks  and other  firms  to begin moving  business  to the 
United  States (see Hoshi, Kashyap,  and Scharfstein, 1993). 
28.  See Berger  and Udell (1993), Calomiris  and Carey  (1994), and Ang (1992). 78  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
to multinational  home country  clients with U. S  . operations,  which per- 
haps  often replaces  a foreign bank  loan booked  to the client in the home 
country,  rather  than  replacing  a U.S. bank  loan. This evidence suggests 
that foreign banks tend to deal with large borrowers  who often have 
other  low-cost sources of external  finance, and that  these banks  are not 
likely to pick up many small borrowers  who are more dependent  on 
bank  credit. Accordingly, foreign banks are probably  not as important 
a source of financing for U.S.  business as their market share might 
indicate. 
Taken together, the results in table 4 provide a somewhat mixed 
picture  of the evolving market  position of the banking  industry.  Over 
the last fifteen  years U.S. banks  have lost considerable  share  in the debt 
markets  on both their asset and liability sides, but banking has still 
grown moderately  in real terms because of the substantial  overall real 
growth of financial markets. Put differently, despite the loss of share 
to foreign banks and nonbank  competitors, banks have found enough 
new customers, or have sufficiently  extended  their  ties to existing cus- 
tomers, to grow at a moderate  pace over the long term. As we discuss 
further  below, however, some of the loss of lending in the first  half of 
the 1990s may be of concern. 
For the purposes  of looking to the future, it is not possible to keep 
track  of all these subtle interactions.  However, the findings in table 4 
do suggest that industry growth can perhaps be used as a summary 
indicator  that, at least indirectly, picks up some of the effects of the 
continued  changes in external  competition.  Thus  in analyzing  the future 
below, we allow for different  scenarios  regarding  the overall growth  of 
the banking  market. 
Behind the Transformation:  The Role of Deposit  Rate Regulation 
As discussed above, another  way in which market  innovations  have 
affected external competition is through  the role they have played in 
the dismantling  of regulatory  restrictions  on deposit interest  rates and 
account  types. As a consequence of the invention  of safe, deposit-like 
instruments  that paid market  interest rates, the banking industry  lost 
much of its monopsony power over depositors in the early 1980s. To 
provide a rough indication  of the cost to banks of having to pay more 
market-oriented  rates  on deposits, table 5 presents  data  on various  mea- Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  79 
Table  5. Expenses  of the U.S. Commercial  Banking Industry 
Percent,  except where  indicated 
Item  1979  1986  1994 
Interest  expenses/assets  5.17  5.13  2.73 
One-year  Treasury  bill rate  10.65  6.45  5.32 
(Interest  expenses/assets)  less one-year  Treasury  rate  -5.48  -  1.32  -2.59 
Noninterest  expenses/assets  2.39  3.03  3.55 
[(Interest  and  noninterest  expenses)/assets]  less one-year 
Treasury  rate  -3.09  1.71  0.96 
Number  of banking  offices  50,136  58,063  65,610 
Number  of automated  teller  machines  13,800  64,000  109,080 
Source: Tables AI and A4. One-year Treasury rate is obtained directly from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
sures  of bank  costs and  levels of open-market  interest  rates. As of 1979, 
total bank interest  expenses were 5.17 percent  of gross total assets, or 
5.48 percentage points below the average one-year Treasury  rate for 
that year of 10.65 percent. By 1986, when deposit interest  rates were 
totally deregulated,  the interest  expense ratio was only 1.32 percentage 
points below the Treasury  rate of 6.45 percent-an  increase  in interest 
costs of 4.16 percentage  points of assets-reflecting  a very significant 
loss of market  power on the deposit side. 
These extra  interest  costs would  not have been so expensive for banks 
if they had been able to offset them by reducing  noninterest  expenses. 
Such a reduction  could have been achieved by pruning  extra branches 
and other services that provided customer convenience in the more 
highly regulated  era before the 1980s, when banks  could not compete 
for customers  with market  interest  rates. However, the data  suggest that 
this was not done. As table 5 illustrates,  the number  of banking  offices 
increased  by 15.8 percent, from 50,136 to 58,063, between 1979 and 
1986, despite the fact that the number  of ATMs more than  quadrupled 
over this same interval, from 13,800 to 64,000. In addition,  total non- 
interest  expenses rose from 2.39 percent  to 3.03 percent  of assets over 
this period.29  As a result, the total real interest plus noninterest  cost 
29.  When making cost comparisons  over time, it is important  to account for all 
noninterest  expenses, including  the residual  category of "other noninterest  expense." 
As shown in table A2, other noninterest  expense rose from 10.0 percent  of operating 
expenses in 1979, to 14.1 percent  in 1986, to 25.4 percent  in 1994, and now exceeds 
total salary  and benefits  costs. The biggest item in other  noninterest  expense appears  to 
be data  processing  costs paid  to holding  company  subsidiaries.  The tremendous  increase 
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rose from 3.09 percentage  points below the one-year Treasury  rate in 
1979 to 1.71 percentage  points above the Treasury  rate in 1986, and 
has remained  above it ever since.30 
These data suggest that market  innovations  and the external  compe- 
tition to the banking  industry,  particularly  on the liability side, encour- 
aged banks to provide not only additional  interest  payments, but also 
increased  customer  convenience during  the early 1980s.3'  This, in turn, 
bureaus  in order  either  to gain efficiencies or to help to market  these services to others. 
One implication  for banking  research  is that measures  of input usage that exclude 
these costs can be misleading. For example, labor productivity  as measured  by gross 
total assets per employee rose from $2.32 million in 1979, to $2.48 million in 1986, to 
$2.74 million in 1994 (calculated  from table Al),  suggesting  an improvement  in costs. 
However, as shown in table 5, total noninterest  expenses per dollar of assets actually 
increased  over time, reflecting  labor  and capital  costs incurred  outside  the banks. 
30.  We recognize  the limitations  of this simple  analysis, including  the fact that  about 
half of the noninterest  expenses are not properly  attributable  to funding. Nevertheless, 
these results are generally consistent with the findings of more rigorous studies of 
productivity  growth  and technical  change in banking  that use a multiproduct  cost func- 
tion approach  to map out the movement  of the efficient frontier  over time. Berger  and 
Humphrey  (1992a) and Bauer, Berger,  and  Humphrey  (1993) find  that  the cost increases 
associated  with the increase  in external  competition  and  the deregulation  of deposit  rates 
in the early 1980s were larger  in magnitude  than  the cost decreases  from improved  cost 
efficiency over the same time period. However, the losses for banks were more than 
made  up for by the gains for consumers  in terms  of higher  deposit interest  rates  and the 
greater  convenience  from ATMs. 
31.  In terms of the direct compositional  effects on bank balance sheets, table A2 
shows that until the passage of the Garn-St Germain  Act in late 1982, banks were 
rapidly  losing demand  and transaction  accounts-as  a share of assets, these accounts 
fell from 25.3 percent  to 16.8 percent  between the end of  1979 and the end of 1982. 
After the passage of the Garn-St Germain  Act banks  were able to compete  more  effec- 
tively by using deposit accounts  that  paid  market  rates  of interest,  such as money  market 
deposit accounts  (MMDAs). Overall, between 1983 and 1992 domestic  deposits  were a 
stable source of funding, rising from 65.0 percent  to 67.7 percent  of gross total assets, 
before  falling to 60.0 percent  in 1994. 
Table A3 shows that most of the drop in domestic deposits after 1992 comes from 
decreases  in the deposit  ratios  of the megabanks.  This shift is partly  due to an accounting 
change  that  forces banks  to account  separately  for profitable  and  unprofitable  derivative 
positions, and  has thereby  increased  the "other  liabilities" category,  especially  for large 
banking  organizations  with substantial  derivative  positions. Financial  Accounting  Stan- 
dards  Board interpretation  39 (FIN 39) was adopted  by all banks as of the 1994 Call 
Report,  but some banks  adopted  it earlier. Under  FIN 39, banks  are no longer allowed 
to net out their derivative  positions across all counterparties  jointly and report  a single 
net derivative  position as an asset if positive, or a liability if negative. Instead,  netting 
is now limited  to positions  with the same counterparty  when certain  legal conditions  are 
also met. After this limited netting, derivative  contracts  or net positions with positive 
market  values are recorded  as assets, and those with negative values are recorded  as Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  81 
Table  6. Profitability  of U.S. Banking Organizations 
Percent 
Return  on equity  1979  1986  1994 
All banks  14.0  10.0  15.0 
Megabanks  14.3  6.9  14.2 
Small  banks  14.0  4.8  11.0 
Source: Tables A2, A3,  and A5. 
suggests a substantial  rise in costs in the banking  industry  and a corre- 
sponding fall in the franchise value of banks. Again, note that these 
losses were mainly  due to the exogenous innovations  and  external  com- 
petition that led to the deregulation  of deposits, rather  than the dereg- 
ulation itself. 
These higher  costs of funds appear  to have affected  bank  profitability 
substantially.  Although  the industry  absorbed  many  shocks  that  affected 
their  profits  during  the period-including  unexpected  swings in interest 
rates, difficulties with loans to less developed countries, problems in 
the agricultural  and natural  resource  sectors, and  regional  recessions- 
the rise in funding costs likely contributed  significantly  to the decline 
in return  on equity, which decreased  from 14.0 percent  in 1979 to 10.0 
percent  in 1986, as shown in table 6. The reduction  in profitability  was 
most significant  for small banking  organizations  that  are typically most 
dependent  on deposits for funding. Table 6 also shows that the return 
on equity for organizations  with less than $100 million in assets fell 
from 14.0 percent in 1979 to 4.8 percent in 1986, when interest rate 
ceilings were completely  phased  out. The largest  organizations  suffered 
a slightly smaller  drop  in profitability,  in part  because  they were already 
paying market  rates for significant  portions  of their funds. 
This decline in industry  profitability,  along with severe problems  of 
loan performance  experienced by many banks, also may have helped 
to create  a dramatic  increase  in the number  of bank  failures. Information 
on the failures is presented  in figure 1. The lighter  bars  show that  at the 
beginning of the sample period there were typically fewer than ten 
failures per year, but that by the end of the 1980s, more than two 
liabilities. In 1994, this convention  resulted  in the artificial  inflation  of bank  assets by 
approximately  $90 billion. The effects of this change are captured  in tables A2-A5 
under  "Assets in Trading  Accounts" (for positive market  positions)  and "Other  Liabil- 
ities" (for negative market  positions). See English  and Reid (1995). 82  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 1. U.S. Commercial  Bank Failures, 1979-94 
Number  of failures  Billions  of 1994  dollars 
200 





1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994 
Source: Authors' calculations based on unpublished data from the FDIC and from the Consolidated Report of Condition 
and Incomie  for Banks. 
a. Estimated cost to the bank insurance fund at time of failure. Cost data are unavailable for the period before 1981. 
hundred  banks were failing annually-a  twentyfold increase. The full 
data on failures, contained in table A9, also indicate that there was a 
significant  increase in the size of the institutions  that were closed by 
regulators.  Before 1988, only five banks  with assets over $1 billion had 
been closed, but in the next five years, twenty-seven  banks  of at least 
this size failed. The darker  bars in figure 1 show the estimated  cost to 
the bank  insurance  funds of the failures at the time when they occurred 
(actual  costs may differ). Overall, the estimated  cost of the 1,455 fail- 
ures from 1981 through 1994, was $51.7 billion in real 1994 dollars. 
The exact relationship  between the increase in costs from external 
competition and deposit rate deregulation, on the one hand, and the 
greater  incidence and public costs of bank failures, on the other  hand, 
is unknown, but several theories exist. The reduction  in profitability 
from paying higher deposit rates may have directly contributed  to the 
weakness of some banks by consuming  their capital. This reduction  in 
capital may have created further  problems if it led troubled  banks to 
gamble by increasing their portfolio risks. Most banks that failed in the 
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of problem  loans before  the failure. Unfortunately  there  is no consensus 
as to whether  this empirical relationship  primarily  indicates that high 
costs led to problem  loans through  the moral  hazard  channel, that  prob- 
lem loans created  high costs because of the difficulties  of dealing with 
these loans, or that bad managers handled both operating costs and 
portfolio risks poorly.32  While a full analysis of the failures is beyond 
the scope of this paper, the dramatic  increase in bank  failures is likely 
to be remembered  as the defining characteristic  of the subperiod  from 
the mid-1980s to the very early l990s.33 
Overall, it seems clear that the deregulation  of deposit rates was 
involved with many of the important  changes in the banking  industry 
during the 1980s and very early 1990s. However, it appears  that the 
impact of this change in regulation  has now been largely played out, 
and therefore  we need not model it in our prediction  of the future. 
Behind the Transformation: The Role of Changes  in 
Capital Regulation 
Before 1981 capital regulation was relatively discretionary  and ad 
hoc. Standard  supervisory  practice generally required  less capital for 
large  banks  because of their presumed  superior  diversification  of risks. 
Table 7 shows that, in part  because of this practice, the ratio  of equity 
to gross assets for megabanks  was 3.9 percent in 1979, while it was 
8.5 percent  for small banking  organizations.  The formal  flat-rate  capital 
standards  implemented  in the early 1980s (described  in table  B 1) forced 
large  banks, in particular,  to hold more  capital, thus pushing  the equity 
ratio for megabanks  up to 5.2 percent  by 1989. 
The flat-rate  standards  did not require  any  capital  against  off-balance 
sheet activities, and  therefore  likely encouraged  the substitution  of off- 
balance  sheet  counterparty  guarantees-such as standby  letters  of credit 
and  loan commitments  that  back  up commercial  paper-for  on-balance 
sheet loans. As shown in table A3, the largest banking  organizations, 
which  were best positioned  to take  advantage  of these types  of products, 
quickly increased  their  off-balance sheet activities relative  to their  on- 
32.  See Berger and Humphrey  (1992a), Coyne, McManus,  and Stagliano (1993), 
Barr  and Siems (1994), Berger  and DeYoung (1995), and  Wheelock  and  Wilson (1995) 
for evidence on these points. 
33.  See Barth,  Brumbaugh,  and Litan  (1990), Kane  (1993), and Mishkin  (1995) for 
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Table  7. Bank Capital and Portfolio  Ratios 
Percent 
Item  1979  1989  1994 
Equity/assets 
All banking  organizations  5.7  6.1  7.7 
Megabanks  3.9  5.2  7.0 
Small  banks  8.5  9.1  9.9 
Total  loans/assets 
All banking  organizations  55.5  61.3  58.0 
Megabanks  57.7  69.8  56.6 
Cash  and  securities/assets 
All banking  organizations  38.3  31.5  31.4 
Megabanks  32.2  19.4  22.1 
Commercial  real  estate  loans/assets 
All banking  organizations  6.3  11.6  9.8 
Megabanks  2.9  8.5  4.4 
Loan  loss provisions/assets 
All banking  organizations  0.2  1.0  0.3 
Source: Tables A2,  A3, and A5. 
balance sheet financing, and thus reduced their required  capital. The 
empirical  literature  generally suggests that  the flat-rate  capital  require- 
ments of the 1980s played some role in the expansion of off-balance 
sheet activities, but that economic factors, including  the technical and 
financial innovations discussed above,  were likely even more im- 
portant.34 
One potentially  important  effect of any capital  standard  is that  it can 
give some banks  incentives to either  raise or lower their  portfolio  risks. 
However, it is quite difficult to precisely document any purposeful 
changes in portfolio  risk that may have occurred  and link them directly 
to the changes in capital standards.  It appears  that in the 1980s the 
largest banking organizations  increased their credit risk exposure by 
substituting  from  cash and  securities  holdings  into loans. Between 1979 
and 1989, organizations  with more than $100 billion in total banking 
assets increased  the fraction  of their assets invested in loans and leases 
from 57.7 percent to 69.8 percent and decreased  their cash and secu- 
rities holdings by about the same amount, from 32.2 percent to 19.4 
percent (see table 7). Almost half of the new loan growth came from 
34.  See Benveniste and Berger (1987), Pavel and Phillis (1987), Baer and Pavel 
(1988), Koppenhaver  (1989),  Berger and Udell (1993), and Jagtiani, Saunders, and 
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increases  in commercial  real estate lending, one of the riskiest  and  least 
diversifiable  investments  that  banks  make. In fact, for the entire  indus- 
try, between 1979 and 1989 the share of assets going into commer- 
cial real estate nearly doubled from 6.3 percent to 11.6 percent (see 
table 7). 
Table 7 also shows that the industry's  provisions for loan and lease 
losses rose from 0.2 percent  of assets in the 1979 to 1.0 percent  by the 
end of the decade. Certainly,  some of these losses were caused by bad 
luck (for example, the unexpectedly  restrictive  U.S.  monetary  policy 
of the early 1980s, or the steep drop in commercial  real estate prices in 
the late 1980s) rather  than intentional  increases in risk-taking.  Never- 
theless, given first, the increase in loan loss provisions; second, the 
twentyfold increase in bank failures; third, the rise in the proportions 
of assets invested in loans, particularly  risky commercial real estate 
loans; and fourth, the explosion in off-balance sheet risks, it seems 
likely that a substantial  portion of the banking industry  intentionally 
raised its portfolio risks during the 1980s. The extent to which these 
shifts may have been a reaction  to the formalization  and tightening  of 
capital  requirements  over the period 1981-85, or alternatively,  whether 
the capital standards  may have mitigated some of the risk-taking, is 
difficult to determine.35 
One regulatory  response to the problems  of the late 1980s and the 
deficiencies  of the flat-rate  capital  standards  was the Basle Accord  risk- 
based capital standards  that were adopted  by bank  regulatory  agencies 
from  twelve major  industrialized  nations  in July 1988, and  in the United 
States were phased  in from 1990 to 1992. The Basle standards  penalize 
portfolio  risk by requiring  more capital against assets and off-balance 
sheet activities in categories with higher perceived  credit risks. As the 
risk-based  capital standards  were being implemented,  industry  equity 
35.  See Koehn and Santomero  (1980), Keeton (1988), Kim and Santomero  (1988), 
Furlong  and Keeley (1989), Keeley and Furlong (1990), Gennotte  and Pyle (1991), 
Avery and Berger  (1991), and Berger,  Herring,  and Szego (1995) for discussions  of the 
theoretical  conditions under which capital standards  give banks incentives to raise or 
lower  their  portfolio  risks. The empirical  literature  generally  finds  that  banks  with higher 
capital in the 1980s had lower portfolio risks, lower failure  rates, and higher  earnings 
(see, for example, Lane, Looney, and  Wansley, 1986;  Avery and  Berger, 1991;  Berger, 
1995; and Cole and Gunther, 1995). Nevertheless, the policy issue remains  somewhat 
clouded  because  most  of the observed  variation  in capital  ratios  is likely due to voluntary 
differences  in capital  ratios, rather  than  changes in regulatory  capital  requirements. 86  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
rose from 6. 1 percent of gross total assets at the end of  1989 to 7.4 
percent  at the end of 1992 (see table A2). The megabanks  were again 
affected the most by the regulatory  change, and their equity ratio rose 
from 5.2 percent to 7.0 percent, over this period (see table A3). This 
differential  effect on the megabanks  is not surprising,  given that until 
the implementation  of risk-based  capital standards,  the largest  banking 
organizations  had higher proportions  of off-balance sheet activities, 
and higher proportions  of  their on-balance sheet assets in the risk 
categories that required  the most capital than smaller banking  organi- 
zations.36  The industry's  overall equity ratios continued  to rise gently 
after  the risk-based  capital standards  had  been fully implemented  at the 
end of 1992, likely in part  due to the unprecedented  profitability  of the 
industry  over the period 1992-94. 
Lending Patterns in the First Half of the 1990s 
Collectively, the information  in the first seven tables and figure 1 
summarizes  most of the key changes in the banking  industry  over the 
last fifteen years. However, because the business lending patterns  of 
the industry  affect the economy as a whole, they deserve special atten- 
tion. In our analysis of the future  below, we explore the possibility that 
lending to business, particularly  small businesses, will be affected by 
the transition  to nationwide  banking.  As a starting  point, we review the 
developments  in bank lending over the first half of the 1990s. 
Aggregate  Commercial  and Industrial Lending Patterns 
The first  half of the 1990s seems to fall into two distinct  periods:  one 
from the end of 1989 through  the end of 1992, and the other from the 
end of  1992 through the end of  1994. During 1989-92  there was a 
reduction  in aggregate  bank  lending. Table 8 shows that  for the banking 
industry  as a whole, the proportion  of gross assets invested in domestic 
loans fell from 55.5 percent  to 51.7 percent  over these three  years. The 
table also shows that 57.1 percent  of the decline occurred  in domestic 
commercial and industrial  (C&I) loans, which dropped  from $596.7 
billion to $458.2 billion in real dollars, or from 15.4 percent  to 12.5 
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Table  8. Recent Domestic Commercial  and Industrial  Lending Patterns 
Units  as indicated 
Item  1989  1992  1994 
Total  domestic  loans/assetsa  55.5  51.7  52.3 
Total  commercial  and industrial  loans/assetsW  15.4  12.5  11.9 
U.S. commercial  banks'  share  of total  nonfinancial 
corporate  debta  18.1  14.2  14.5 
Total  commercial  and  industrial  loansb  596.7  458.2  480.6 
Megabanksh  40.1  74.0  92.2 
Small  banks"  30.0  23.5  21.9 
Total  commercial  and industrial  loans  under  $1 millionh  143.7  88.4  93.7 
Megabanksh  0.6  2.6  2.3 
Small  banksb  29.2  18.8  17.9 
Total  commercial  and  industrial  loans  betweeen  $1 million 
and  $25 million'  283.3  243.8  277.1 
Total  commercial  and industrial  loans  over $25 million"  169.7  126.0  109.7 
Megabanksh  19.2  38.6  40.8 
Small  banksb  0.0  1.2  0.1 
Source: Tables A2, A8, and A1O. 
a. Percent. 
b. Billions of  1994 dollars. 
percent of gross assets. This finding is consistent with the fall in the 
domestic banking  industry's  share  of the nonfarm,  nonfinancial  corpo- 
rate  loan market  from 18.1 percent  to 14.2 percent  over the same three- 
year period. Moreover, if lending by U.S. banks is excluded from the 
total of this debt aggregate, the remainder  is approximately  constant 
over this subperiod  (see table A8). Thus it appears  that the slowdown 
in corporate  lending was relatively concentrated  in the domestic com- 
mercial  banking  industry. 
Some slowdown in aggregate lending might have been expected as 
a result  of the macroeconomic  and  regional  recessions and  the reactions 
by nonfinancial  firms  to the leveraging problems  of the 1980s. Further 
reductions in bank lending might also have been expected from the 
implementation  of risk-based capital standards,  given that domestic 
C&I loans are in the risk category requiring  the most capital under  the 
Basle Accord (see table A12).  However, the data suggest that risk- 
based capital standards  were not principally  responsible  for the slow- 
down in these loans. 
If the imposition of risk-based  capital standards  were the dominant 
explanation  of the decline in bank lending, this decline would be ex- 
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are most often either in violation of, or close to, the capital  minimums. 
Lending  by small banking  organizations,  which are almost  always well 
in excess of the standards,  would be expected to be relatively unaf- 
fected. The data are not consistent with these predictions.  As shown in 
table 8, banking organizations with less than $100 million in assets 
reduced  their  domestic C&I  lending  by 21.7 percent,  from  $30.0 billion 
to $23.5 billion, over 1989-92; taking  account  of the declining  number 
of organizations,  the decline is 11.8 percent  per banking  organization. 
Megabanks, with assets over $100 billion,  appear actually to have 
increased  their  domestic C&I lending during  this period, but this result 
is an artifact  of the fact that the number  of megabanks  increased  over 
this time interval. Focusing only on the set of banking  organizations 
that  had over $100 billion in assets in every year of the 1990s, the data 
show that  these "constant  megabanks"  cut back their  lending  by much 
less than  the smaller  banking  organizations.  They reduced  their  lending 
from $40.1 billion in 1989 to $37.4 billion in 1992, a drop  of just 6.7 
percent.  As a rough  comparison  of bank  behavior  in the two categories, 
this is about one-half of the decline in loans per banking  organization 
for the small banking  organizations.37 
Moreover, there has not been a substantial  rebound in bank C&I 
lending for the industry  as a whole after 1992. Over the period 1992- 
94, total domestic C&I lending recovered  only $22.4 billion, or 16.2 
percent, of its $138.5 billion fall between 1989 and 1992, and all of 
the recovery  was concentrated  in 1994. Similarly,  the share  of nonfarm, 
nonfinancial  corporate  debt held by banks recovered only from 14.2 
percent to  14.5 percent, as shown in table 8.  As discussed further 
below, the weak rebound  in bank lending suggests that the slowdown 
may be more long-term  than at first appeared;  something  more than a 
very short-term  reaction  to a recession or change in capital  regulations 
now appears  to be at work. 
To gain further  insights, we go behind the aggregate  data and look 
37.  These data are consistent with the more detailed analysis of Berger  and Udell 
(1994), who find  that  the C&I lending  decline was not concentrated  either  in banks  with 
low risk-based  capital ratios or in large banks, as would have been expected if banks 
were reducing  their lending  to try to meet the Basle standards. 
It is interesting  to note the proportion  of their gross assets that megabanks  invested 
in loans as a whole fell from 69.8  percent to 63.7  percent over 1989-92.  But this 
essentially reflects a drop in their foreign lending from 25.6 percent  of gross assets to 
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at the distribution  of lending across borrowers  of different size cate- 
gories. If the decline in bank lending was concentrated  on large bor- 
rowers, then this shift may not have had much impact  on the economy 
as a whole since large borrowers  typically have alternative  sources of 
low-cost external  finance. However, if small borrowers  lost their  bank 
funding,  they may not have been able to raise funds  quickly  and  cheaply 
from  other  sources, at least in the short  run. The empirical  literature  on 
relationship  lending suggests that small borrowers  pay progressively 
lower loan rates  and  have easier  collateral  requirements  as their  banking 
relationship  matures.38  These relationship  borrowers  may find  it costly, 
and  possibly time-consuming,  to form  new relationships  if their  regular 
banks  deny them credit. 
It is also important  to examine the different  lending  patterns  of small 
and large banking  organizations.  As the industry  continues  to consoli- 
date in the future under nationwide banking, banking assets will, on 
average, be transferred  from smaller organizations  to larger ones. If 
organizations  of different  sizes tend to lend to different  groups  of bor- 
rowers, then changes in the patterns  of lending might be coincident  to 
the consolidation. 
Estimating  the Distribution  of Commercial and Industrial Loans 
To address  these concerns we estimate the distribution  of loans by 
U.S. banks to different  size categories of domestic C&I borrowers  for 
every year of the sample period, 1979-94. Because such data  have not 
previously  been constructed,  we briefly  explain the key elements  of our 
calculations  (more details are given in appendix  C). The estimates are 
based on the Federal Reserve's Survey of the Terms  of Bank Lending 
to Businesses (STBL), an unpublished  survey that records  the charac- 
teristics of all domestic C&I loans made by a sample of banks  on one 
or more  days of the first  week of the second month  of each quarter.  The 
STBL  queries approximately  three  hundred  banks  each quarter,  includ- 
ing the forty-eight largest U.S.  banks and a representative  stratified 
sample from smaller size classes. On average, about 25,500 loans are 
reported  per  quarter,  for a total  of 1,631  ,614 loans over the entire  period 
1979-94. Due to the inclusion of the largest  banks, organizations  with 
STBL representation  held 73 percent of the nation's gross total assets 
38.  See Petersen  and Rajan  (1994) and Berger  and Udell (1995). 90  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
in 1994. Despite this rich sample, our estimates of lending totals by 
borrower  size category are considerably less reliable than the other 
balance  sheet and income figures  shown in the tables, which are essen- 
tially population  totals aggregated  directly  from  regulatory  filings made 
by all federally insured  commercial  banks. 
To proxy for the size of the borrower  for each loan, we record  the 
maximum  of, first, the size of the loan from the bank;  second, the total 
commitment  (if any) under which the loan was drawn  from the bank; 
and third, the total size of the participation  (if any) by all banks in a 
loan participation.  This measure  is an estimate  of the total credit  avail- 
able to the borrower  from the bank, or group  of banks, involved in the 
loan. 
We convert the flow of loans from the STBL into estimates of the 
proportions  of balance sheet loans in each of seven categories of bor- 
rower credit size: under $100,000 in borrower  credit, from $100,000 
to $250,000,  from $250,000  to $1 million, from $1 million to $10 
million, from $10 million to $25 million, from $25 million to $100 
million, and over $100 million. For convenience, we sometimes refer 
to all the borrowers  with bank credit of less than $1 million-that  is, 
those in the three smallest size categories-as  "small borrowers." 
Similarly, we sometimes refer to borrowers  with credit of less than 
$250,000 as "very small borrowers," to those with credit of between 
$1 million and  $25 million as "medium-sized  borrowers,"  and  to those 
with credit of more than $25 million as "large borrowers." However, 
these broader  groupings are used only to interpret  the results; we use 
all seven size categories to perform  the calculations. 
To convert the flow of loans from the STBL into representation  in 
the stock of the portfolio, each of the loans originated is weighted 
according  to its amount  and repayment  duration  (see appendix  C). For 
example, a three-year,  $5,000 loan receives fifteen times the represen- 
tation of a one-year, $1,000 loan since on average over time the first 
loan will have fifteen times the proportion  of total loans as the second 
loan. For banking organizations that did not respond to the STBL 
(which represented  27 percent  of gross assets in 1994), this information 
is extrapolated  by means of a prediction model that is estimated by 
using data on the STBL respondents, based on the available balance 
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breakout  of domestic C&I loans across borrower  credit categories is 
shown in table A10. 
Commercial and Industrial Lending to Small, Medium, 
and Large Borrowers 
The estimates of the distribution  of loans suggest several stylized 
facts. First, table 8 shows that large banking organizations  appear  to 
make very few C&I loans to small businesses. As of  1994, banking 
organizations  with more than $100 billion in assets had an estimated 
$2.3 billion, or 2.5  percent of their $92.2  billion of domestic C&I 
loans,  devoted to small borrowers, with bank credit of less  than 
$1 million. Only $0.7 billion of the total, well under 1 percent  of their 
domestic C&I loans, is estimated to go to very small borrowers,  with 
bank credit of under $250,000  (see table AIO). In contrast, table 8 
shows that  these megabanks  are estimated  to have issued $40.8 billion, 
or 44.3  percent, of their loans to large borrowers, with bank credit 
exceeding $25 million. 
Second, the data  also suggest that  the converse is true-small  bank- 
ing organizations  primarily  lend to small borrowers.  As shown in table 
8, in 1994 organizations  with less than $100 million in assets are esti- 
mated  to make 81.7 percent  of their loans ($17.9 billion out of $21.9 
billion) to borrowers  with bank credit below $1 million; in fact, most 
of the lending is to the very small borrowers,  with less than $250,000 
in bank credit. Similarly, table 8 also shows that these organizations 
make almost no measurable  quantity  of loans to large borrowers:  only 
$0.1 billion to borrowers  with credit exceeding $25 million in 1994. 
Both of these stylized facts-that  large  banking  organizations  generally 
make very few small business loans and that small banking  organiza- 
tions tend to specialize in these loans-are  corroborated  by the new 
Call Report  data on small business lending available  for June 1994.39 
39.  See Berger  and Udell (1996, table 1). As discussed  further  in the text below and 
in appendix  C, data  are available  on the quantity  of lending  to small businesses  for June 
1994 from a new section of the Call Report, and these data have been analyzed by 
Berger  and Udell, and Peek and Rosengren  (1996). Berger  and Udell find some differ- 
ences between the new Call Report  figures and the STBL figures for the same banks, 
but they also find that these differences may be explainable. In any event, only the 
STBL data are suitable for conducting  comparisons  over time, which is the primary 
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Using the estimated distribution  of C&I lending across borrower 
credit size categories, it is possible to look behind  the aggregate  infor- 
mation on the lending slowdown of the period 1989-92.  The data 
suggest that the slowdown was most concentrated  on the smallest bor- 
rowers, consistent with many of the public complaints at that time. 
Table 8 shows that lending to firms with less than $1 million in bank 
credit  fell by an estimated  $55.3 billion, or 38.5 percent,  from 1989 to 
1992. For very small business borrowers,  with credit  below $250,000, 
the estimated  reduction  in credit  is even greater:  45.2 percent  (see table 
AIO). These figures contrast with the 23.2 percent drop in aggregate 
C&I lending during  these three years. 
Furthermore,  our  estimates  suggest  that  over the period  1992-94, C&I 
lending  to borrowers  with bank credit  of less than $1 million and those 
with credit of less than $250,000 recovered  only 9.6 percent  and 7.3 
percent,  respectively,  of their  declines  over the period 1989-92. Thus  at 
the end of  1994, real loans to these two borrower  categories  were still 
34.8 percent  and  41.9 percent  below 1989 levels, respectively. 
In contrast,  table 8 shows that  C&I  borrowers  who received  between 
$1 million and  $25 million in bank  credit  fared  very differently.  During 
the lending slowdown of 1989-92  these medium-sized  borrowers  ex- 
perienced  only a 13.9 percent  decline in lending. Moreover,  their  bank 
credit  jumped from $243.8 billion at the end of 1992 to $277.1 billion 
at the end of  1994. After this rebound, medium-sized  borrowers  re- 
ceived only an estimated  2.2 percent  fewer loans in 1994 than  in 1989- 
a far cry from the estimated 34.8 percent and 41.9 percent  drops for 
smal and very small borrowers,  respectively. 
Still a third  pattern  emerges  for the large  borrowers-firms with bank 
credit  exceeding $25 million. During 1989-92 their  real  bank  loans fell 
by an estimated $43.7 billion, or 25.8 percent;  less than for the small 
borrowers, but more than for the medium-sized borrowers. Perhaps 
surprising, loans to these borrowers continued to decline after this 
point. Table 8 shows that loans to large borrowers  dropped  again, from 
$126.0 billion to $109.7 billion, between 1992 and 1994, so that  by the 
end of 1994 their bank credit was estimated  to be 35.4 percent  below 
1989 levels. Thus our estimates suggest that although  the paths were 
quite  different, the proportional  loss over the full 1989-94 interval  was 
about  the same for both large and small borrowers. 
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consistent with Berger and Udell's "monitoring  technology hypothe- 
SiS.'40  Under  this hypothesis, improvements  in information  processing 
technology  and  applied  finance  allow direct  financing  alternatives  (such 
as commercial paper and corporate bonds) and other intermediaries 
(such as foreign banks and finance  companies)  to compete more effec- 
tively for larger  borrowers.4'  Nevertheless, as discussed  above, the fate 
of large bank  borrowers  is of less concern  than  that  of small borrowers 
because creditworthy  borrowers  with bank credit of over $25 million 
almost surely are able to avail themselves of low-cost financing  oppor- 
tunities elsewhere. The information  on debt market  shares presented 
above also suggests that many corporate  borrowers  did switch to other 
types of market  debt.42 
Alternative Hypotheses  to Explain  the Lending Slowdown 
This estimated breakdown  of the data by borrower  size categories 
may shed some additional  light on the lending slowdown of the early 
1990s. Some have argued  that a credit crunch-a  short-term  reduction 
in the supply of bank  credit-occurred over the 1989-92 interval.  The 
supply  shift may have been due to regulatory  factors  (for example, risk- 
based capital standards,  the new leverage requirement,  tougher  exam- 
ination standards)  or nonregulatory  factors (for example, banks' de- 
pleted capital positions, their choice of a lower portfolio risk). Other 
40.  Berger  and Udell (1993). 
41.  However, the finding  that banks  are reducing  their small business lending  over 
time runs  contrary  to another  prediction  of the monitoring  technology  hypothesis-that 
improvements  in technology should also open up markets  for banks  in small loans that 
previously were too expensive or information-intensive  for them to make. Other hy- 
potheses  are offered below to explain the reduction  in lending  to small businesses. 
42.  As a robustness  check on our breakout  of domestic C&I loans into different 
borrower  credit size categories, we also examine the data for the subset of banking 
organizations  with STBL respondents.  That  is, we try dispensing  with the extrapolation 
to non-STBL  banks  described  in appendix  C. The results  for this subsample  confirm  the 
patterns  found  in our main  results. Lending  to small borrowers,  with less than  $1 million 
in bank  credit, falls from  $35.8 billion in 1989  to $25.5 billion in 1992  and  then  partially 
recovers, to $32.8 billion, in 1994. For very small borrowers,  with less $250,000 in 
credit, the corresponding  figures are $17.3 billion in 1989, $9.7 billion in 1992, and 
$12.6 billion in 1994. For large  borrowers,  with over $25 million in credit, lending  falls 
from  $112.7 billion in 1989  to $96.7 billion in 1992, and  continues  to fall to reach  $90.5 
billion in 1994. Note that this STBL subsample  is skewed toward  the large banking 
organizations  and  therefore  should  be considered  more  accurate  for the loans to medium 
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analysts point to a reduction  in the demand  for bank loans during  this 
period because of macroeconomic  and regional recessions, or because 
business borrowers  may have restructured  their balance sheets away 
from  bank  debt and  other  debt and  toward  equity as a result  of problems 
associated with high leverage positions in the 1980s.43 
Under most of these explanations, the quantity  of C&I lending is 
expected to rebound  fully, or almost fully, after the complete imple- 
mentation  of a regulatory  change or the onset of an economic recovery. 
By the end of 1992 most observers believed that the credit tightening 
was essentially over, the implementation  of risk-based  capital  standards 
was complete, the economy was recovering, and  bank  profits  were near 
record levels.  The lack of  a substantial  recovery in aggregate C&I 
lending, along with the very different patterns  of lending to different 
sizes of borrower, suggests that something more complicated than a 
simple, across-the-board  reduction  in loan supply or demand  is likely 
to have been at work in the 1990s. 
We examine several alternative  hypotheses to explain these lending 
patterns.  First, the recent lending patterns  may be due to factors com- 
mon to macroeconomic  recessions and recoveries. We evaluate this 
hypothesis by comparing lending during this episode to the lending 
around  the time of the previous  recession that  began in the third  quarter 
of 1981 and  lasted  through  the end of 1982. During  the  earlier  recession, 
real domestic C&I lending actually rose substantially, from $523.8 
billion at the end of 1981 to $570.9 billion at the end of 1982 (see table 
A10). This increase contrasts  with the slowdown in lending during  the 
recent recession, when C&I lending dropped  from $596.7 billion to 
$491.7 billion between the end of  1989 and the end of  1991. More 
important,  lending patterns  were quite different during  the three-year 
recovery periods after these recessions. Over 1982-85 total real C&I 
lending rose by 4.3 percent, from $570.9 billion to $595.5 billion. In 
contrast, total real lending in the three recovery years following the 
latest recession fell  by 2.3  percent, from $491.7  billion in  1991 to 
$480.6  billion in  1994. Loan pricing data presented below suggest 
further  differences  between these two recessions and  their  recoveries.44 
43.  See, for example, Bernanke  and  Lown  (1991), Perry  and  Schultze  (1993), Berger 
and  Udell (1994), Hancock,  Laing, and  Wilcox (1995), and  Peek and  Rosengren  (1995) 
for discussions and tests of both the credit  crunch  and  the demand  hypotheses. 
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A second possible explanation for the behavior of C&I lending is 
that  some of these loans may now be recorded  in different  ways by the 
banks. Small businesses may have switched to borrowing  by means of 
pledging real estate, through credit card debt, or by personal loans 
issued to the owners. Table A2 shows that  commercial  real estate lend- 
ing fell as a percentage  of assets from 11.6 percent  to 10.7 percent  over 
1989-92 and continued to fall, reaching  9.8 percent  by 1994. Thus a 
switch from C&I loans to commercial  real estate loans does not appear 
to explain the C&I results. However, as new home mortgage  rates slid 
from 10.13 percent in 1989 to 8.24 percent in 1992, and then to 7.49 
percent  in 1994, one-to-four-family  residential  real estate loans  jumped 
from 10.4 percent of assets in 1989 to 13.0 percent  in 1992, and then 
to 13.9 percent  in 1994. Loans  to individuals  and  credit  card  loans both 
decreased  slightly over 1989-92  and increased  over 1992-94.  There- 
fore it is possible that by the end of the period the estimated loss of 
small business lending was partially offset by small business owners 
switching  to borrowing  directly, through  home equity  loans, credit  card 
loans, or personal  loans; but determining  to what  extent such increases 
in personal  debt  really represent  small business  debt  is beyond  the scope 
of this paper.45 
Finally, there is the possibility that the significant  liberalization  of 
geographic  restrictions  on banking and the increase in the proportion 
of industry  assets controlled  by the largest  banking  organizations  in the 
1990s may be responsible for some of the recent changes in lending 
behavior. As discussed above, during  the first half of the 1990s inter- 
state banking  privileges increased  tremendously,  and the banking  sys- 
tem  responded  with a significant  increase  in out-of-state  bank  ownership 
and a substantial  amount  of industry  consolidation. 
credit of less than $1 million shrank  considerably  during  both recessions and did not 
rebound  substantially  during  either  recovery. As emphasized  by Bernanke,  Gertler,  and 
Gilchrist  (1996), the drop in small business lending during  recessions may be in part 
due to a "flight to quality" whereby  banks reduce their risk exposures. The lack of a 
rebound  in these loans during  the recovery  periods  is less easily explained. 
45.  Another  possibility is that small businesses may have temporarily  offset some 
of the reductions  in bank  credit by using trade  credit from larger  suppliers.  Calomiris, 
Himmelberg,  and Wachtel  (1995) find that  evidence that  this type of substitution  some- 
times occurs. However, their  evidence also suggests that  this substitution  is likely to be 
relatively  short-term  in nature.  Thus it seems unlikely  that  the trade  credit  channel  could 
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It seems likely that the reallocation  of assets from smaller banking 
organizations to larger organizations and to interstate organizations 
would tend to reduce small business lending. Legal lending limits usu- 
ally restrict  lending to a single borrower  to no more than 15 percent  of 
the bank's equity capital. Because of these limits, as well as problems 
of diversification, small banking organizations  are virtually  restricted 
to lend only to small businesses. For instance, a bank  with $100 million 
in assets and  $6 million in equity  usually  can legally lend  only $900,000 
(15 percent  of equity) to a single borrower,  although  it can have a small 
portion of a large participated  loan. As shown above, organizations 
with less than $100 million in assets made the vast majority  of their 
C&I loans in 1994 to small borrowers  with bank credit of less than 
$1 million. Also shown above, the largest  banking  organizations  typi- 
cally do very little lending to small businesses. The greater  geographic 
reach of the large banks in the 1990s may also have increased their 
opportunities  to make, or lowered their costs of making, large loans. 
Thus  the liberalization  of interstate  banking  rules, as well as the removal 
of within-state  branching  requirements  and geographic  restrictions  on 
bank  holding companies, may have shifted lending  from small borrow- 
ers to large borrowers  as banks were able to become larger  and have 
easier access to large borrowers  in more locations. 
Of course, this "consolidation  hypothesis" cannot  explain all of the 
major  changes in lending patterns,  since banks  also reduced  lending to 
the very largest borrowers  during  the first  half of the 1990s. However, 
it might be part of the reason that small business lending declined 
drastically  relative to lending to medium-sized  borrowers  (with credit 
of between $1 million and $25 million) during  these five years, given 
that medium-sized loans are virtually out of reach for small banking 
organizations. 
There  is some limited evidence to support  the consolidation  hypoth- 
esis. Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren combine a single cross-section of 
Call Report data on lending to small businesses in the New England 
states for June 1994 (discussed in appendix  C) with some information 
on mergers and de novo entry. They find that after larger banking 
organizations  merge with smaller organizations,  the consolidated or- 
ganization  typically reduces the amount  of small business lending that 
was conducted earlier by the acquired institution. Their limited evi- 
dence on de novo entry also suggests that new banks pick up only a Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  97 
small portion  of the "lost" loans. These data  support  the consolidation 
hypothesis, although  they are only for one year and one region.46 
In addition, using STBL data  Berger  and Udell find  that  large banks 
not only tend to make much smaller  proportions  of their loans to small 
borrowers,  but also tend to charge lower average prices to the small 
borrowers  that receive credit from them, both in terms of reduced 
interest  rates and fewer collateral requirements.47  This pattern  is con- 
sistent with the view that  large banks  tend to issue small business loans 
only to higher-quality  credits that can be evaluated  in the same way as 
large borrowers,  through  analysis of financial  ratios. These banks  may 
tend to eliminate relationship  loans that generally have higher interest 
rates and collateral requirements,  because these loans demand more 
intimate knowledge of the small business, its owner, and the local 
community  that is gained through  contact over time. This effect may 
occur because of organizational  diseconomies of the type described 
by Oliver Williamson-in  this case associated with trying to manage 
transaction-driven  and  relationship-driven  loans  within  the same  bank.48 
These results also support  our consolidation  hypothesis. 
To further  explore the empirical implications of the consolidation 
hypothesis, we examine  the price behavior  over time of the STBL  loans 
to small borrowers,  medium borrowers,  and large borrowers.  For the 
1,631,614 loans in our sample, we regress the loan premium  (the rate 
charged on the loan less the rate on a Treasury  security of the same 
repayment  duration) on a number of regressors that control for the 
characteristics  of the loan (which are often correlated  with the risk of 
the borrower), the economic environment in the state in which the 
issuing bank is located, and a series of dummies and interactions  for 
the year and the size category of the borrower.49  The objective is to 
46.  See Peek and  Rosengren  (1996). Keeton  (1995) similarly  analyzes  the June 1994 
Call Report data on small business lending for banks in the tenth Federal Reserve 
District.  He finds  that  banks  with a high degree  of branching,  small banks  in single-state 
MBHCs,  and banks  owned by out-of-state  MBHCs  tend to invest smaller  proportions  of 
their funds in loans to borrowers  with less than $100,000 in bank  credit  than  did other 
banks  without  these characteristics.  These findings  are  consistent  with the consolidation 
hypothesis, since they suggest that larger banks, banks that are part  of MBHCs, and 
multistate  banking  organizations  all lend less to very small borrowers. 
47.  See Berger  and Udell (1996). 
48.  See Williamson  (1967, 1988). 
49.  The regressors  include the estimated  repayment  duration  and contract  terms as 
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determine  whether  the prices of small business loans increased  or de- 
creased during the first half of the 1990s when the quantity  of these 
loans decreased, controlling for a number  of demand  factors. We as- 
sume that  if the supply  of loans decreases, the borrowers  that  no longer 
receive credit would have been paying a higher-than-average  price for 
their size category, year, environment,  and so forth. This implies that 
if there is an observed price decrease, supply and demand  cannot be 
identified-the  observed lower price may be due to either a reduced 
demand  by borrowers,  or a flight to quality by lenders that has elimi- 
nated  many  of the higher-priced  borrowers.  However, if a price  increase 
is observed as the quantity  of lending is falling, this would indicate a 
reduction  in bank supply due to the consolidation  hypothesis or other 
supply factors. 
For convenience, we normalize  the coefficients of the dummies  and 
interactions  of the borrower  credit  size and  year  so that  average  adjusted 
premium  over the entire  period 1979-94 is zero for loans to each of the 
three size categories of borrower.  The results are displayed  in figure  2. 
The clearest result is that the premiums  for all size categories of 
borrower  fluctuated  much more around  the time of the recession and 
recovery of the early 1980s than in the early 1990s. By comparison, 
loan prices have been rather  stable recently. There are some small, but 
discernible price changes in the 1990s. In 1990 the premiums  for all 
three size categories of borrowers  fell, consistent with either reduced 
loan  demand  or supply  during  the recession. After 1990 the gap between 
the rates paid by small and large borrowers  widened. From 1990 to 
1992 the difference between the adjusted  premiums  paid by small and 
large borrowers  increased by 25 basis points, and this difference had 
widened to 54 basis points by 1994. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that small business C&I borrowers  faced higher  prices and 
a reduced supply of credit after 1990. It is relatively weak evidence, 
collateral  pledged, was on a floating-rate  basis, had pricing based on prime, or had a 
fixed maturity.  Control variables  for the economic environment  include the state un- 
employment  rate, state income growth rate, and dummies  for all the states (except the 
base case of California).  The key variables  that track  the loan premium  over time for 
each size category of borrower  are dummy variables  for medium  and large borrowers 
and interactions  between dummies  for all three  borrower  size categories, and dummies 
for the years from 1980 to 1994. Thus a small borrower  in 1979 is the excluded base 
case and the differences for all other combinations  of borrower  category  and year can 
be estimated  from the coefficients on the borrower  size and interaction  dummies. Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  99 
Figure 2. Adjusted  Premium for Commercial  and Industrial  Loans by Borrower  Size 
Category, 1979_94a 
Basis points 
200  -  Borrower  credit  less than  $1 million 
-  -  --  Borrower  credit  $1 million-$25 million 
-.  A8  -  -  Borrower  credit  greater  than  $25 million 
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Source: Price and other loan contract information are unpublished data from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of 
Bank Lending. Data for demographic variables are obtained directly from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
a. Based upon regression results of loan rate less the Treasury rate of equal repayment  duration  on a number  of regressors 
that control for the characteristics of the loan, the economic environment in the state in which the issuing bank is located, 
and a series of dummy and interaction variables for the year and the size category of borrower. Data are normalized so that 
the average adjusted premium over time equals zero for all three borrower size categories. 
however, because the price changes are so small and because the ob- 
served prices combine demand and supply effects with unobserved 
changes in the quality pools of borrowers  who receive loans. 
Implications  of the Consolidation  Hypothesis 
It is important  to recognize that if the consolidation hypothesis is 
correct-that  is, the lifting of geographic  restrictions  leads to mergers, 
which reduce small business lending-economic  efficiency is likely to 
be improved  by the new allocation of funds. There  is a presumption  in 
economics that the relaxation  of artificial  constraints  on trade, such as 
the restrictions  on geographic  diversification  in banking, will improve 
allocative efficiency by allowing resources  to flow more freely toward 
activities that yield higher returns  and more efficient producers.5" 
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One way in which efficiency may have been impaired  in the banking 
industry  by the constraints  on consolidation  is that  the geographic  bar- 
riers to competition  may have allowed banking  organizations  in some 
communities  to exercise market  power and  buy deposit funds at below- 
competitive  rates. For instance, it has been found that  banks  in concen- 
trated  markets  pay about 50 basis points less for their deposits.5'  This 
source of cheap funds may have allowed such organizations  to invest 
profitably  in loans that would have had negative NPVs if funded at 
competitive rates. Similarly, the lack of market  discipline engendered 
by the geographic restrictions  may have created a cushion of above- 
normal  profits  for some banking  organizations,  allowing them to make 
investments with negative NPVs even given the below-market  prices 
paid for deposits. That  is, the extra  profits  from  noncompetitive  pricing 
on some deposit or loan products  may have allowed banking  organiza- 
tions in some protected  markets  to make unprofitable  investments  be- 
cause the management  of these organizations  was either inefficient or 
had motives other than profit  maximization. 
Moreover,  these same geographic  barriers  may have made  takeovers 
more difficult and thus may have partially thwarted  the market for 
corporate control. These barriers may have permitted entrenched, 
inefficient  managers  to run some banks, yielding suboptimal  cost min- 
imization  and portfolio investments. In addition,  this blocking  of com- 
petition in the market  for ownership  and control of banking  organiza- 
tions may have allowed local managers  to extend loans to suit their 
personal  interests  or those of the directors,  even though  these may have 
run contrary  to the interests  of the organization  as a whole. 
If the consolidation  that follows the removal of geographic  barriers 
eliminates  some small  business  loans that  are  negative  NPV investments 
when evaluated  at competitive market  prices, such loans are not likely 
to be picked up by other lenders. However, it is also possible that 
consolidating  banks  do not reissue some relationship-based  or character 
loans that are positive NPV investments, even at competitive prices, 
because they do not fit into the consolidating  banks' existing loan pro- 
would improve  economic efficiency occurs if the consolidation  results  in an increase  in 
the exercise of market  power. However, the removal  of geographic  restrictions  likely 
reduces  the exercise of market  power, if anything,  by unleashing  more  actual  or potential 
customers  into local banking  markets. 
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grams. As noted above, this can occur because of organizational  dis- 
economies in issuing both transaction-driven  and relationship-driven 
loans within the same large banking organization. For example, the 
president of  a small bank may be able to approve a positive NPV 
relationship loan based on personal contact with the small business 
owner. However, when the bank  is taken  over by a larger  organization, 
the loan may not be reissued because it is too costly for the local loan 
officer to transmit  the relationship  information  through the loan ap- 
proval  channels of the larger  organization.  In the long run, other  bank 
or nonbank  lenders are likely to step in and make many of these prof- 
itable loans, although there may be some short-term  costs during the 
transition.52  It also may be the case that some marginal  loans that had 
positive NPV at competitive prices based on the private  information  of 
the issuing banks are not reissued after industry  consolidation  because 
it is not profitable,  ex ante, for a new lender to reinvest in developing 
the private  information  needed to extend the loans. 
The next section evaluates the consolidation hypothesis further  by 
estimating  a model of how the banking  system responds  to changes in 
state geographic  restrictions.  We simulate  the effects of moving to full 
nationwide  banking on the distribution  of bank assets, the number  of 
banking organizations, and the amounts of bank lending to different 
size categories of borrower. 
The Simulated Effects of Nationwide Banking on Consolidation 
and Lending Patterns 
The information  reviewed in the previous section reveals several 
interesting  points that  may bear  on the future  of bank  consolidation  and 
lending. First, large banking  organizations  tend to make very few C&I 
loans to small business borrowers, whereas small organizations  lend 
primarily  to small borrowers. Second, in the 1990s there has been a 
pronounced  increase in the ability of banking  organizations  to expand 
52.  For instances  in which small business  borrowers  have switched  to smaller  bank- 
ing organizations  following the acquisition  of their  previous  lending  organizations,  see 
Jonathan  D. Glater, "Lenders with a Little Edge; In the Race for Small Companies' 
Business, Smaller Banks May Have the Advantage," Washington  Post, August 28, 
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geographically.  In response, there  have been substantial  increases  both 
in the fraction of the nation's banking assets that reside in the largest 
organizations  (from 8.6 percent in 1989 to 18.8 percent  in 1994), and 
in the proportion  of banking  assets controlled  by out-of-state  multibank 
holding  companies  (from 18.9 percent  in 1989 to 27.9 percent  in 1994). 
Third, during the 1990s there has been a significant  reduction  in the 
amount  of domestic  C&I  lending  by the banking  industry.  Our  estimates 
suggest that the biggest cutbacks  have occurred  in C&I lending to the 
smallest  and the largest  businesses. It was originally  thought  that  much 
of the lending slowdown was associated with short-term  regulatory 
factors and general economic conditions that had mostly played them- 
selves out by 1992, but our estimates show that C&I lending to small 
and large borrower  groups still had not recovered  by the end of 1994. 
Finally, on the legislative front, the Riegle-Neal Act will deliver the 
potential for essentially full nationwide banking over the next few 
years. 
Together  these observations  raise two important  questions  about  in- 
dustry consolidation in the future. First, how much consolidation is 
likely to occur? And second, what will be the effect of any such con- 
solidation  on lending, particularly  to small businesses?  Under  the con- 
solidation hypothesis offered above, the net transfer  of assets from 
smaller organizations  with limited market  access to larger ones with 
greater  geographic  reach is likely to reduce  the amount  of credit issued 
to small borrowers,  at least in the short  term. To the extent that some 
of the eliminated credits are negative NPV investments  that were the 
consequence of protection  from product  market  competition  and limi- 
tations on the market  for corporate  control, the loss of these loans is 
likely to be permanent  and represents an improvement  in economic 
efficiency. 
To address  these questions we use a two-step procedure.  First, we 
extrapolate  from past experience with the liberalization  of geographic 
restrictions  to predict  how the movement  toward  nationwide  banking  is 
likely to influence  the future size distribution  of the banking  industry. 
Second, given this simulated size distribution,  we estimate the likely 
impact  on lending patterns. 
At the outset, it is useful to recognize the degree of discord  over the 
likely consequences of nationwide banking. For instance, at a recent 
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would  have virtually  no effect on community  banks  in the United  States, 
while the Legislative Counsel for the Independent  Bankers  Association 
of America  insisted that interstate  branching  would take away a signif- 
icant  amount  of business from  community  banks.53  Given this disagree- 
ment, a systematic assessment of the effects of nationwide banking 
based on the experience to date with interstate  and intrastate  banking 
rules would seem appropriate. 
A Model of the Distribution  of Banking Assets 
We begin by building a model that explains the distribution  of do- 
mestic bank assets across banking organization  size classes within a 
state. We estimate  the proportions  of each state's assets that  will reside 
in the five size classes of banking  organization  (under  $100 million in 
total assets, between $100 million and $1 billion, between $1 billion 
and $10 billion, between $10 billion and $100 billion, and over $100 
billion). We make  these proportions  functions  of the geographic  restric- 
tions on branching  and MBHC acquisitions, and on the demographic 
characteristics  of the state. We estimate over the entire period 1979- 
94 to get sufficient  variation  in the regulatory  conditions. For example, 
all but one state allowed at least some interstate  MBHC affiliations  as 
of 1994. 
The analysis is performed  at the state level in order  to allow for the 
possibility that difficult-to-measure  characteristics  of particular  states 
will continue to be important  determinants  of the distribution  of bank 
assets. For example, even if the amount  of banking  assets and regula- 
tory rules in Illinois and Ohio were the same, we would not assume 
that  the distributions  of bank  assets across  organization  size are  identical 
in these two states. In Illinois most of the population  and  banking  assets 
are concentrated  in a single large metropolitan  area;  in Ohio they are 
not. In addition,  it seems plausible  to model the domestic  assets of each 
state as exogenous, and to let the state's geographic  restrictions  help to 
determine  the distribution  of assets across organization  size classes. 
After estimating the state-level distributions  of assets, we simply ag- 
gregate  the results to recover the national  estimates  reported  below. 
The regressions are specified so that each dependent  variable  is the 
natural  log of the ratio of the proportion  of the state's assets in a given 
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banking  organization  size category  to the proportion  in the smallest  size 
category. Thus the four dependent  variables  take the form ln(Pl/P,), i 
=  1,.  .  .,4,  such that In indicates  natural log,  and Pi is the proportion 
of the state's assets in size class i,  where 1 is the largest size class 
(assets greater  than $100 billion) and 5 is the smallest (assets less than 
$100 million). The right-hand  side of the regressions contains demo- 
graphic  control variables  for the state, regulatory  variables  measuring 
the bank  branching  and MBHC  privileges granted  by the state and how 
long ago these privileges were granted, some interaction  effects, and 
some demographic  information  on the external region that the state's 
MBHCs  can enter. Thus  the four main  estimated  equations  of the model 
are of the form: 
ln(Pi/P5)  =  f(state demographics  and dummies,  branching  and 
MBHC  privileges, time since privileges  granted, 
interactions  of privileges  and time since 
privileges  granted  with size of state  or external 
region, interaction  of interstate  privilege 
with external  region demographics), i  =  1,. . .,4. 
The fifth equation that completes the model and allows us to estimate 
and  simulate  all five proportions  is the identity  that  the five proportions 
must sum to one.54 
This grouped  log-odds specification  is a special case of a multinomial 
logit model that  accounts  for the fact that  the bank  asset  data  are  grouped 
at the state level.  The variables and regression results are shown in 
table 9. The four regressions  are  estimated  separately  by weighted  least 
squares  to remove heteroskedasticity  problems.55 
The demographic  variables  included  in the model are the ratio  of the 
state's population  to the state's gross domestic  assets (STPOPISTGDA), 
the natural  log of per capita income in the state (LNSTINCISTPOP), 
the population  density of the state (STPOPISTAREA),  the proportion  of 
the population in metropolitan  statistical areas (STPOPINMSA),  the 
natural  log of gross domestic banking  assets in the state (LNSTGDA), 
54.  Some states have no banking  organizations  in the three largest size classes; in 
these cases the value 0.000001 is used to replace  a zero value for Pi. Later  we also set 
very small predicted  future  values of Pi to zero; that is, it is predicted  that some states 
will not have any large  banking  organizations  within  their  borders,  even after  nationwide 
banking  is allowed. 
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and  dummy  variables  for each state (AL,  AK, AZ, and so forth), except 
the base case of California. Collectively, these variables  are intended 
to capture  the main determinants  of what bank market  structure  in the 
state would be in the absence of geographic  restrictions  on branching 
and expansion by bank holding companies. 
The regulatory  variables  in the model include measures  of five priv- 
ileges of geographic expansion granted  to banking  organizations  in a 
state. These rights include:  at least limited  branching  in the state (LIM- 
BRAN);  unlimited statewide  branching  (STATEBRAN);  at least limited 
opportunities  for multibank  holding  companies  (LIMMBHC);  unlimited 
statewide opportunities for MBHCs (STATEMBHC);  and interstate 
MBHC affiliations (INTERSTATE).  Each of these privileges is repre- 
sented by a dummy variable set equal to one when permitted  by the 
state, and set equal to zero otherwise.56 
The adjustment  to the removal of geographic  restrictions  is not in- 
stantaneous-it  takes time to plan, to get regulatory  approval  for, and 
to consummate  mergers.57  We allow for transition  periods  by including 
in the regressions some "time-since-liberalization" variables, LIM- 
BRANTIME,  STATEBRANTIME,  LIMMBHCTIME,  STATEMBHC- 
TIME, and INTERSTATETIME,  which represent  the number  of years 
that  each geographic  banking  privilege has been available. These vari- 
ables enter the regressions as inverses; for example, 1/STATEBRAN- 
TIME  is equal to 0. 1 for a state that has allowed statewide  branching 
for ten years. The inverse form allows the variable  to have an asymp- 
totically decreasing effect such that the transitional  effects go to zero 
in the long run. As noted below, other functional  forms of these time- 
since-liberalization  variables  were tried and found to have no material 
effects on our simulations  of the future  structure  of the banking  indus- 
try. The dates at which each state granted  each of these privileges are 
shown in table B6. 
Importantly,  we incorporate  the potential  geographic  reach  of bank- 
ing organizations  in the state  by interacting  the regulatory  dummies  and 
time-since-liberalization  variables  with the amount  of banking  assets to 
56.  Since LIMBRAN  and LIMMBHC  are defined  in terms  of having  at least limited 
powers  within  the state, they remain  equal  to one after  statewide  privileges  are granted. 
57.  For example, when two bank holding companies wish to merge, it may take 
time to obtain approval  from both the Federal Reserve and the U.S.  Department  of 
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which they might have access. The four within-state  regulatory  dum- 
mies (that is, LIMBRAN, STATEBRAN,  LIMMBHC, and STATEMBHC) 
are interacted with the natural log of state gross domestic assets 
(LNSTGDA),  which was also included  as a separate  demographic  vari- 
able above. The larger  are a state's banking  assets, the greater  should 
be the effects of liberalizing  the branching  and holding company  affil- 
iation rules on the size of banking  organizations  in the state. For ex- 
ample, the statewide branching  privilege should increase the average 
size of banking  organizations  more, the greater  are the state's assets to 
which the branching  network  can have access. The time-since-liberal- 
ization  variables  (for example, I  /STATEBRANTIME)  are  also interacted 
with LNSTGDA  because the transition  time to taking full advantage  of 
the privileges to expand within the state is expected to be longer, the 
larger  is the state. 
Similarly,  the INTERSTATE dummy and the  I/INTERSTATETIME 
variable  are interacted  with the natural  log of gross domestic assets in 
the  external  region  to  which  MBHCs  in the  state  have  access 
(LNRGGDA),  that is, the natural  log of the assets in all the states that 
the local MBHCs can enter, other than their home state. Note that 
LNRGGDA  also measures the size of the region from which banking 
organizations  headquartered  in other states can enter  the home state. It 
is expected that the larger  is the region into which the state's banking 
organizations  can enter  and  from  which the state  can be entered  by other 
organizations,  the greater is the effect of allowing the access. In our 
simulation  of nationwide banking described below, LNRGGDA  plays 
an important  role because we expand the external  region to include all 
the states, other than the home state. In the model we also interact 
INTERSTATE  with the other demographic  variables, but computed  on 
the basis of the external  interstate  banking  region, rather  than  the home 
state. These variables, shown in table 9, have the letters  RG replacing 
ST to indicate  the same demographic  variables  as defined  above for the 
home state, but applied  to the external  region to which an organization 
has access. Note that  LNRGGDA  and all the other  external  region var- 
iables are determined  as the averages over the period of time that the 
state has allowed interstate MBHCs (that is,  when INTERSTATE  is 
equal to one), since the external  region for a given state often changes 
radically  from year to year. 
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well. The adjusted  R2  values lie between 0.89 and 0.95.  A number  of 
the individual coefficients of the regulatory  variables and their inter- 
actions are statistically  significant, despite the fact that  there  are  eighty 
coefficients in each equation and the fact that all of the regulatory 
variables appear  at least twice in each equation (alone and interacted 
with a state  or external  region size variable).  The more  appropriate  tests 
of statistical significance in this situation may be to examine whether 
groups  of the parameters  are statistically  significant.  For  each equation, 
we therefore  test the coefficients of the sixteen within-state  regulatory 
variables and interactions  jointly, the eight variables  and interactions 
involving interstate  banking  privileges jointly, and all twenty-four  of 
these  parameters  jointly. In all cases, the null hypothesis  of no statistical 
significance  was easily rejected  at the 1 percent  level. 
Model Simulations  of the Effects of Nationwide  Banking on the 
Distribution  of Banking Assets  and Number of Organizations 
We simulate the future distribution  of gross domestic assets across 
banking  organization  size classes and the total number  of banking  or- 
ganizations  under  nationwide  banking  in two different  ways: first, as- 
suming  zero asset growth, and  second, assuming  growth  at the national 
trend  rate over the sample period. 
The "zero-growth" simulations shown in the top panel of table 10 
reflect the changes in the distribution  of banking assets as a result of 
lifting all geographic  restrictions  in the model for five, ten, and  twenty- 
five years in the future, and in the "long run," keeping total gross 
domestic assets in each state at 1994 levels. This scenario may alter- 
natively be thought of as what the structure  of the banking industry 
would have been in 1994 had full nationwide  banking  been in effect for 
the past five, ten, or twenty-five  years, or permanently.  We hold all the 
demographic  variables  in each state constant  in order  to focus specifi- 
cally on the effects of liberalizing  geographic  restrictions,  while mini- 
mizing other effects. 
We assume that nationwide  banking  occurs immediately  and there- 
fore set all the dummy variables for the liberalization  of geographic 
restrictions (LIMBRAN, STATEBRAN, LIMMBHC, STATEMBHC, and 
INTERSTATE)  equal to one,  although in most cases these variables 
were already  equal to one by 1994. For each successive year into the Table  10. Simulated  Future Distribution  of Gross Domestic Banking Assetsa 
Units as indicated 
Number of years 
into the  future  Long 
Organization size  1994  5  10  25  run 
Simulations  assuming  zero growth  in gross  domestic  banking  assets 
Proportion  of gross domestic assets 
Less than $100 million  0.070  0.035  0.035  0.034  0.033 
$100 million-$1 billion  0.138  0.079  0.078  0.075  0.072 
$1 billion-$10 billion  0.157  0.092  0.090  0.088  0.085 
$ 10 billion-$ 100 billion  0.446  0.372  0.376  0.382  0.395 
Greater  than $100 billion  0.188  0.421  0.420  0.421  0.416 
All organizations  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number  of organizations 
Less than $100 million  5,636  2,763  2,800  2,748  2,626 
$100 million-$1 billion  2,051  1,179  1,162  1,120  1,065 
$1 billion-$10 billion  178  104  102  99  96 
$10 billion-$100 billion  55  46  46  47  49 
Greater  than $100 billion  6  13  13  13  13 
All organizations  7,926  4,106  4,125  4,028  3,849 
Market  shareb  0.214  0.222  0.224  0.227  0.231 
Herfindahl  indexC  0.058  0.059  0.059  0.058  0.057 
Gross domestic assetsd  3,491  3,491  3,491  3,491  3,491 
Simulations  assuming  growth  in gross  domestic  banking  assets  equal to the historical 
average  of  1.71  percent per yearc 
Proportion  of gross domestic assets 
Less than $100 million  0.070  0.029  0.024  0.016  . . . 
$100 million-$1 billion  0.138  0.068  0.058  0.037  . . . 
$1 billion-$10 billion  0.157  0.067  0.050  0.025  . . . 
$10 billion-$100 billion  0.446  0.400  0.421  0.450  . . . 
Greater  than $100 billion  0.188  0.436  0.447  0.471  . . . 
All organizations  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  . . . 
Number  of organizations 
Less than $100 million  5,636  2,287  1,946  1,285  . . . 
$100 million-$1 billion  2,051  1,015  857  556  . . . 
$1 billion-$10 billion  178  76  56  29 
$10 billion-$100 billion  55  49  52  56  . . . 
Greater  than  $100 billion  6  14  14  15  . . . 
All organizations  7,926  3,440  2,925  1,939  . . . 
Market  shareb  0.214  0.212  0.207  0.195  . . . 
Herfindahl  indexc  0.058  0.058  0.056  0.050  . . . 
Gross domestic assetsd  3,491  3,803  4,143  5,358  . . . 
Source: Authors' simulations based on model described in text, using data from the Consolidated Report of Condition 
and Income for Banks and Amel (1993). 
a. Financial values are expressed in 1994 dollars. 
b. Average share of market deposits controlled by each organization in the market weighted by the proportion of the 
state's gross domestic assets in the market. 
c.  The Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each organization in the market. The number 
reported  is the weighted average Herfindahl-the  average Herfindahl  across markets in each state weighted by the proportion 
of the state's gross domestic assets in the market. 
d.  Billions of  1994 dollars. 
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future, we also add one more year to the denominators  of each of the 
time-since-liberalization variables (1  ISTATEBRANTIME,  1IINTER- 
STATETIME,  and so forth). In the long-run case, these variables are 
set equal to zero in order to remove all of the transitional  effects. As 
noted above, the LNRGGDA  variable and the other external regional 
demographic  variables  are set to reflect nationwide  banking  by includ- 
ing the assets, population  density, and  other  characteristics  of the forty- 
nine states and the District of Columbia, other than the home state. 
To illustrate,  consider  the values of the right-hand-side  variables  that 
are used to predict the distribution  of banking  assets in Alabama  five 
years into the nationwide  banking  regime. As shown in table B6, Ala- 
bama  granted  statewide  branching  privileges in June 1990 and  interstate 
MBHC access in July 1987, and had granted  all the other privileges 
before 1960.58  For  the simulation,  none of the regulatory  dummies  need 
to be changed because Alabama  institutions  already  had these powers 
in 1994. We add five years to all the denominators  of the time-since- 
liberalization variables; for example,  1IINTERSTATETIME  changes 
from 1/(4.5) to  1/(9.5).  Importantly,  we also adjust all the external 
region variables to reflect five years of access to the forty-nine states 
and the District of Columbia, other than Alabama. 
The changes in the predicted  Pis for each state due to the changes in 
the geographic restrictions  and the time-since-liberalization  variables 
are  added  to the actual Pis  for that  state  in 1994, effectively maintaining 
any idiosyncracies  of the state in  .that  year. This procedure  ensures  that 
any errors  in predicting  the 1994 values do not affect our simulations 
of the changes due to nationwide  banking. The overall proportions  of 
banking  assets in the different size classes shown in the top panel of 
table 10 are  the weighted  averages  of the state  distributions.  The number 
of banking  organizations  in each size class is obtained  by dividing the 
total dollar value of assets in each size class by the average size of 
organization  in that size class in  1994. That is,  we assume that the 
average size of organization  in each size class remains  constant over 
time, even while banking  assets are shifting into and  out of the classes. 
Once again we make the most neutral  assumption  possible, so that the 
simulations  reflect only the changes predicted  from the regulatory  var- 
iables in table 9. 
58.  Because  our  geographic  restriction  data  are  generally  only accurate  back  to 1960, 
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The zero-growth  simulations  shown in table 10 suggest that the re- 
moval  of all geographic  barriers  to nationwide  banking  is likely to result 
in substantial  consolidation  of the banking  industry,  and that this con- 
solidation would likely occur rather  quickly. The model predicts that 
within five years of the full implementation  of nationwide  banking, all 
else held constant,  the share  of domestic  assets  controlled  by megabanks 
would more than double from 18.8 percent  to 42.1 percent, while the 
share held by the smallest banking organizations  would fall by about 
half, from 7.0 percent  to 3.5 percent. The number  of banking  organi- 
zations is also simulated  to fall by almost 4,000, from 7,926 to 4,106, 
over the five-year horizon. 
It is interesting  to note that these changes are similar to the trends 
that have already occurred in the recent past, as documented  above. 
The halving of the share  of the smallest banking  organizations  and the 
elimination of about four thousand institutions essentially replicates 
what has occurred in the industry over the last fifteen years. Thus 
nationwide  banking  appears  likely to accelerate  the process  of reducing 
the number and market share of small banking organizations  that is 
already underway. The slightly more than doubling of the share of 
assets controlled  by megabanks  essentially matches the gains made in 
the last five years, and thus continues the increase in market  shares  of 
very large banking  organizations  with no substantial  change. 
The data also show very little change in the distribution  of indus- 
try assets across organization  size after the first five years of nation- 
wide banking  in this simulation. The industry  is predicted  to lose only 
seventy-eight additional  banks over the subsequent  twenty years. The 
simulation  of the long run-in  which all transitional  effects represented 
by the time-since-liberalization  variables  are  eliminated-yields  an ad- 
ditional loss of only 179 banking organizations  after the first twenty- 
five years, leaving 3,849 organizations.  The long-run  prediction  also 
provides  a check on the model, verifying that  the estimated  parameters 
predict a smooth asymptotic transition to nationwide banking. Of 
course, the precise amount of consolidation that will actually occur 
depends  on many factors that are not included in the model, but these 
projections  are only intended  to gauge the general  importance  of lifting 
the restrictions  on nationwide  banking. 
This simulated rapid adjustment  to nationwide banking may seem 
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from the data  presented  above. Table 3 shows that  by 1994 nationwide 
access was well on the way to being a reality, with the average  MBHC 
having access to 69.4 percent of the nation's banking  assets, up from 
29.0 percent  in 1989. At least partly  in reaction  to this increased  market 
access, a great deal of consolidation occurred  in the first half of the 
1990s. Megabanks more than doubled their national share from 8.6 
percent to  18.8  percent (see  table Al)  and interstate penetration 
increased from 18.9 percent to 27.9 percent (see table 3) in the last 
five years. Given that  past opportunities  to expand  geographically  were 
quickly  seized, it is not surprising  that  the model  predicts  that  the future 
response to regulatory liberalization  may also happen relatively 
quickly  .9 
Reading the simulation results from a slightly different angle, the 
model  predicts  that  the top sixty or so banking  organizations  with assets 
of over $10 billion may control approximately  80 percent of industry 
assets under  nationwide  banking. These organizations  may be thought 
of  as including regional banks, superregionals, and money center 
banks. This finding of a dominant,  but not overwhelming  position for 
these large  banking  organizations  represents  a middle  position between 
the extreme  positions discussed above of no effect on community  banks 
versus the devastation  of such banks and consolidation  of the industry 
into tens or hundreds  of large organizations.  In effect, the model has 
common ground with both extremes-many  small community  banks 
are predicted to survive and the number  of banking organizations  is 
predicted  to remain  in the thousands,  but the vast majority  of assets are 
59.  Bolstering  the argument  for rapid  consolidation  at the large end of the market, 
there  were at least five announcements  of mergers  of banking  organizations  with assets 
between  $10 billion and $100 billion in the first  eight months  of 1995 (see Saul Hansell, 
"Wave of Mergers  is Transforming  American  Banking," New York  Times, August  21, 
1995, pp. Al,  A12). Together,  the two largest, First  Union-First  Fidelity  Bancorp  and 
First  Chicago-NBD Bancorp,  would  push  almost  another  7 percent  of the nation's  assets 
into the megabank  category. Moreover, if the proposed  takeover  of First Interstate  by 
Wells Fargo  is consummated,  an additional  3 percent  of national  assets would  be shifted 
into the largest banking  organization  size class (although  no shift in size classes will 
occur if First Interstate  alternatively  merges with First Bank Systems). Finally, the 
recently  announced  megamerger  between  Chemical  and  Chase  Manhattan  will create  the 
largest  U.S. banking  organization,  with  combined  assets  of nearly  $300 billion, although 
it will not move any assets between our size classes since both organizations  already 
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also predicted  to be controlled by a relatively small number  of large 
banking  organizations. 
Importantly,  this common ground  of substantial  consolidation  with 
thousands  of small banks  remaining  is consistent  with the past  behavior 
of the banking  industry.  In reaction  to past liberalizations  of interstate 
banking  rules, most large  banking  organizations  responded  quickly, but 
stayed primarily  within their regions; no organization  expanded  so as 
to have commercial banks in more than fourteen states. As discussed 
above, it is possible that the simulations  understate  the amount  of con- 
solidation in the long run, since access to large portions  of the nation 
is relatively new, and the banking  system may not yet have had suffi- 
cient time to take advantage  of the previously available  options. 
To examine this issue further and to see whether our finding of 
thousands  of banking organizations  seems reasonable  and robust, we 
consider  the experience  of California.  California  has allowed full state- 
wide branching  since 1909 and has an economy larger than all but a 
few countries.  Presumably,  by consolidating  throughout  the entire  state, 
its banking  system should already  have gone much of the way toward 
achieving the long-run size distribution  of banking  organizations  and 
the effective market  for ownership  and corporate  control  that  might be 
expected in equilibrium  under nationwide banking. As of the end of 
1994, there  were gross domestic banking  assets of $298 billion located 
in California, or 8.5  percent of the national total of $3,491 billion. 
California also had the equivalent of 342 full banking organizations 
operating  in the state (after removing the non-California  portions of 
some interstate  organizations).60 If we simply "blow up" California  to 
a national  scale, the country  would have approximately  4,024 banking 
organizations  (342/0.085),  which is nearly identical to the 4,028 pre- 
dicted by the model after twenty-five years of nationwide banking. 
Likewise, Timothy Hannan  and Stephen Rhoades project  the number 
of banking  organizations  in the nation  twenty  years  from 1990 by using 
California  trends  and  predict  about  3,500 organizations  in 2010.6' Such 
60.  A total of 352 organizations  had some domestic  assets in the state, but some of 
these organizations  also had assets in other states. The figure of 342 is derived by 
counting  multistate  banking  organizations  as their  fraction  of assets in California  banks. 
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calculations  based on raw data for California  are obviously simplistic 
because they do not take into account the specific demographics  and 
idiosyncracies of California, yet they give figures very close to our 
estimates that do embody the demographics  and idiosyncracies  of all 
the states.62  The California  experience  also makes  it highly improbable 
that the number of banking organizations  would number  in the tens 
under  nationwide  banking, since the industry  did not reduce the num- 
ber of California institutions to the tens when it legally could have 
done so.63 
We also run four additional robustness checks on these results, 
changing  the specifications  of the regulatory  variables. The results are 
consistent with the California  robustness  check and support  our main 
findings. In all cases the vast majority  of the consolidation  is complete 
within five years, and the number  of banking  organizations  simulated 
after  twenty-five years ranges between 4,000 and  4,900.64 
Southeast  region, New England,  and the nation  as a whole, and obtain  estimates  of five 
thousand  to six thousand  organizations  remaining  in the year 2010. 
62.  Berger  and Humphrey  (1988) simulate  the effects of nationwide  banking  on the 
payments system using similar techniques to those employed here and find that the 
Federal  Reserve is likely to lose about half of its market  share in check clearing after 
consolidation.  Similarly, they compare  their  results  to the raw  data  from  California  and 
find that the California  raw data somewhat  overstate  the predicted  change in the check 
clearing  system. That is, the California  raw data  predict  a drop  of two-thirds  in Federal 
Reserve  market  share, relative  to a loss of about  half in the simulations  that  account  for 
the demographics  and other  characteristics  of all the areas  of the country. 
63.  It is also notable  that  in some countries  with universal  banking,  such  as Germany 
and Switzerland,  where banks have almost unlimited  powers to grow and enter other 
industries, many small banking organizations  operate alongside the large, universal 
Grossbanken. 
64.  First, we change the specification  of the time-since-liberalization  variables  in 
the model in order  to be sure that the simulated  rapid  consolidation  of the industry  is 
not an artifact  of the functional  form of these variables.  We add second-order  terms in 
the inverse of the number  of years that a banking privilege has been available (for 
example, 1/2 x  I/[STATEBRANTIME]2)  to allow more flexibility in the specification. 
Second, we specify the natural  log of the number  of years in the denominator  in place 
of the level (for example, Illn[STATEBRANTIME]).  Third, we remove  from the speci- 
fication  all the terms related  to limited banking  privileges within the state (LIMBRAN, 
IILIMBRANTIME,  LIMMBHC,  lILIMMBHCTIME,  and all the interactions  of these 
variables),  in order  to allow for the possibility that  these minor  privileges  are no longer 
very relevant  because most states have allowed them for some time so that  they may be 
mostly adding  noise to the process. Fourth,  we try running  the regression  model  exclud- 
ing the thirteen  states of the Southeast,  since the organizations  in this region are known 
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One reason  that there will likely continue  to be many small banking 
organizations  in the future  is that the system has adapted  to them, thus 
making  it difficult  to drive them out of the industry,  even in cases when 
they might be somewhat inefficient. The existence of federal deposit 
insurance  means  that  small banks  can offer depositors  virtually  the same 
safety for their  funds as a nationally  diversified  organization.  It is likely 
that  deposit  insurance  subsidizes  some small  banks  that  would  not other- 
wise be economically viable, in part  because the premiums  paid  for the 
deposit insurance  vary within a relatively narrow  band that does not 
fully account  for risk. Similarly, in cases in which small organizations 
cannot adequately  exploit economies of scale or diversification,  such 
as back-office payments  processing and issuing large loans, the corre- 
spondent  banking  system and (in the case of the payments  processing) 
the Federal  Reserve have evolved to pool these services and  offer them 
to small  banking  organizations  on a secondary  market  basis. In addition, 
many  small banking  organizations  have built up capital  over time in the 
form of branch  offices, relationships  with customers,  and so forth, that 
might be expensive to replace. Moreover, as mentioned  above, small 
banking  organizations  may have comparative  advantages  in some types 
of relationship  lending or character  lending for which personal  knowl- 
edge of local business owners is important. 
We also simulate the average local market  structure  of the banking 
industry-the weighted  average  market  share  and  Herfindahl  index. For 
each local market,  defined  as the metropolitan  statistical  area  (MSA) or 
non-MSA  county, the Herfindahl  index of the concentration  of deposits 
(the sum of squares  of local market  shares)  is calculated  and  the average 
market  share  is tallied. The weighted averages  of market  share  and the 
Herfindahl  index for the state are used as dependent  variables  and sim- 
ulated  analogously  to the size class log-odds ratios. The results, in the 
top panel of table 10, show very little change in local market  structure, 
suggesting  that  most of the consolidation  will take place through  merg- 
ers between organizations  in different  local markets.65 
sample period. The states thus excluded are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maryland,  Mississippi, North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Tennes- 
see, Virginia,  and  West Virginia.  None of these alternative  specifications  affect  the main 
results  of the model. 
65.  In principle,  the predicted  values of the market  share  and the Herfindahl  index 
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Our second simulation of the future distribution  of gross domestic 
assets, shown in the bottom  panel of table 10, adds  the assumption  that 
each state's future banking assets grow by 1.71 percent  per year, the 
national  trend  rate  over the period 1979-94. This scenario  may be more 
realistic than the zero-growth simulation in terms of predicting the 
future,  but it requires  some speculation  about  the growth  of bank  assets. 
This growth simulation  introduces  some dynamics  as unobtrusively  as 
possible, remaining  neutral  regarding  any more controversial  assump- 
tions about cyclical fluctuations, migration, population growth, and 
wealth  accumulation  in each state. In other  words, this approach  allows 
us to extend the results while still focusing on the effects of the liber- 
alization  of geographic  constraints.  The growth  simulation  also allows 
us to examine the interaction  between the growth of the industry  and 
the lifting of geographic  constraints. 
As discussed above, the future  growth  of the industry  may be largely 
determined  by the success of external competitors  in increasing  their 
shares  of U.S. debt markets,  so the actual  future  growth  path  for bank- 
ing assets is highly uncertain. Our two point estimates-zero-growth 
and  average  past growth-are  intended  to give a rough  idea of the effect 
of different assumptions  about external competition  and other factors 
affecting growth on the future  consolidation  of the banking  industry. 
The procedure  for the growth  simulation  requires  only a few changes 
from the zero-growth simulation. The assets in the states and in the 
external regions increase by 1.71 percent for each year ahead of the 
simulation, affecting the logs of these variables  and the population-to- 
asset ratios, and increasing  the total assets that are apportioned  among 
the banking  organization  size classes. To obtain  the number  of organi- 
zations in each size class, we assume that the average  size of banking 
organizations  within each size class also grows at the rate of  1.71 
percent per year, the same as the rate of growth of domestic assets. 
This is a neutral assumption, in the sense that if the model were to 
predict no change in the proportions  of  assets in the different size 
industry. Local concentration  will increase if banking firms in the same market  are 
joined, remain unchanged if banking organizations  in different markets  are simply 
merged, and decrease if deregulation  spurs  entry into new markets  or more aggressive 
competition  from organizations  with small shares. The result of very little change in 
local market  concentration  during  industry  consolidation  is corroborated  by Akhavein, 
Berger, and Humphrey  (1996), who find that the large banking  mergers  of the 1980s 
were accompanied  by very little increase  in local market  Herfindahl  indexes, on average. Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  119 
classes, we would predict  no change in the number  of banking  organi- 
zations because the growth in total assets would be absorbed  by all 
banking  organizations  growing at a rate of 1.71 percent  per year.66 
As shown in the bottom panel of table 10, allowing for growth in 
the industry  raises the amount  of consolidation  by a small amount  over 
five years relative to the zero-growth  simulation:  the number  of orga- 
nizations  shrinks  to 3,440 rather  than  4,106. However, after  five years 
the amount  of consolidation is substantially  increased, relative to the 
zero-growth  simulation. The number  of banking  organizations  is pro- 
jected to fall by about three-quarters  in twenty-five years, from 7,926 
to 1,939, a loss of almost 6,000 banking  organizations,  or about half 
again as many as under  the zero-growth  scenario. The megabank  cate- 
gory grows to fifteen  institutions  controlling  47. 1 percent  of all banking 
assets, as opposed  to the thirteen  megabanks  with  42. 1 percent  of assets 
in the zero-growth  simulation.  Moreover,  the share  of all organizations 
in the top two size classes with over $10 billion in assets (regionals, 
superregionals,  and  money centers)  is predicted  to be 92.1 percent  after 
twenty-five years. In comparison, banking  organizations  in these size 
classes currently  have 63.4 percent  of assets, and are forecast to have 
80.3 percent  under  the zero-growth  scenario. 
Some of the additional  movement into larger  size classes under  the 
growth scenario, relative to the zero-growth  scenario, reflects the fact 
that the growtih  of assets would push some banking  organizations  into 
larger  size classes. However, the historically strong  positive relation- 
ship between the amount  of bank  assets in a state and the proportion  of 
these assets in large banking organizations  is likely a more important 
factor. Larger states tend to have even more disproportionately  large 
banking  organizations,  perhaps  because of economies in collecting de- 
posits and creating assets where financial  resources are more densely 
concentrated.  The positive relationship  between growth  in industry  as- 
sets and consolidation also accords  well with the aggregate  figures  for 
the period 1979-94,  during  which gross domestic assets grew by 29.3 
percent, while the industry  consolidated  into 36.4 percent  fewer orga- 
nizations. Thus the basic trends  in the historical  data  suggest that asset 
growth  gives an extra kick to bank  consolidation. 
66.  Note that even with 1.71 percent  annual  growth  for twenty-five  years, the av- 
erage  size of organization  in every size class still remains  well within  the range  of assets 
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These findings  reinforce our earlier  conclusions and again illustrate 
the common ground that our simulated  results share with both of the 
extreme  positions noted earlier. These results appear  to agree with the 
prediction  of one extreme that the vast majority  of industry  assets will 
be tied up in tens of  large organizations (in this case,  seventy-one 
organizations  that  control  92. 1 percent  of assets). Our  results  also agree 
with the prediction  of the other extreme that the total number  of orga- 
nizations  will still be counted in the thousands  (in this case, about  two 
thousand). 
Overall, these simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather  than 
precise forecasts of the future. The zero-growth  simulation  likely more 
accurately  reflects the pure effects of liberalizing geographic  restric- 
tions on banking, and yields a reasonable  estimate  of what  the industry 
might  have been like had  the geographic  restrictions  been relaxed  much 
earlier. The growth simulation helps to show how the growth of the 
industry  is likely to result in additional  consolidation, as it has done in 
the past.67 
The Effects of Nationwide  Banking on Credit Flows 
With these two paths of consolidation, it is possible to investigate 
the effects of nationwide banking  on credit flows. Under the consoli- 
dation  hypothesis  outlined  above, the consolidation  of the industry  into 
larger  organizations  would be expected to result in a reduced  supply of 
credit to small borrowers.  As assets are shifted on net from smaller  to 
larger  organizations,  it is likely that  some loans to small  businesses  that 
would otherwise be issued or reissued may be dropped.  As discussed 
above, the lowering  of geographic  barriers  to competition  under  nation- 
wide banking  is likely to reduce  the exercise of local market  power and 
open up the market for corporate  control in banking. Consequently, 
some small business loans that have negative NPVs when evaluated  at 
competitive  market  prices will likely be eliminated  and not be reissued 
67.  One  caveat  that  applies  to both  simulations  is that  they may  understate  the effects 
of geographic  deregulation  because they are based on past interstate  experience with 
MBHC  consolidation  but not with interstate  branching.  It is likely that the opportunity 
to branch  outside the state as well as expand  through  holding  companies  may increase 
the amount  of industry  consolidation,  but we do not have interstate  branching  experience 
from  which to extrapolate.  In this regard,  it is again  worth  noting  that  the simulation  for 
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by other lenders. The reallocation of these funds to other uses likely 
represents  an improvement  in economic efficiency. 
Consolidating  banks might also fail to reissue some positive NPV 
relationship-based  or character  loans that simply do not fit into their 
existing loan programs. As discussed above, there may be organiza- 
tional diseconomies to providing small relationship-driven  loans that 
require personal knowledge of the small business owner along with 
transaction-driven  loans that are based primarily  on credit analysis of 
financial  statements.  In the long run, many of these loans are likely to 
be picked up by other bank or nonbank  lenders that can profit from 
them, although  there may be significant  short-term  costs for these bor- 
rowers during  the transition. However, some loans that have positive 
NPV based on private information  generated  by their bank over time 
may not be reissued because the private information  is "lost"  in the 
consolidation  process and it is not profitable  for another  lender  to rein- 
vest in "finding" this information. 
Rather  than trying to disentangle all of these effects, we simply try 
to estimate the first-order,  or first-round,  effects of consolidation on 
lending. We assume that banking organizations  in a given size class 
will continue to devote the same proportions  of their gross domestic 
assets to loans to borrowers  in each credit  category  as they did in 1994. 
For  example, in 1994 banking  organizations  with less than  $100 million 
in assets lent an estimated 2.68 percent of their gross domestic assets 
to borrowers  with bank credit of $100,000 or less, whereas  organiza- 
tions with over $100 billion in assets made loans of only an estimated 
0.05  percent of their assets to this smallest borrower  category (per- 
centages are not shown in the tables). Thus if the simulated  consoli- 
dations  were to redistribute  $1 million in assets from  the smallest  bank- 
ing organization  size class to the largest, we would predict a fall of 
(0.0268  -  0.0005)  x  $1 million =  $26,300 in C&I lending to the 
smallest borrower  category. 
We recognize that this calculation  is inherently  partial  equilibrium, 
and  that  there  will likely be an adjustment  in the long run  as either  other 
banks  or nonbank  financial  intermediaries  pick up some of the lost loans 
that  have positive NPVs based on publicly available  information.  Only 
those loans with negative NPVs, and those for which it is not worth- 
while to reincur  the costs to find out that they are positive NPV loans, 
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generally  be considered  as upper  bounds  on the amount  of redistribution 
of lending that might take place in the long run. 
The lending results for the zero-growth  simulation  are shown in the 
top panel  of table 11. Since this simulation  predicts  a fast and  significant 
shift of assets away from small banks and toward  much larger banks 
(see table 10), it is not surprising  that small business credit is also 
projected  to shrink  quickly and noticeably. More specifically, loans to 
small borrowers,  with less than  $1 million in bank  credit, are  projected 
to drop  by $30 billion in five years, from  $93.7 billion to $63.7 billion, 
or 32.0 percent.  Very little change  is estimated  to occur  after  five years. 
Similarly, loans to very small borrowers, with less than $250,000 in 
bank credit, are projected  to fall by $17.5 billion, from $47.8 billion 
to $30.3 billion, or 36.6 percent, over the same short interval  and to 
remain  relatively constant  thereafter. 
While these may seem like large  adjustments  over short  time periods, 
they are actually smaller, both in real dollar value and in percentage 
terms, than the declines in small business C&I lending that are esti- 
mated  to have already  taken place, over the last five years. As shown 
above in table 8, we estimate that C&I loans to borrowers  with credit 
of less than $1 million fell by $50 billion, or 34.8 percent, over 1989- 
94, and C&I loans to borrowers  with less than $250,000 in credit fell 
by $34.5 billion, or 41.9  percent, over the same period. These past 
declines are larger, in all cases, than  the simulated  future  reductions  in 
lending to small businesses. 
The growth simulation, shown in the bottom panel of table 11, is 
both more interesting and more complex. In this case there are two 
additional  effects on small business lending that approximately  cancel 
each other out. First, the share of lending to small businesses falls by 
more than in the zero-growth  scenario  because of the greater  degree of 
industry  consolidation under the growth scenario. For example, after 
five years the proportion  of loans to borrowers  with credit  of less than 
$1 million falls from 2.69  percent of gross domestic assets to  1.68 
percent  in the growth simulation, whereas it falls only to 1.83 percent 
in the zero-growth  simulation. Second, because assets (and therefore 
loans) are growing, the effect of the reduced share of small business 
lending is essentially offset in terms  of total dollars, yielding about  the 
same quantity  of this lending as in the zero-growth  case. For example, 
lending to borrowers  with credit of less than $1 million is predicted  to Table  11. Simulated  Future Distribution  of Domestic Commercial  and 
Industrial  Loansa 
Units as indicated 
Number of years 
into the future  Long 
Credit size of borrower  1994  5  10  25  run 
Simulations  assuming  zero growth  in gross  domestic  banking  assets 
Total dollar volumeb 
Less than $100,000  22.5  14.0  14.0  13.7  13.4 
$100,000-$250,000  25.3  16.3  16.3  16.1  15.8 
$250,000-$i  million  45.9  33.4  33.4  33.1  33.0 
$1 million-$10 million  152.7  146.2  146.4  146.9  148.1 
$10 million-$25 million  124.4  138.5  138.8  139.5  140.5 
$25 million-$100 million  86.5  115.9  116.0  116.6  117.0 
Greater  than $100 million  23.2  29.7  29.7  29.7  29.6 
All borrowers  480.6  494.0  494.5  495.6  497.6 
Proportion  of gross domestic assets 
Less than $100,000  0.0064  0.0040  0.0040  0.0039  0.0039 
$100,000-$250,000  0.0073  0.0047  0.0047  0.0046  0.0045 
$250,000-$S  million  0.0132  0.0096  0.0096  0.0095  0.0095 
$1 million-$10 million  0.0438  0.0419  0.0420  0.0421  0.0424 
$10 million-$25 million  0.0356  0.0397  0.0397  0.0400  0.0403 
$25 million-$100 million  0.0248  0.0332  0.0332  0.0334  0.0335 
Greater  than $100 million  0.0067  0.0085  0.0085  0.0085  0.0085 
All borrowers  0.1377  0.1415  0.1417  0.1420  0.1425 
Gross domestic assetsb  3,491  3,491  3,491  3,491  3,491 
Simulations  assuming  growth  in gross  domestic  banking  assets  equal to the historical 
average  of  1.71  percent per year- 
Total dollar volumeb 
Less than $100,000  22.5  13.6  13.4  13.9  . . . 
$100,000-$250,000  25.3  16.1  16.2  17.6  . * 
$250,000-$i  million  45.9  34.4  35.8  42.4  ... 
$1 million-$10 million  152.7  161.3  177.6  233.3 
$10 million-$25 million  124.4  155.8  173.9  233.5  . . . 
$25 million-$100 million  86.5  131.3  147.2  200.0 
Greater  than $100 million  23.2  32.7  35.9  47.6 
All borrowers  480.6  545.2  600.0  788.3  . . . 
Proportion  of gross domestic assets 
Less than $100,000  0.0064  0.0036  0.0032  0.0026  . . . 
$100,000-$250,000  0.0073  0.0042  0.0039  0.0033  ... 
$250,000-$S  million  0.0132  0.0090  0.0086  0.0079 
$1 million-$10 million  0.0438  0.0424  0.0429  0.0435  . . . 
$10 million-$25 million  0.0356  0.0410  0.0420  0.0436  . . . 
$25 million-$100 million  0.0248  0.0345  0.0355  0.0373  . . . 
Greater  than $100 million  0.0067  0.0086  0.0087  0.0089 
All borrowers  0.1377  0.1434  0.1448  0.1471  . . . 
Gross domestic assetsb  3,491  3,803  4,143  5,358 
Source: Authors' simulations based on model described in text, using data from the Consolidated Report of Condition 
and Incomiie  for Banks and Amel ( 1993). 
a.  Financial values are expressed in 1994 dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator. 
b.  Billions of  1994 dollars. 
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be $64.1 billion after five years, nearly the same as the $63.7 billion 
predicted  in the zero-growth  scenario. For  subsequent  years, somewhat 
more  small business lending  is predicted  under  the growth  scenario  than 
under  the zero-growth  scenario, as the effects of the larger  asset base 
eventually  outweigh the effects of the smaller  share  for small business 
loans. 
To this point, we have focused exclusively on lending  to small busi- 
nesses, which is of most interest  for policy purposes  and is most likely 
to be affected by nationwide banking legislation. Another  interesting 
finding of the model is the prediction  that lending to large businesses 
will increase as assets are transferred  to larger  banking  organizations 
that are able to make loans to large business borrowers. The zero- 
growth  case shows that loans to borrowers  with more than  $25 million 
in bank  credit are projected  to rise by 32.7 percent  in five years, from 
$109.7 billion to $145.6 billion, with very little change  thereafter.  The 
growth scenario predicts an increase of 49.5 percent  in these loans in 
five years, raising their value to $164.0 billion, and predicts further 
increases  in the future  as industry  assets continue  to grow. These results 
generally indicate that the banking industry  will be in a better  market 
position to compete  for a larger  share  of the large  borrower  loan market 
than it otherwise would have been. 
However, our nationwide banking simulations-which  are geared 
toward  making  predictions  about small business lending-exclude  the 
important  fact that the industry's  propensity  to lend to large borrowers 
has been declining. Since 1989 the estimated  proportion  of gross total 
assets devoted to domestic C&I loans to borrowers  with credit of over 
$25 million has declined from 4.39 percent  to 2.73 percent  (not shown 
in the tables). As discussed above, the loss of these large  business loans 
is likely primarily  due to increased  external  competition  resulting  from 
improvements  in technology and applied  finance  that  helped  alternative 
sources  of finance  more  than  U.S. banks, as predicted  by the monitoring 
technology hypothesis. Since this hypothesis is not incorporated  into 
the nationwide  banking  simulations,  we place considerably  less weight 
on the accuracy  of the predictions  for lending to large businesses. 
Nevertheless, note that  any change  in large  business  lending  by banks 
is likely to be reflected  either  in a fall in assets or in a rise in securities, 
and  is not likely to affect small business lending  by banks  significantly. 
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ing organizations  in different  size classes, and  that  bank  lending  to both 
large and small borrowers  fell during  the first half of the 1990s. Thus, 
although  large business lending may be driven by factors that are not 
incorporated  into our model, this should not seriously affect our pre- 
diction of a fall in small business lending resulting  from consolidation. 
Collectively, the results  of the simulations  suggest two main  conclu- 
sions about  the likely responses  to the Riegle-Neal Act. First, consoli- 
dation will likely occur relatively quickly, similar to the response to 
the lifting of interstate  banking  restrictions  that  occurred  in the first  half 
of the 1990s. Second, the share  of C&I lending flowing to small busi- 
nesses will likely continue to decline along with the number  of small 
banking  organizations  that tend to specialize in this type of lending. 
In terms of general equilibrium  considerations, a key question is 
what portion  of these loans will be picked up by other  banking  organi- 
zations or nonbank  financial intermediaries.  Presumably,  most of the 
loans that are positive NPV investments based on publicly available 
information  will eventually  be reissued. Although  investigation  of non- 
bank behavior is outside the scope of this paper, several pieces of 
evidence suggest that other commercial  banks  will not pick up most of 
the slack. 
First, the data from the first half of the 1990s suggest that small 
business lending slowed down and was not significantly  compensated 
for by banking  organizations  of any size. Table AIO shows that small 
banking  organizations  (assets of less than $100 million) and midsized 
organizations  (assets of between $100 million and $100 billion) both 
cut back their C&I loans to small businesses substantially  during  the 
consolidation  of the first half of the 1990s, and megabanks  increased 
their  lending to borrowers  with credit  of under  $1 million by only $1.7 
billion. As noted above, the estimated  decline in small business  lending 
during  this period exceeds the decline that the model predicts for the 
future  under  nationwide  banking. However, for many reasons the first 
half of the 1  990s was a period of unusual  changes and therefore  it may 
not provide  the best controlled  experiment. 
Second, we examine the lending behavior of California banks in 
1994. Presumably,  if other banks will pick up the slack from consoli- 
dation, this would already be seen in a very large state that has been 
relatively  free from  geographic  restrictions  for the last  eighty-five  years. 
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national  level yields much less lending  to small borrowers  than  actually 
occurred  nationally  in that year, and yields similar  numbers  to our zero 
growth forecasts for the very small borrowers.  This finding suggests 
that adjustment  to a relatively unrestricted  banking  environment  may 
not involve other banks making up for the effect of consolidation  on 
small business lending.68 
Third, we address  the possibility that the lending propensities  used 
in the simulations  might be unstable  if the propensities  in the base year 
of 1994 were particularly  unusual.  To test this, we rerun  the simulations 
in four different ways using first, the 1989 propensities;  second, the 
average  propensities  over 1990-94; third,  the average  propensities  over 
1979-94; and fourth, the average  propensities  from California  in 1994 
discussed above. In all cases, simulated lending to small businesses 
decreased  by proportions  similar to those shown in table 11. 
As a final  check on our results, recall Peek and  Rosengren's  research 
that draws on a single cross-section of Call Report  data on lending to 
small businesses in the New England states for June 1994. They find 
that  mergers  typically reduce the small business lending that  has tradi- 
tionally been conducted by the acquired  institution, and that de novo 
entry appears  to pick up only a small portion  of the lost loans.69 
Conclusions 
This paper has presented many facts, figures, and analyses of the 
banking  industry, but the main findings can be summarized  by a few 
68.  For  purposes  of comparison  with the first  column  in table 1  1, "blowing up" the 
lending  for California  in 1994  to the national  level yields, in ascending  order  of borrower 
size class, $15.4 billion, $16.0 billion, $49.3 billion, $197.7 billion, $127.0 billion, 
$81.7 billion, and $25.7 billion, for a total of $512.8 billion. 
The distribution  of lending propensities  in California  is also interesting.  Although 
the proportion  of gross total assets devoted to domestic C&I lending in California  is 
very close to that  for the nation-l  1.57 percent  in California  compared  to 11.94 percent 
for the nation  in 1994-California banks  are skewed away from  small business  lending, 
with only 1.21 percent  of assets lent out to small C&I  borrowers  with credit  of less than 
$1 million, compared  to 2.33 percent  nationally. The smallest banking  organizations, 
with assets of less than  $100 million, and the largest  organizations,  with assets of mnore 
than  $100 billion, both  have more  small  business  lending  in California  than  in the nation, 
but this is more than offset by the behavior  of the midsized California  organizations, 
which have a much lower propensity  to lend to small borrowers. 
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broad propositions. First, the banking industry  was transformed  over 
the period 1979-94, as evidenced by the massive reduction  in the num- 
ber of banking  organizations;  the significant  increase  in the number  of 
failures; the dramatic  rise in off-balance  sheet activities; the major 
expansion in lending to U.S. corporations  by foreign banks;  the wide- 
spread  adoption  of ATMs;  the loss of monopsony  power  over depositors 
and the resulting higher costs of funds; the increase in equity capital 
ratios, particularly  for the largest banking organizations;  the opening 
up of interstate  banking markets  and the rapid  penetration  of banking 
organizations  across state lines; and the estimated  reductions  in com- 
mercial  and industrial  lending to both small and large businesses in the 
first  half of the 1990s. 
Second, most of these major changes in banking can be explained 
by two factors: first, the extraordinary  number of major regulatory 
changes that occurred  during this period, including deposit deregula- 
tion, increases  in capital  requirements,  the lifting of geographic  restric- 
tions, the expansion of bank powers, and the reduction  of reserve re- 
quirements;  and second, clearly identifiable  innovations  in technology 
and  applied  finance, including  improvements  in information  processing 
and telecommunications  technologies, the securitization  and sale of 
bank  loans, and  the development  of derivatives  markets.  In many  cases, 
the clearest  manifestation  of the regulatory  changes  or innovations  was 
in the form of a shift in external competition. For example, improve- 
ments  in data  processing, electronic  funds  transfers,  and  statistical  tech- 
niques for analyzing credit likely helped to open U.S.  loan markets  to 
global competition  and may have contributed  to the substantial  loss of 
domestic banks' share of U.S. corporate  lending to foreign banks. 
Third, despite the tumult of this period, the size of the banking 
industry-as  measured  by assets, deposits, or corporate  loans-grew 
at a moderate  pace over the fifteen-year  interval. Although  banks lost 
market  shares  of one-quarter  to one-third  in the major  debt  markets  over 
1979-94,  the tremendous  growth in these markets  offset the loss of 
shares  and left the banking  industry  enough room to continue  growing. 
This evidence yields a somewhat mixed answer to the question of 
whether the banking industry is declining, advancing, or remaining 
about  constant,  relative to the rest of the economic environment. 
Fourth,  one of the most interesting  recent  developments  has been the 
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known, commercial  and industrial  lending by U.S. banks  fell from the 
end of 1989 to the end of 1992, and a number  of demand-  and supply- 
based theories have been put forward  to help to explain this lending 
slowdown. This paper  reports  the perhaps  surprising  finding  that  aggre- 
gate C&I  lending  did not rebound  substantially  between  the end of 1992 
and the end of 1994, when the macroeconomy  was recovering. 
To look behind these aggregate data, we estimate the changes in 
lending to borrowers  of different size categories based on a sample of 
over 1.6 million bank  loans issued over 1979-94. The data  suggest that 
C&I loans to small business borrowers  exhibited the greatest  propor- 
tional  decline over 1989-92, and  rebounded  only minimally  over 1992- 
94, although  it is possible that some of these loans were transferred  to 
personal  loans by the owners  of the small businesses. Loans  to medium- 
sized borrowers  had a much smaller estimated  decline over 1989-92, 
and  had  almost  completely  recovered  by 1994. In contrast,  C&I  lending 
to large business borrowers  is estimated  to have declined significantly 
during 1989-92,  and to have continued  to decline over 1992-94.  Al- 
though  these breakdowns  of C&I loans by borrower  size category  com- 
puted  from  the Survey  of Terms  of Bank  Lending  are less accurate  than 
the total C&I lending figures taken from the Call Report, we believe 
that  the general movements  of the data are reliably portrayed. 
These findings  imply  that  something  more  complicated  than  a simple, 
across-the-board  reduction  in loan demand  or supply occurred  during 
the first half of the 1990s. The continuing  decline estimated  for large 
business lending is consistent  with Berger  and  Udell's monitoring  tech- 
nology hypothesis, under which improvements  in technology and ap- 
plied finance may support other types of financing in the large loan 
market  more than lending by U.S.  banks.70  The estimated  fall in C&I 
lending to small business borrowers  may, in part, be explained  by the 
rapid  consolidation  of the banking  industry  in the first  half of the 1  990s. 
Under  this consolidation  hypothesis, the transfer  of assets from  smaller 
banking  organizations  to larger  organizations  may  have reduced  lending 
to small businesses. Such a drop in small business loans may occur 
because organizational  diseconomies make it difficult  for large organi- 
zations  to invest in small, relationship-based  loans. As discussed  further 
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below, the elimination of  some of these loans is likely to improve 
economic  efficiency. 
These recent trends are particularly  important  because the industry 
is poised for yet another transformation  as it enters the nationwide 
banking  era over the next few years. The passage of the Riegle-Neal 
Act opens the way for coast-to-coast branch  banking, which has the 
potential  to increase competition in local banking  markets  and reduce 
the exercise of market  power in the pricing of banking  products. Na- 
tionwide banking  is also likely to enable the market  for corporate  con- 
trol in banking  to operate  more effectively by allowing potential  take- 
overs of poorly  run  banks  by other  organizations  from  across  the nation. 
To quantify  the possible effects of nationwide  banking,  we construct 
a simulation  model to predict  how much  consolidation  is likely to occur, 
and the effects of this consolidation on C&I lending, particularly  to 
small businesses that often have few alternative  sources of external 
finance. The simulations  extrapolate  from prior  experience  with varia- 
tions in geographic restrictions on banking across states and across 
time. Although  the recent  past has been a turbulent,  and  possibly atyp- 
ical, period, extrapolation  from models based on recent data still ap- 
pears to be the best way to predict  the future. 
The data suggest that as a result of the Riegle-Neal Act several 
thousand  banks may disappear  and the proportion  of banking assets 
controlled  by large banking  organizations  is likely to increase  substan- 
tially. The scenarios  predicted  by our  model share  common  ground  with 
the extreme positions that have been taken by others on both sides of 
this issue: thousands  of small banking organizations  are predicted  to 
survive, but also, the vast majority  of assets are predicted  to be con- 
trolled by a relatively small number  of large banking organizations. 
Furthermore,  the model predicts  that the change is likely to occur rel- 
atively quickly, to be mostly completed within five years. These pre- 
dictions are consistent with the rapid consolidation that has already 
occurred  over the last five years, as well as recently announced  plans 
for still more large bank mergers. 
The data  also suggest that consolidation  has clear limits. There  is no 
evidence to suggest that the number  of banking  organizations  will be 
counted  in the tens, or even the hundreds,  over the foreseeable  future. 
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uninhibited  consolidation  across a very large  state  for decades  and  there 
are currently  well over three hundred  banking organizations-corro- 
borates  the conclusion that  there  will continue  to be many  organizations 
in the nation as a whole in the future. 
In terms of credit flows, this shift toward  larger  banking  organiza- 
tions may lead to a reduction in the share of  loans made to small 
businesses, as larger  banking  organizations  take over assets that were 
previously controlled by smaller organizations. Because of organiza- 
tional diseconomies, it may be difficult for the larger  organizations  to 
invest profitably  in relationship-based  small business loans. The loss of 
share for small loans due to the consolidation of banking assets pre- 
dicted by the model should be considered  as an upper  bound, because 
other  banks  or nonbank  competitors  will likely step in and  reissue some 
of these loans. 
However, many of the eliminated loans likely will not be reissued 
because they are negative NPV investments. The earlier barriers  to 
geographic competition in banking product markets, as well as the 
restrictions  on the market for corporate  control of banks implied by 
these geographic barriers, may have permitted some managers who 
were inefficient or pursuing goals other than profit maximization  to 
exercise market  power  and  issue some loans that  would  not be profitable 
at competitive market  prices. Such negative NPV loans are not likely 
to be reissued by other lenders and their elimination, along with real- 
location  of the funds  to other  uses, likely improves  economic  efficiency. 
Some loans that are positive NPV investments  might also be elimi- 
nated  by consolidation  because  of difficulties  of combining  relationship- 
driven loans in the same organizational  structure  as transaction-driven 
loans. Most of the eliminated loans that have positive NPV based on 
publicly available  information  are likely to be reissued  by other  lenders 
in the long run. Some additional data suggest that most of the lost 
lending is unlikely to be picked up by other U.S.  commercial  banks, 
although  we do not have information  on other types of lenders. Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  131 
APPENDIX  A 
Data on the Banking  Industry, 1979-94 
THE  TEN  TABLES  in this  appendix provide  detailed  data assembled  by 
the authors  from official data  sources. These data  quantify  the transfor- 
mation  of the U.S. commercial  banking  industry  over the sample  period 
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APPENDIX  B 
Changes in Banking  Regulation, 1979-94 
THIS APPENDIX provides  supporting  background  information  on the con- 
clusions in the text regarding  the five major  types of regulatory  changes: 
deregulation  of deposit accounts, reduction in reserve requirements, 
formalization and tightening of capital requirements, expansion of 
bank powers, and liberalization  of the rules regarding  geographic  di- 
versification. 
Deposit Deregulation 
The first major  regulatory  change of the 1980s was the removal of 
interest  rate ceilings on bank deposits. Ever since the Banking  Act of 
1933, U.S. financial  intermediaries  had been restricted  in the rates  that 
they could pay depositors. The best known of these rules, regulation 
Q, placed ceilings on the interest  rates offered on time deposits. Other 
regulations  also prohibited  the payment  of interest  on demand  deposit 
accounts. With the dramatic  rise in inflation  during  the 1970s, banks 
found that the restrictions  on nominal interest  rates were allowing less 
tightly regulated  competitors, such as money market  mutual  funds, to 
harvest many of their deposits. Another innovation, the invention of 
repurchase  agreements,  was allowing businesses to earn market-based 
interest  rates  on their demand  deposit balances  at banks. These circum- 
stances  prompted  a drive by banks  to create  accounts  that  could legally 
pay market  interest  rates. 
Congress responded  by passing the Depository Institutions  Deregu- 
lation and Monetary Control Act of  1980 (DIDMCA). Among other 
provisions, this legislation permitted  banks throughout  the country  to 
offer negotiable order of withdrawal  (NOW) and automatic  transfer 
system (ATS) accounts.71 A NOW account essentially operates as a 
checking account  that pays interest, while an ATS account  permits  the 
bank  to sweep the balances in a customer's account  at the end of each 
day into an interest-bearing  overnight  account.  Therefore  the DIDMCA 
71.  NOW accounts had been introduced  in Massachusetts  in 1973 and had spread 
throughout  New England  by 1980. Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  179 
allowed banks to begin offering competitive market  rates on checking 
accounts. 
The DIDMCA  also mandated  that  the regulation  Q interest  rate ceil- 
ings be phased out by March 1986. This gradual  elimination  of price 
controls was not sufficient to keep banks from continuing  to lose de- 
positors, so in October 1982 Congress passed the Depository Institu- 
tions Act (commonly referred  to as the Garn-St Germain  Act), which 
authorized  banks to offer money market  deposit accounts (MMDAs). 
These accounts  carried  no reserve requirements  and were exempt from 
the regulation  Q ceilings, and therefore  could compete  effectively with 
the MMMFs.72 
These changes were pivotal because the banking  industry's  monop- 
sony on insured deposits had provided an easy source of profits and 
helped  to keep the industry  stable and  virtually  free of failure  for almost 
fifty years. The exodus of funds from the industry  caused by technical 
and financial  innovations  and the subsequent  deregulation  allowed the 
banks to compete with nonbanks  and other banks for funds at market 
interest  rates, but left them with much higher interest  costs. As shown 
in table 5, the increased interest costs were substantial  and were not 
offset by noninterest  expenses, which also rose over this period. These 
extra costs appear  to have had a significant  effect in reducing  profita- 
bility in the industry.  As discussed in the text, the reduced  profits  may 
be linked, directly  or indirectly, to the dramatic  increase  in the number 
of bank  failures  later  in the decade. Also noted  in the text, it is important 
to recognize that the key factors driving these higher costs were the 
technical and financial innovations that allowed nonbanks to offer 
deposit-like products, rather  than the deregulation  itself. 
Capital Regulation 
At the start  of our sample period, capital regulation  was extremely 
fragmented  because the various regulatory agencies were not using 
consistent standards.73  For example, in the 1950s the Federal  Reserve 
72.  The MMDAs were subject to regulatory  restrictions  on minimum balances, 
numbers  of checks per month, and so forth. 
73.  Banks are regulated  by the Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation,  the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller  of the Currency,  and various  state regulators. 180  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
alone adopted  the "analyzing bank  capital" (ABC) approach  to capital 
adequacy. These guidelines required  banks to hold different amounts 
of capital depending  on the riskiness and liquidity of their assets, and 
therefore  were very similar  in spirit  to the current  risk-based  guidelines. 
For instance, as in the current  system, no capital was required  to be 
held against short-term  government  securities. The ABC requirements 
were somewhat cumbersome  to administer  and were dropped  by the 
Federal  Reserve in the mid-1970s. Thus by the start  of our sample in 
1979, capital  regulation  was relatively ad hoc and  depended  largely on 
the judgment  and discretion  of bank supervisors. 
Against  this backdrop,  the share  of foreign assets in U.S. bank  port- 
folios was rising and  capital  levels were falling in the 1970s. Regulators 
responded  by taking steps to eliminate some of the discretion in the 
system. Table B 1 gives a chronology of the major  changes in capital 
requirements  from 1979 to 1994.74  Starting  in 1981, a new set of stan- 
dards required  that banks hold capital equal to a fixed percentage  of 
their  balance  sheet assets. The flat-rate  standards  initially  required  large 
banks to hold less capital than small banks, but the standards  were 
equalized  in 1985. There were no capital  requirements  for off-balance 
sheet activities, such as standby  letters  of credit  and  loan commitments. 
The differential  treatment  of balance  sheet and  off-balance sheet activ- 
ities, along with several innovations discussed in the text, helped to 
encourage  banks to shift some activities off their balance sheets. For- 
eign banks  were not subject  to these rules and  thus benefited  relative  to 
their U.S.  competitors. 
The Basle Accord risk-based  capital standards,  which were agreed 
upon in 1988, provided responses to a number  of problems  raised by 
the flat-rate requirements, particularly the lack of capital required 
against  off-balance sheet risks, the equal  treatment  of on-balance sheet 
assets that have very different  risk characteristics,  and the competitive 
inequities of multinational  banks operating  with different  capital stan- 
dards.75  The Basle Accord's risk-weighted  assets (RWA) denominator 
74.  The entries  in table B I are arranged  by the dates  on which the capital  rules  were 
made, rather  than  by when they went into effect, since new rules  were sometimes  added 
before the old rules were fully implemented.  For example, the Tier I leverage  require- 
ment  and  the prompt  corrective  action  features  of FDICIA  were decided  upon  before  the 
risk-based  capital  standards  were fully implemented. 
75.  The risk-based  capital  requirements  were partially  implemented  as of December 
1990, and fully implemented  as of December 1992. Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  181 
Table  B1. Major Changes  in Capital Requirements,  1979-94 
Date  Capital  requirements 
January  1979-  No formal  minimum  capital  ratios.  Banks  subject  only to 
December  1981  supervisory  oversight. 
December  1981  Primary  capital  (common  equity,  loan  loss reserves,  some 
convertible  debt  and  preferred  stock)  and  secondary  capital 
(subordinated  debt  and  the  remaining  preferred  stock)  defined. 
Regional  banks  (total  assets  ?  $1 billion,  not  multinational) 
required  to hold  at least  5 percent  primary  capital  and  5.5 percent 
total  capital  (primary  plus  secondary)  against  gross  total  assets 
(total  assets  plus  loan  loss reserves).  Community  banks  (total 
assets  <  $1 billion,  not multinational)  required  to hold  primary 
capital  and  total  capital  ratios  of at least  6 percent.  Multinational 
banks  still  had  no formally  established  capital  ratios. 
June 1983  Standards  for regional  banks  extended  to cover  multinational 
banks. 
April 1985  Disparities  between  large  and  small  banks  and  multinational 
and  domestic  banks  eliminated.  All U.S. banks  required  to 
have primary  and  total  capital  ratios  of at least  5.5 percent  and 
6.0 percent,  respectively. 
July 1988  Basle Accord  sets minimum  risk-based  capital  standards  for 
banks  operating  internationally  in twelve participating  nations. 
January  1989  U.S. regulators  publish  guidelines  for implementing  risk-based 
capital  requirements  based  on the Basle Accord.  All U.S. banks 
covered  (not only multinationals).  Similar  requirements  set for 
U.S. bank  holding  companies  and  thrifts. 
All assets and  off-balance  sheet instruments  are  assigned  risk 
weights  of 0 percent,  20 percent,  50 percent,  or 100 percent, 
depending  on the perceived  credit  risk  of the instrument  and 
obligor.  Examples  are  commercial  loans (100 percent),  most 
residential  mortgages  (50 percent),  most  claims  on other  banks 
(20 percent),  and  Treasury  securities  (0 percent).  Risk-weighted 
assets  (RWA)  is the sum of the notional  value  of the 
instruments  times  the risk  weights.  Other  risks  (for example, 
interest  rate  risk, foreign  exchange  risk, concentration  risk) 
were to be included  later. 
Requirements  are  set in terms  of Tier 1 capital  (common 
equity, some preferred  stock, other)  and  Tier  2 capital  (some 
subordinated  debt, some loan loss reserve,  other)  per  dollar 
of RWA. 
As of December  1990, banks  must  hold  Tier 1 capital  of at 
least 3.625 percent  of RWA, and  Total  capital  (Tier 1 plus 
Tier  2) of at least  7.25 percent  of RWA. Starting  in December 
1992 the Tier 1 ratio  must  be at least  4 percent  and  the Total 
risk-based  ratio  must  be at least 8 percent.  See table  B2 for 
additional  details. 
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Table Bi.  (continued) 
Date  Capital requirements 
August  1990  Regulators  begin  setting  new leverage  requirements.  Banks 
with the best CAMEL  rating  and  meeting  other  conditions  must 
hold Tier 1 capital  of at least 3 percent  of (unweighted)  gross 
total  assets. Other  banks  must  hold at least  4 percent  or higher, 
depending  upon  the CAMEL  rating  and  discretion  of the 
supervisors.  The leverage  requirement  is effective  in 1991. 
December  1991  FDIC  Improvement  Act (FDICIA)  mandates  stricter 
enforcement  of capital  standards  and  closure  rules  on regulators 
and  risk-based  deposit  insurance  premiums  that  vary  with 
capital  ratios,  among  other  regulatory  changes. 
Prompt  corrective  action  (PCA)  rules  specify  a series  of 
successively  more  severe  regulatory  penalties  (some mandatory, 
some discretionary)  as capital  deteriorates  through  five capital 
categories.  Supervisors  can also downgrade  the bank  by one 
category.  These  categories  and  the mandatory  and  discretionary 
actions  are in tables  A3, A4, and  A5. Importantly,  the well- 
capitalized  category  (at least  6 percent  Tier 1, at least 10 
percent  Total, at least  5 percent  Tier 1 leverage  ratio)  requires 
capital  above  the full risk-based  capital  minimums. 
Source: Federal Reserve press releases. 
focuses on credit risk, reflecting the perception  that credit risk poses 
the most serious threat  to bank solvency. Other  types of risk were to be 
incorporated  later. To compute  RWA, all assets and off-balance sheet 
instruments  are assigned risk weights of 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 
percent, or 100 percent, depending on the credit risk group to which 
the obligor belongs and the type of financial instrument.  The Basle 
Accord sets a minimum  standard  of 4 percent  for Tier 1 capital (which 
contains equity) and a minimum  standard  of 8 percent  for total capital 
(which contains both equity and subordinated  debt). Thus an asset in 
the 100 percent risk category, such as a C&I loan, requires  4 percent 
of Tier 1 capital and 8 percent  of Total capital  to be held against  it, and 
an asset in the 50 percent  risk category requires  half of these amounts. 
Although the Basle Accord applies only to multinational  banks, U.S. 
regulators chose to apply versions of  it to all banks, bank holding 
companies, and thrift  institutions.  Details of the RWA categories, cap- 
ital categories, and risk-based  capital  requirements  for banks  are given 
in table B2. 
The risk-based capital standards  do not account for some obvious Table  B2. The Basle Accord Risk-Based  Capital Standards 
RISK-WEIGHTED  ASSET  CATEGORIES 
0 percent risk category 
Cash, Federal  Reserve  Bank  balances 
Securities  of the U.S. Treasury,  OECD  governments,  and  some U.S. agencies 
20 percent risk category 
Cash  items  in the process  of collection 
U.S. and  OECD  interbank  deposits  and  guaranteed  claims 
Some non-OECD  bank  and  government  deposits  and  securities 
General  obligation  municipal  bonds 
Some mortgage-backed  securities 
Claims  collateralized  by the U.S. Treasury  and  some other  government  securities 
50 percent risk category 
Loans  fully secured  by first  liens on 1-4 family  residential  properties 
Other  (revenue)  municipal  bonds 
100 percent risk category 
All other  on-balance  sheet  assets  not listed  above, including: 
loans  to private  entities  and individuals,  some claims  on non-OECD 
governments  and  banks,  real  assets, and investments  in subsidiaries 
Off-balance  sheet activitiek? 
Direct-credit-substitute  standby  letters  of credit  (mainly  100 percent) 
Performance-related  standby  letters  of credit  (mainly  50 percent) 
Unused  portion  of loan  commitments  with original  maturity  of more  than  one year 
(mainly  50 percent) 
Other  loan  commitments  (0 percent) 
Commercial  letters  of credit  (20 percent) 
Bankers  acceptances  conveyed  (20 percent) 
Derivative  contracts-interest  rate  swaps, forward  commitments  to purchase  foreign 
exchange,  and  other  items  (between  0 and  5 percent  of the notional 
value, plus the mark-to-market  value of the contract,  capped  at 50 percent) 
CAPITAL  CATEGORIES 
Tier I 
Common  equity, some preferred  stock, minority  interest  in consolidated  subsidiaries 
less goodwill 
Tier 2 
Loan  loss reserve  (limited  to 1.25 percent  of risk-weighted  assets), subordinated  debt 
(limited  to 50 percent  of Tier 1), and  other  preferred  and  convertible  stock 
Tier  2 capital  cannot  be larger  than  Tier 1 capital 
Total capital 
Tier 1 plus Tier  2 
CAPITAL  REQUIREMENTS 
Tier 1 capital  must  be at least  4 percent  of risk-weighted  assets 
Total  capital  must  be at least 8 percent  of risk-weighted  assets 
Source: Federal Reserve press releases. 
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determinants  of credit risk, such as differences in credit quality across 
C&I  loans (all of which are  in the 100 percent  category);  concentrations 
of risk to a particular  counterparty,  industry, region, or nation; and 
covariances among the values of financial instruments.  In part, these 
potential shortcomings  reflect concerns that the capital standards  be 
reasonably  simple, be uniformly applied across banks, and avoid ex- 
cessive governmental  control  or direction  of credit  flows. It was planned 
that the standards  would later take into account interest  rate risk and 
other  market  risks, although  this has not yet occurred  for U.S. banking 
organizations.76  In order to capture  risks that might be missed by the 
risk-based  capital standards,  in 1990 U.S. regulators  added  a leverage 
requirement  which mandated  that  banks  hold Tier 1 capital  of 3 percent 
or more against unweighted assets. The amount above 3 percent de- 
pends upon examination  ratings  and the discretion  of the regulator. 
Several empirical studies have found that the relationship  between 
the risk-based  capital standards  and bank risk is relatively weak, and 
that  some of the relative  risk weights in RWA are  not well aligned  with 
actual risks.77  Furthermore,  some studies show that RWA can be im- 
proved significantly  by adjusting  the requirements  using either public 
information  on nonperforming  loans from the Call Report or private 
information  on classified assets from examination  reports.78 
Legislators were also concerned that there might be too much dis- 
cretion in the enforcement  of the standards  and the closure of capital- 
impaired  banks. Therefore, the prompt  corrective  action provisions  of 
the FDIC Improvement  Act of  1991 stipulate that banks with capital 
ratios below certain thresholds be subject to various mandatory  and 
discretionary  sanctions.79  For instance, the asset growth  of undercapi- 
talized banks  with less than  4 percent  Tier 1 capital  and 8 percent  Total 
capital is restricted. Summaries  of the prompt  corrective action cate- 
gories, mandatory  actions, and  discretionary  actions  are  shown  in tables 
B3, B4, and B5, respectively. Despite these steps, there  is evidence to 
76.  In July 1995 the federal  banking  agencies  released  for public  comment  proposals 
for incorporating  the market  risks of a bank's  trading  account  into the risk-based  capital 
standards. 
77.  See, for example, Avery and Berger  (1991) and Cordell  and King (1995). 
78.  See Berger, King, and O'Brien (1991) and  Jones and King (1995). 
79.  Among other provisions, the FDICIA also recapitalized  the Bank Insurance 
Fund, mandated  that annual  examinations  be performed  for all banks, and dictated  that 
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Table  B3. Prompt Corrective  Action Capital Categories 
Percent 
Tier I 
Capital  Total  risk-  Tier  I risk-  leverage 
category  based  ratio  based  ratio  ratio  Other 
Well capitalized  ?  10; and  ?  6; and  ?  5, and  Not subject  to a capital 
directive 
Adequately  ?  8; and  ?  4; and  ?  4a, and  Does not qualify  as well 
capitalized  capitalized 
Undercapitalized <  8; or  < 4; or  <  4b,  and  Does not qualify  for lower 
categories 
Significantly  < 6; or  <  3; or  <  3, and  Does not qualify  for lowest 
undercapitalized  category 
Critically  Ratio  of tangible  equity  to 
undercapitalized  total  assets  of 2 or underc 
Source: Federal Reserve press releases. 
a. Leverage ratio -3  for CAMEL I-rated banks that are not experiencing or anticipating significant growth. 
b. Leverage ratio <  3 for CAMEL I-rated banks that are not experiencing or anticipating significant growth. 
c. Tangible equity is Tier  I plus cumulative perpetual preferred stock,  net of all intangibles except those amounts of 
purchased mortgage servicing rights allowable in Tier I capital. 
suggest  that because  the risk-based  capital ratios do not measure risk 
very precisely,  prompt corrective  actions are not likely  to be triggered 
soon enough to make a difference  to most failing  institutions.80 
Geographic  Banking  Rules 
Since  the  1800s,  branching by banking organizations  in the United 
States has been primarily governed by state laws.8' The McFadden Act 
of 1927 required national banks to obey state restrictions on branching, 
which effectively  prohibited interstate branching. Over time, individual 
states developed  a wide range of rules governing  intrastate branching. 
The most restrictive regime limited each bank to a single office.  Known 
as unit banking, this system inhibited banks' ability to grow and diver- 
80.  See Jones and King (1995). Note that many of the mandatory  actions contain 
exceptions  that  allow supervisors  flexibility in choosing not to enforce  restrictions  under 
certain  circumstances.  Also, although  the prompt  corrective  action  rules  do not explicitly 
provide  for differential  treatment  of banks in the well-capitalized  and adequately  capi- 
talized categories, a number  of other regulatory  rules do give preferential  treatment  to 
well-capitalized  banks. For additional  details and discussion of FDICIA and prompt 
corrective  action  rules, see Jones and  King (1995), Kaufman  (1995), and  Garcia  (1995). 
81.  See Calomiris  (1993) for a discussion  of the historical  reasons  for this fragmen- 
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Table  B4. Mandatory  Actions under Prompt Corrective  Actiona 
Well  capitalized  and adequately  capitalized  categories 
Prohibit  payment  of dividends,  other  capital  distributions,  or management  fees that 
would  leave institution  undercapitalized 
Undercapitalized  category 
Subject  to increased  monitoring 
Require  institution  to submit  and implement  capital  plan  within  45 days 
Growth  of total  assets  must  be restricted 
Prior  supervisory  approval  needed  for acquisitions,  new branches,  and  new lines of 
business 
Significantly  undercapitalized  category 
Restrict  bonuses  and  raises  for senior  officers 
Critically  undercapitalized  category 
Must  be placed  in conservatorship  or receivership  within  90 days, unless  the 
appropriate  agencies  concur  that  other  action  would  better  achieve  purpose  of prompt 
corrective  action 
Continual  review, meeting  of conditions,  and  certification  by heads  of banking 
agencies  must  occur  after  90 days to avoid  receivership 
After  60 days, prohibited  from  paying  principal  or interest  on subordinated  debt 
without  prior  approval  of the FDIC 
Restrict  activities.  May not do the following  without  prior  written  approval  of the 
FDIC: 
-Enter  into any material  transaction,  other  than  in the usual  course  of business 
-Extend  credit  for any highly leveraged  transaction 
-Make  any material  change  in accounting  methods 
-Engage  in any 'covered  transactions' 
-Pay  excessive compensation  or bonuses 
-Pay  interest  on new or renewed  liabilities  at a rate  significantly  exceeding  local 
market  rates 
Source: Federal Reserve press releases. 
a. Actions mandated for any one capital category also apply to lower categories. 
sify their  risks, but it was often supported  by rural  interests  fearing  that 
local deposits would be invested outside their communities.  In August 
1991, Colorado  became  the last state  to discard  the unit  banking  system. 
Other  states allowed branching,  but limited either the number  or loca- 
tion of branches to reduce interbank  competition. Although thirteen 
states still restricted  branching  as of the end of 1994, all of the others 
have shifted to an unimpeded  statewide  branching  model. 
In some cases, banks reacted to branching  restrictions  by forming 
multibank  holding companies that owned more than one bank in unit 
banking or limited branching  states.82  In turn, states often placed re- 
82.  Additional benefits of the bank holding company form include the ability to Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  187 
Table  B5. Discretionary  Actions under Prompt Corrective  Actiona 
Well  capitalized  and adequately  capitalized  categories 
None 
Undercapitalized  category 
Require  institution  to raise  capital 
Restrict  transactions  with affiliates 
Restrict  deposit  interest  rates 
Replace  senior  officers  and  directors 
Restrict  activities  of the institution  and  holding  company 
Require  divestiture  or sale of the institution 
Other  actions  that  would  better  carry  out purposes  of prompt  corrective  action 
Significantly  undercapitalized  category 
Restrict  the institution's  asset growth  or require  a reduction  in total  assets 
Restrict  any activity  that  poses excessive risk 
Prohibit  the institution  from  accepting  deposits  from  correspondent  depository 
institutions 
Holding  company  may be prohibited  from  paying  dividends  without  prior  Federal 
Reserve  approval 
Require  the institution  to be acquired,  or require  the holding  company  to divest 
Require  divestiture  or liquidation  of any subsidiary  or other  affiliate 
Critically  undercapitalized  category 
Additional  restrictions  may be placed  on activities 
Source: Federal Reserve press releases. 
a. Actions for any one capital category generally also apply to all lower categories. 
strictions on the activities of the MBHCs. Intrastate  restrictions on 
MBHCs  usually focus on market  share  and concentration,  leaving geo- 
graphic  expansion  within the state unregulated.  As with branching  reg- 
ulation, the trend over time has been to gradually  ease state-level re- 
strictions  on MBHCs. 
Perhaps  more important  than the changes in intrastate  banking  leg- 
islation has been the recent trend for individual  states to cooperate  in 
opening their banking markets  to competition from MBHCs in other 
states. Such cooperation  among the states has taken a range  of forms, 
from the specific enumeration  of eligible states in a regional compact 
to blanket  permission  for all states. Table B6 gives historical  informa- 
tion about when each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia 
eased their  geographic  restrictions  on bank  branching  and  MBHC  affil- 
expand into activities prohibited  at the bank  level, such as securities  underwriting,  and 
greater  financial  flexibility in overcoming  bank-level  constraints  on leverage, asset ac- 
quisition, and liability issuance. There are also substantial  tax advantages  to the bank 
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Figure  Bi. Marginal  Reserve  Tax  on Transaction  Deposits,  1959:1-1994:4a 
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Source: Data on the effective  federal funds rate are obtained directly from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Data 
on reserve requirements are from Feinman (1993). 
a. The marginal reserve tax is the quarterly  average effective federal funds rate multiplied by the highest reserve require- 
ment on transaction deposits during the quarter. 
iation.  Interstate bank branching  was  prohibited before  1995,  but is 
starting to  be  allowed  under the Riegle-Neal  Interstate Banking  and 
Branching Efficiency  Act of  1994. 
Reserve  Requirements 
The Bank Act of  1935 required the Federal Reserve to impose reserve 
requirements  on banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System. Through- 
out the 1960s and 1970s the Federal Reserve actively adjusted these re- 
quirements as part of its efforts to steer the expansion of domestic money 
and credit.83  National banks were all members of the Federal Reserve and 
had to abide by its rules. However,  state-chartered  banks had the option 
of being governed by state regulatory authorities, rather  than belonging to 
the Federal Reserve System. One important  difference was that state reg- 
ulators often allowed banks to count interest-bearing assets as reserves, 
whereas the Federal Reserve paid no interest on reserves. 
Figure B 1 shows  the marginal reserve tax on transactions deposits 
83.  See Feinman  (1993). Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  191 
that  is implied  by multiplying  the quarterly  average  level of the federal 
funds rate (the opportunity  cost of reserves) by the highest level of 
reserve requirements  on transactions  accounts. The figure shows that 
the steady drift in inflation  and interest  rates  over the 1960s and 1970s 
increased  the cost of complying with reserve  requirements.  The higher 
cost of compliance drove banks to leave the Federal  Reserve System, 
so that between the mid-1960s and 1980 the fraction of the nation's 
deposits  at member  banks  had fallen from  almost  80 percent  to less than 
65 percent. This slippage may have reduced the effectiveness of the 
new operating  procedures  that the Federal Reserve adopted in 1979, 
which emphasized reserve targets, because deposits were less tightly 
linked to reserves. 
The DIDMCA  sought to correct  these problems  by requiring  that all 
banks, regardless  of whether  or not they belonged to the Federal  Re- 
serve System, adhere  to a single set of reserve  requirements  chosen by 
the Federal  Reserve. Simultaneously,  the act lowered reserve require- 
ments  on nontransaction  accounts  from 12 percent  to 3 percent.84  Aside 
from a minor adjustment  in the 1982 Garn-St Germain  Act, reserve 
requirements  remained  largely unchanged  during  the rest of the 1980s. 
During the first half of the 1990s, however, the Federal Reserve 
twice relaxed reserve requirements.  In December 1990 it removed all 
reserve requirements  on nontransaction  accounts, and in April 1993 
it reduced  the requirement  for transaction  deposits from 12 percent  to 
10 percent.85  Joshua  Feinman  estimates  that  given the prevailing  levels 
of interest  rates, the first  cut saved the banking  industry  approximately 
$800 million in forgone interest, and  the second recouped  another  $350 
million.86  Thus regulatory  changes regarding  required  reserves have 
been quite favorable  for banks. 
84.  The DIDMCA  also forced the Federal  Reserve to begin charging  for payment 
services. This was, in part, intended  to compensate  for the lower reserve "tax" on 
deposits.  These  changes  may  have benefited  large  banking  organizations  relative  to small 
ones, because large organizations  carry  more required  reserves  and because  the pricing 
of payments  services created business opportunities  for large correspondent  banks to 
compete  with the Federal  Reserve in providing  these services to small organizations. 
85.  The DIDMCA  prohibits  the Federal  Reserve from setting reserve  requirements 
of less than  8 percent  on transactions  accounts.  This limit  appears  to be based  on concerns 
about  the amount  of revenue that the Federal  Reserve turns  over to the Treasury  (see 
Feinman, 1993). 
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Expansion of Bank Powers 
In contrast  to the relatively mild debate over how to handle  reserve 
requirements,  the issue of bank powers has proven to be extremely 
contentious.  The Bank  Act of 1933 (commonly  referred  to as the Glass- 
Steagall Act) separates  both the ownership and the activities of com- 
mercial banks and other enterprises. In particular,  it prohibits com- 
mercial banks from underwriting  corporate  securities and serving as 
securities brokers, and also separates the ownership of commercial 
banks and nonfinancial  firms. The act reflects the turmoil  in the early 
1930s, when more than a third  of U.S. banks  failed or were taken  over 
by other  banks. There was also a belief that  deposit insurance  could be 
put in place to protect  depositors  and increase  the stability  of the bank- 
ing system. Accordingly, the Glass-Steagall  Act established  the Federal 
Deposit Insurance  Corporation  to provide deposit insurance.87 
There  have been many attempts  in the last fifteen years to dilute the 
Glass-Steagall  restrictions  on bank  powers. While the rules on the sep- 
aration  of ownership  are still largely intact, many  of the restrictions  on 
activities have gradually  been lifted, at least for bank holding compa- 
nies. Currently,  bank  holding companies  are  allowed to have separately 
capitalized  subsidiaries  that offer investment  advice, provide  discount 
brokerage  services, and underwrite  various securities, including  com- 
mercial  paper,  municipal  revenue  bonds, and  some corporate  bonds  and 
equity under  limited circumstances.88 
Despite these changes, the market  for corporate  ownership  and con- 
trol of banks is still essentially closed to nonbanking  firms-a  com- 
mercial bank or bank holding company can only be purchased by 
another  banking organization.89  In addition, whether  banking  organi- 
zations should be permitted  to enter more lines of business, such as 
insurance  underwriting,  remains  a major  source of debate. On the one 
hand, it is argued  that  the combination  of banks  and  nonbanks  may lead 
to the undesirable  extension of the federal  safety net to other  endeavors. 
87.  See Kroszner  (1996). 
88.  See Hubbard  (1995). 
89.  One important  exception is that nonfinancial  firms  can own "nonbank  banks," 
which do not qualify as commercial  banks because they either do not issue demand 
deposits or do not make commercial loans. However, the ability to form or expand 
nonbank  banks  has been significantly  limited by the Competitive  Equality  Banking  Act 
of 1987 (see Saunders, 1994). Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  193 
On the other hand, it is argued that the gains from diversification  or 
production  synergies  resulting  from  such combinations  would  outweigh 
any extension of the safety net, or that  such extension  can be controlled 
effectively through  the use of firewalls, capital requirements,  or other 
means. The expansion of bank  powers may also improve  efficiency by 
broadening  the market  for corporate  control of banks, adding to the 
pool of firms that could take over, or threaten  to take over, a poorly 
run  banking  organization. 
APPENDIX  C 
Estimation  of the Distribution  of Loans across 
Borrower Credit Size Categories 
THIS  APPENDIX  describes  the procedures employed  to estimate the dis- 
tribution  of loans across borrower  credit size categories  shown in table 
AIO. Our breakdown  of the domestic commercial  and industrial  bank 
loans into borrower  credit size categories for each year-end, 1979-94, 
involves two major  steps. The first is to construct  these data for orga- 
nizations that responded  to the Federal  Reserve's Survey of Terms of 
Bank  Lending  to Business. The second is to extrapolate  this information 
to non-STBL organizations. As noted in the text, the STBL is an un- 
published  source  that  contains  detailed  contract  information  on some of 
the loans issued each quarter  by respondent  banks, which include all of 
the largest U.S.  banks and a stratified  sample of smaller  banks. As of 
1994, organizations  with STBL respondents  accounted  for 73 percent 
of U.S. banking  assets. 
STBL loans are divided into seven borrower  credit size categories, 
based  on the maximum  of the loan amount,  the commitment  amount  (if 
any), and the participation  amount (if any), as shown in table A10.90 
This measure  conforms as well as possible to the notion of the amount 
of bank  credit  available  to the borrower  at the time, but may understate 
90.  Before the third quarter  of  1982 no information  was available  from the STBL 
on the commitment  amount  or participation  amount,  so borrower  credit  size is calculated 
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the total bank credit for some borrowers  who have unrelated  loans or 
commitments  at the same or other banks. Note that  even small organi- 
zations can extend credit to large borrowers  through  the loan partici- 
pation  market.  For example, a small bank  can have a $100,000 portion 
of a $100 million loan without violating its legal lending limits, al- 
though  in practice, this is very rare. 
To convert  the flow of loan originations  into estimates  of the stocks 
of loans in different credit size categories, we assume that the flow of 
loans made by a banking  organization  during  a given year is represen- 
tative of the flow that comprises  the stock of loans on December  31 of 
that year. That is, although  some loans originated  during  the year will 
not remain  on the books at the end of the year, and some of the loans 
in the portfolio at the end of the year were originated  in earlier  years, 
we assume enough consistency in lending policy over time that loan 
data  collected from throughout  the year should be reasonably  represen- 
tative of the portfolio at the end of the year. Since most loans have 
maturities  that are well under one year, we do not expect significant 
problems  from this assumption.91 
The formula  for the proportion  of the organization'  s gross  total  assets 
in category i in December  of a given year is Pi =  (DOLYEARSilDOL- 
YEARS,t,)  x  (DCILNIGTA),  where  DOLYEARS indicates  the  sum 
across loans of the loan amounts  times their repayment  durations,  and 
DCILN  and GTA  are domestic C&I loans and gross total assets for the 
organization, respectively, both taken from the Call Report. That is, 
DOLYEARS  turns  the flow of new credit into the quantity  it is expected 
to represent  on average over time in the portfolio. Thus DOLYEARSil 
DOLYEARS,o,  is an estimate of the proportion  of the domestic C&I 
loans that are invested in credit size category i.92 Multiplication  by 
DCILNIGTA  is needed to put  Pi in terms  of the proportion  of gross total 
91.  Consistent  with the basic assumptions  of the paper,  we aggregate  the loans  within 
a holding  company  and  treat  the holding  company  as a single decisionmaking  unit. When 
only some of the banks  within a holding company  were STBL respondents,  we use the 
STBL loans as representative  of the entire organization.  This should  not pose a signifi- 
cant problem  in most cases, since the STBL usually  captures  the largest  bank  within  the 
MBHC, and therefore  is fairly representative  of the holding  company's  assets. 
92.  For  example, if an organization  made  a two-year  loan for $500,000 (one million 
DOLYEARS)  and a one-year loan for $19 million (nineteen  million DOLYEARS),  then 
we would infer that 95 percent  (nineteen  million of twenty million DOLYEARS)  of the 
portfolio  is in the $10 million to $100 million  category, and  5 percent  is in the $250,000 
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assets. Note that in this analysis we treat  GTA  as exogenous and model 
the banking  organization  as choosing how to allocate its assets among 
loans to various sizes of borrowers  and other assets.93 
The second step is to estimate the proportions  of GTA  allocated to 
the various borrower  credit size categories for organizations  that did 
not have STBL  respondents.  With  some important  exceptions  discussed 
below, this extrapolation  is performed  by running  a set of grouped  log- 
odds regressions  for the proportion  of GTA  that is in a given borrower 
credit size category i, using data on the organizations  with STBL rep- 
resentation. The seven dependent  variables take the form ln[Pi/(1 - 
Pi)],  i  =  1,.  .  .,7.  The model is run separately for each year, allowing 
the probabilities  of being in different  borrower  credit  size categories  to 
vary  freely over time.94  Each  equation  is estimated  using weighted  least 
squares  in order  to avoid heteroskedasticity  problems.95 
Table Cl  presents a representative  regression in which Pi refers to 
the proportion  of GTA in the third borrower  credit size category (be- 
tween $250,000  and $1 million) for the year 1994. The independent 
variables  include  dummies  for the size class of the banking  organization 
(the smallest class, total assets below $100 million, is excluded as the 
93.  There  is some concern  that  because  the STBL  data  are  based  on loan  originations, 
rather  than on the loans that remain  on the balance sheet, biases could occur if some 
types of loans are more often prepaid  or sold. For example, large business loans are 
more often sold without recourse  than are small business loans. However, we do not 
believe this to be a serious problem  for our purposes.  For the goal of evaluating  credit 
availability,  the act of originating  a loan is more  important  than  whether  that  bank  keeps 
the loan on its books. Moreover, most of the loan sales are to other  banks, especially 
foreign  banks, so that  the reshuffling  of large loans likely still leaves most of them held 
by banks. Most important,  we are primarily  interested  in the variation  in these data  over 
time, and any biases that are reasonably  constant over time should not impair our 
comparisons  of different  time periods. 
94.  A more standard  methodology  for this problem  would be to set up a model in 
which all of the dependent  variables  are expressed  relative  to the eighth asset category, 
assets  other  than  domestic  commercial  and  industrial  loans;  that  is,  ln(Pi/P8),  i  = 
1,...,7.  Completing  this model would be an identity that the eight probabilities  must 
sum to one. However, here such a method  would be excessively complicated  and cum- 
bersome  because of some important  deletions from the model discussed  below. Essen- 
tially, we remove the data when a banking  organization  size class makes no loans or 
almost no loans to a given borrower  size category. This procedure  removes both data 
and right-hand-side  variables from consideration  in some of the probabilities  but not 
others, making the estimation of a fully integrated  model extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. 
95.  Each  observation  is divided by a number  proportional  to the estimated  standard 
error  of its error  term [{(l/Pi)  +  [1/(1 -  Pj)]}lDOLYEARSj]12. 1-  00  dt  m 
N 
r  m  \c  o  00 S-  -  -?  \C  t  t-  -  -  (7  \,  m  00  \,  en  CNt  "t  00  0)  0) tr  tf  CO 
m  tf  m  tr  (  -,  00  00  C>  C1  N  t  oooNtf  C1  \  ?  -  M  M  'It  CN  0  >?- 
I  II  II  I  I  lII  I  I  I  I  II  I  I  I  I  I 
tq  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t 
00 
w:  o  oo  o o  o  o  -  -  r0  o  oo  o  r-  o  t  -o  r  -  oo \  -  oo 4  r- 
_  E 
I 
I  I  I  I  I  _  II  _  I  I  II  Il  I  I  I  _  I 
I  n  I 
o  S 
r  0-r-  .Cn~t.1  0 
O  .- 
U, 
Cu  c  o  r- 0  0----  C  O\Oe1-N00  0000  --0-0tt  r  0  0  -C)-0 
\C  tn  C1  \C  C)  C)  0  0  C  -  m  0  -  tn  CN  \  \C  ^  -  CN  C  -N  -  C1  00  C)  ^  o 
._  t-  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  CI  I  I 




9 II  E  Z Z  sS  u :;t  Q  CI 
0  Q 
O-19  619  -9  .  6a;.LZ1-  - 
*z  t 
_-  Ef;S Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  197 
base case), the ratio of equity to GTA  (EQUITYIGTA),  the Tier 1 and 
Total  risk-based  capital  ratios  (TIER1IRWA  and  TOTALIRWA),  the ratio 
of loan loss reserve to GTA (LLRIGTA),  the ratio of other real estate 
owned to GTA  (OREOIGTA),  the ratio of nonperforming  (past due and 
nonaccrual)  domestic C&I  loans to total  DCILN  (NPCILNIDCILN),  the 
ratio of DCILN  to GTA  (DCILNIGTA),  second-order  terms  in all these 
ratios to allow for nonlinearities,  the Herfindahl  index (HERF)  for the 
average  local market  of the banking  organization  (defined  as the MSA 
or non-MSA  county), the market  share  of organization's  average  local 
market  (SHARE), a dummy for the lead bank or largest bank in the 
holding company  being in an MSA (MSA), and dummies  for the state 
in which the top-tier  holding company  is located (including  the District 
of Columbia;  California is excluded as the base case; and FO is for 
foreign  ownership).  As indicated  in table  C  I, a few of the state  dummies 
drop  out of the estimation  because no banks  from  those states are  in the 
STBL for a given year. Every state other than Idaho is represented  in 
the STBL sample in at least one year between 1979 and 1994.96 
We next take predicted  values from these equations  for the propor- 
tions of the portfolio invested in loans to the various credit size cate- 
gories and multiply them by the bank's actual GTA.97  For banks in 
states without STBL representation  in a particular  year, we use the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for a nearby state with similar de- 
mographics,  economic conditions, and  regulatory  environment.  For  ex- 
ample, Idaho organizations  are usually assigned predicted  values as if 
they were facing the same circumstances  as organizations  in Montana. 
Thus  the model  predicts  the loan distributions  for non-STBL  institutions 
96.  Note that some of the right-hand-side  variables  are obviously endogenous.  For 
example, the proportion  of total domestic C&I loans (DCILNIGTA)  virtually  has to be 
endogenous  to the choices of the borrower  size classes of these loans. Similarly, non- 
performing  loan  ratios  are  likely to be outcomes  of the choice of borrower  size. However, 
this  does not create  an econometric  problem  here  because  our  purpose  is purely  to predict 
what  occurred  in past  portfolios, rather  than  to build  a structural  or reduced-form  model. 
Any information  from the portfolio itself is likely to be helpful in estimating  the credit 
size classes of the borrowers  in the portfolio. 
97.  We set Pi to exp(X,B)/(l +  exp[X,B]),  where  X,B  is the predicted  value from the 
log-odds equation.  This procedure  ignores the effect of the error  term on the expected 
value of Pi, which could matter  because  of the nonlinearity.  We tried  adding  0.5s2 (half 
the estimated  variance  of the error  term), on the assumption  of normality  of the error 
term. This modification  made  no appreciable  difference  to the predicted  values and was 
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on the basis of what would be predicted  for an STBL bank  in the same 
size class, with the same capital  ratios, portfolio  problems,  percentage 
of domestic loans, local market  concentration,  market  share, and  in the 
same or a similar state.98 
A problem which requires the use of an alternative  model in some 
cases  is that some size  classes  of organizations make very small 
amounts  of loans or no loans to some credit  size categories  of borrower. 
For  example, organizations  in the very smallest organization  size class 
make almost no loans to credits in the largest borrower  size category. 
Such  outliers  might  dominate  the sample  and  create  estimation  problems 
if they are  not treated  separately.99  To overcome  this problem  and  obtain 
more accurate  estimates for such cases, we delete the mismatches  be- 
tween banking organization size class and borrower  credit category 
from the log-odds regression models.  '00  In these cases, we instead  use 
what  amounts  to a one-variable  prediction  model in which the weighted 
average STBL proportion  for a particular  size class for a given year is 
98.  Several slightly different versions of the set of right-hand-side  variables  were 
also specified  for different  years  and  different  organizations.  For  the period  before 1984, 
the prediction  models  exclude the risk-based  capital  ratios  and  nonperforming  C&I  loans 
because these variables  were not reported  during  the early time periods. In addition, 
because  some entities were missing data  on HERF  and  SHARE,  and some were missing 
data  on the risk-based  capital  ratios  (even in the 1984-94 interval),  additional  equations 
were run  first, without  HERF  and  SHARE,  but with risk-based  capital;  second, without 
risk-based  capital, but with HERF and SHARE;  and third, without either group of 
variables.  The three  additional  models  provide  a prediction  model  for every organization 
in the country, no matter  which variables they are missing. The use of models with 
fewer variables is essentially equivalent  to replacing  the missing variables  in the full 
model with their  predicted  values based on the other  available  variables. 
99.  For  example, if the largest  organizations  made  no loans to the smallest  borrower 
credit size class, then the coefficient of the large organization  dummy  variable  in the 
log-odds model described  above would be equal to negative infinity. 
100. Note that  even after  these deletions from the main  prediction  models, the log- 
odds models do contain some observations  with very small, or zero, values for the 
dependent  variable,  such as the case of one individual,  very large  banking  organization 
that  made  no very large loans. For  these observations,  we set the P to 0.000001, or one- 
millionth  of the portfolio in the estimation, a standard  procedure  (in fact, everything 
below 0.000001  is set to 0.000001).  The log-odds model can only predict positive 
probabilities,  and therefore will predict a nonzero Pi for an observation  that is very 
likely zero. For  predicted  values  of around  0.000001, the true  proportion  is likely exactly 
zero. Since the model is nonlinear  and it is more likely to go further  above than  below 
0.000001, we set all predicted  values that are below 0.00001 (one-hundred-thousandth 
of the portfolio  or below) to a predicted  value of zero. Similar  procedures  were applied 
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simply applied  to all observations  in that  group  for that  year  (the weights 
are based on GTA). For example, for most of the years exact zeros are 
given for the predicted proportions  of the portfolios of the smallest 
organizations  devoted to loans to the largest  borrowers,  since no loans 
by small organizations  to large borrowers  were found in the STBL for 
those years. 
The two-part "rule" used to determine  the deletions from the log- 
odds prediction models is first, that any pairing of organization  size 
class and  borrower  size category  in which less than  0.1 percent  of GTA 
is invested be deleted; and second, in order  to be consistent  over time, 
that other time periods close to a deletion also be deleted, even if the 
proportion  of GTA  is slightly above 0.1 percent.  '0' 
Note that we adjust  the proportions  for all banks  (STBL  banks  using 
observed  STBL  proportions,  non-STBL  banks  using the log-odds  model 
predictions, and non-STBL banks using the sample proportions)  by 
employing data on actual domestic C&I loans. Recall that our model 
is specified in terms of proportions  of assets, but there is also accurate 
Call Report information  on total DCILN (although  not its breakdown 
across  borrower  sizes). To take this extra  information  into account, the 
proportion  of GTA  in each size category  for each bank  is multiplied  by 
the actual DCILN-to-GTA  ratio divided by the estimated sum of the 
ratios across categories. This procedure  gives the same proportionate 
correction  to each credit size category. Finally, the total loan dollars  in 
each category is simply obtained by multiplying each organization's 
GTA  by the estimated  proportions  of GTA  in each credit size category. 
As noted in the text, the breakdown  of these loans across borrower 
credit categories is considerably less accurate  than the balance sheet 
and income data that are taken from the Call Report. This appendix 
indicates that a number  of assumptions  are needed to extrapolate  from 
101. The deletions from the log-odds prediction  models are as follows. For  banking 
organizations  with assets above $100 billion, we delete the two smallest  borrower  credit 
classes (credit of less than $250,000) over 1988-94.  For organizations  with between 
$1 billion and $10 billion in assets, we delete the largest credit class (credit of more 
than  $100 million) over 1979-94. For organizations  with between $100 million and $1 
billion in assets, we delete the two largest credit classes (credit of over $25 million) 
over 1979-94, and the next smaller  credit class (between $10 million and $25 million 
in credit)  over 1979-89. For organizations  in the smallest  size class, with less than  $100 
million  in assets, we delete the four  largest  credit  classes (credit  of more  than  $1 million) 
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the STBL data in order to complete the estimates. In addition, the 
repayment  durations  of the loans that  are  used in the DOLYEAR  weight- 
ing are often difficult to determine, and will be in error  if the loan is 
prepaid  or sold to a nonbank. It is not known whether any of these 
problems  create serious biases or inaccuracies. However, we believe 
that the data that we report  in the tables are generally indicative  of the 
direction  of change over time, since there is no reason to believe that 
the biases have changed  substantially  over time. Thus  when  we estimate 
that  there  was a 34.8 percent  real contraction  in loans to borrowers  with 
bank  credit of less than $1 million during  the first  half of the 1990s, it 
seems fairly certain  that there was a substantial  drop  in small business 
lending  by banks  over this period, but we do not presume  that  the point 
estimate is precise. 
The only other data source available for the distribution  of loans 
across borrower  credit size categories is a new section of the June  Call 
Reports  that  first  appeared  in 1993. Because of start-up  difficulties, the 
June 1993 data are problematic and only the June 1994 results are 
available for use at this time.  Since there is only one time period 
available, these data are not useful for evaluating  changes over time. 
However, the Call Report  and the STBL data can be compared  for the 
single time period of June 1994. In this case, the Call Report finds 
much more lending to small businesses, particularly  to borrowers  with 
credit of less than $100,000.  Berger and Udell find some potential 
explanations  for the differences.  102  Fortunately  our main results from 
102. See Berger  and Udell (1996). On the Call Report,  banks  that report  that "all 
or substantially  all" of their C&I loans have borrower  credit amounts  of $100,000 or 
less avoid having to provide  most of the information  on the distribution  of these loans. 
As a result, researchers  using these data  typically  assume  that  all of these loans are  made 
to the borrower  credit  size class of $100,000 or less, and  thus may overstate  these small 
loans. This may, in part,  explain why the distribution  of borrower  credit  sizes computed 
from the Call Report  typically finds more lending to small businesses than the STBL 
data. Berger and Udell go further  and investigate how two potential  reporting  errors 
might  also narrow  the differences  between  the STBL and the Call Report  data. First, it 
appears  that some banks might have used the proportion  of the number  of loans that 
were $100,000 or less, rather  than the dollar value, as instructed.  Again, this would 
overstate  the smallest  loan category  in the Call Report  results  since the small percentage 
of large loans may yield a rather  high percentage  of the dollars  of these loans. Second, 
it is possible that some banks might have erroneously  reported  their size categories  by 
loan size, rather  than the maximum  of loan size, commitment  size, and participation 
size. Berger and Udell evaluate both of these possibilities by matching  the STBL and Allen N. Berger, Anil K Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise  201 
using the STBL concerning  the relationship  between organization  size 
and borrower  size are replicated  by both Berger and Udell, and Peek 
and Rosengren  using cross-section data from the 1994 Call Report.'03 
Call Report  data  for June 1994 and  find  that  it is possible that  these factors  could explain 
most of the difference  between the results  from the two data  sources. 
103. See Berger  and Udell (1996) and Peek and Rosengren  (1996). Comments 
and Discussion 
Mark Gertler: Certainly  anyone interested  in learning  what has gone 
on in banking  over the last fifteen  years will find  this paper  a very useful 
resource. As I would expect from these authors,  a breathtaking  amount 
of interesting information  is tabulated  and analyzed. They no doubt 
smash  the record  for the quantity  of numbers  reported  in a single BPEA 
paper.  If you need a time series on the quantity  of ATM machines,  here 
it is. 
The paper  contains  a detailed  review of the developments  in banking 
since 1979 and a survey of the associated literature. What is new, 
however, is the energetic attempt  to estimate the impact  of the relaxa- 
tion of interstate  banking  rules on both industry  consolidation  and the 
size distribution  of lending. Among the results is the startling  conclu- 
sion that industry  consolidation  may be hampering  the flow of credit  to 
small businesses. 
I begin with some general remarks  about measuring  trends  in bank 
activity and then turn to the authors'  predictions about consolidation 
and the size distribution  of bank loans. 
Measuring Trends in Commercial Bank Activity 
To comprehend  the recent trends in banking, it is first important  to 
appreciate  that  the industry  is not in decline. Figure  DI shows the ratio 
of bank  assets to GDP over the postwar  period. The line labeled "Flow 
of Funds" plots this ratio  when the measure  of bank  assets is total loans 
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Figure Dl.  Ratio of Bank Assets to GDP, 1957-92 
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Source: Unadjusted data is from the Flow of Funds Accounts. Adjusted data are from Boyd and Gertler (1994). 
and securities as reported  in the Flow of Funds data. Note that it has 
steadily increased, even after 1979, the period of deregulation. It is 
true that the ratio of bank assets to total credit has been shrinking,  but 
this reflects an astonishing growth in total credit market  debt, not a 
decline in bank credit. 
The Flow of Funds numbers  also understate  the growth  in banking. 
First, they underreport  loans to U.S.  firms made by foreign banks, 
which grew rapidly  during  the 1980s. Second, and more fundamental, 
their simple balance sheet measures  fail to account  for the rapid  rise in 
off-balance sheet activities. 
One of  the most striking developments in banking has been the 
relative shift in business from on to off the balance sheet. By engaging 
in off-balance sheet activities, banks  unbundle  the intermediation  pro- 
cess, but they do not disappear  from the scene. For example, an im- 
portant  way in which banks facilitate lending off the balance sheet is 
by providing  cross-party  guarantees,  either in the form of explicit loan 
guarantees  or as backup lines of credit that may be used as collateral. 
A good example of this phenomenon  is the commercial  paper  market. 
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paper  market  over the last twenty years or so appears  to be a pure loss 
of market  share  for banks. In fact practically  all paper  borrowers,  except 
for a few of the very largest, collateralize  their  issues with backup  lines 
of credit at commercial  banks. Banks earn  nearly  as much in fees from 
this activity as they would by holding these high-quality  assets directly 
on their balance sheets. For the present purpose, one key implication 
is that simple balance sheet measures, such as those taken from the 
Flow of Funds, may have become a far less reliable  indicator  of overall 
bank activity. 
The line labeled "adjusted  for measurement  problems" in figure  DI 
adjusts  the Flow of Funds numbers  to account for these measurement 
issues. Underreported  foreign lines are added  in from  information  from 
the Bank  for International  Settlements,  following Robert  McCauley  and 
Rama  Seth.  ' Off-balance sheet activity is accounted  for by capitalizing 
the income earned  from these activities.2  The adjustments  make a big 
difference:  they suggest that the growth in banking  is about  30 percent 
larger  than  the unadjusted  numbers  indicate.  There  is considerable  mea- 
surement  error  involved in estimating  the off-balance sheet numbers, 
but there is likely to be far greater  error  if they are ignored. Finally, it 
is true that some of the off-balance sheet activity reflects derivatives 
trading.  Here banks are performing  their traditional  role of asset trans- 
formation,  but they are  doing so off the balance  sheet. However, deriv- 
atives probably  account  for no more than a quarter  of the total. 
Industry Consolidation and the Size Distribution of Bank Loans 
The new part  of this paper  concerns  predictions  about  industry  con- 
solidation  and the size distribution  of bank  loans. The most controver- 
sial claim is that consolidation  stemming  from deregulation  will likely 
reduce  the flow of credit  to small borrowers.  The authors'  logic consists 
of three steps. First, small and large borrowers  have historically  oper- 
ated in separate  niches, the former providing funds mainly for small 
borrowers  and the latter mainly providing funds for large borrowers. 
Second, the relaxation  of interstate  banking  is likely to result in a loss 
of market  share  by small banks  in favor  of large  banks.  Third,  assuming 
1. See McCauley  and Seth (1992). 
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that large banks maintain  their historical propensity  to lend to large 
rather  than small borrowers,  the latter  will suffer. 
The third  is the critical and controversial  step in the argument.  The 
key issue is whether  these historical lending propensities  will remain 
invariant  to the shift in interstate  banking laws; that is,  whether the 
Lucas critique is relevant. This, in turn, depends on whether  the his- 
torical  lending patterns  of large and small banks  were due to regulatory 
or technological factors. 
My prior  was that  regulatory  factors  were mainly  responsible.  Limits 
on the size of loan that a bank  can make, relative  to its capital, provide 
large banks with an edge in lending to large borrowers.  Conversely, 
interstate  banking  restrictions  have historically helped small banks to 
keep large banks out of local markets.  Given this regulatory  setting, it 
is natural  than  an arrangement  where large  banks service large  borrow- 
ers and small banks service localized small borrowers should have 
evolved. 
The movement towards nationwide banking should eliminate this 
regulatory  bias by permitting  large banks  to penetrate  local markets.  If 
this is the case, then the lending propensities of large banks should 
change, as they absorb  some small business lending. Some small busi- 
ness lending could be lost, but this would be mainly to borrowers  with 
negative net present value projects  who were subsidized  under  the old 
arrangement. 
To argue that the historical lending propensities will continue (to 
borrowers  with positive net present  value projects)  requires  that  market 
niches were due to technological factors. In particular,  there must be 
diseconomies of scale in lending to small borrowers.  This is hard to 
see. At a minimum, it seems likely that there would be large gains to 
small banks from regional diversification. 
On the other hand, suppose that these diseconomies do exist; then 
small banks would remain  in business. That is, with the elimination  of 
regulatory  bias, the size distribution  of banking  ought to be determined 
purely by technological factors. If small banks are most efficient at 
servicing small customers, then they should remain  in business. 
While I am not convinced by the theoretical  underpinnings  of the 
authors'  arguments,  I do believe that they have identified  a very im- 
portant  issue. There has been a sustained decline in lending to small 
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credit crunch could account for lending behavior beyond the end of 
1992. While there could be a number  of explanations  for this phenom- 
enon (for example, continued  inroads  of finance  companies  at this end 
of the bank loan market), the authors' consolidation hypothesis is at 
least a reasonable  contender. Evidence by Peek and Rosengren  shows 
that  large banks  that  acquired  small banks  in New England  did, in fact, 
reduce the small business lending of the acquired  entity.3  More direct 
evidence of this type would be highly desirable. I am not persuaded  by 
the California  example. The recession and credit crunch  hit California 
later than the rest of the country, and this could have affected small 
business lending. 
It is possible, therefore, that consolidation  could be reducing  small 
business lending in the short run-large  banks take time to adjust  to 
the new market  environment. As a long-run  phenomenon,  this seems 
implausible. While the new regime may eliminate an implicit subsidy 
to small business lending, it should not distort  against  lending  to small 
businesses with positive net value projects. 
Finally, in regard  to the predictions  about  consolidation  in general, 
my belief is that  the most important  question  is what  will happen  to the 
degree of concentration  at the top end of the market.  Currently,  about 
sixty banks  hold about  two-thirds  of total  on-balance sheet  bank  assets. 
It would be a different  regulatory  world if that shrank  to ten or twelve 
that  controlled  over 80 percent.  I do not think  that  the authors'  estimates 
rule out this possibility. 
First, they extrapolate  from a relatively limited experience  with re- 
gional MBHCs  to determine  the effects of nationwide  banking.  Second, 
they extrapolate  on the basis of a few large banks to determine  the 
concentration  at the high end. Until recently, U.S.  banks grew to be- 
come large by expanding into foreign markets because they were 
restricted in domestic  markets. Now  that these restrictions have 
been eliminated, they may expand into U.S.  markets-there could be 
" supermegabanks.  " The recent  merger  of Chase  Manhattan  and  Chem- 
ical Bank  is one example. Further,  it is instructive  that  after  the merger, 
this bank  will only be the twenty-first  largest  in the world. At least from 
a technological perspective, there could possibly be even larger  banks 
in the United States. 
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Benjamin M. Friedman: This paper not only provides a fascinating 
window onto recent developments in the banking industry, but also 
raises two questions with a very long tradition  in the economics of 
monetary  policy: To what  extent  do the restrictive  effects of tight  money 
bear  disproportionately  on small firms?  And, what special role, if any, 
do banks play in how monetary  policy works?  Neither of these issues 
rises to the surface in the authors' exposition, but both are present, 
nonetheless. Indeed, the bearing of the authors' work on these two 
questions  is what  makes  their  paper  relevant  to macroeconomics,  rather 
than merely to the banking  industry,  narrowly  construed. 
The empirical analysis supports four main conclusions. First, the 
record  is clear that small banks lend disproportionately  to small firms 
(or at least, to firms that borrow  in small amounts),  while large banks 
lend disproportionately  to large firms. Second, the consolidation  of the 
U.S. banking  industry  that has taken place over the last decade and a 
half has pushed banks away from lending to small firms and toward 
lending to large ones. Third, at least some part of this consolidation 
has been due to the relaxation  of the legal and  regulatory  restraints  that 
used to prohibit bank combinations; with further  relaxation already 
legislated, therefore, further  consolidation  is likely to follow. Fourth, 
this further  bank  consolidation  in coming years  will, in turn,  push  banks 
further  in the direction  of lending  to large  firms,  rather  than  small ones. 
I agree with each of these conclusions. 
The authors  also push  their  analysis  to provide  quantitative estimates 
of these future  developments, including, in particular,  the likely con- 
sequences  of the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act, which will open the door even 
wider  for bank  consolidations  across state lines. How much  confidence 
to place in these quantitative  estimates is difficult if not impossible to 
judge, however. The authors have made a valuable contribution  in 
estimating so carefully the size distribution  of loans by size of bank, 
and the model that they estimate to establish the effects of regulatory 
changes (and other influences)  on the distribution  of bank  assets across 
bank size seems comprehensive, to say the least. Nevertheless, there 
seems no practical  way to evaluate  the estimates  of the model's param- 
eters which, in turn, underlie the simulations  that the authors  present 
to show to what extent, and how rapidly, banks  will consolidate  as the 
key provisions of Riegle-Neal take effect. 
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cludes 116 estimated  coefficients, of which about  one-half are individ- 
ually significant  by the conventional  standard  of t statistics  equal to or 
greater  than two in absolute value. As is usually the case, some of the 
estimated  parameters  are more important  than others for the purposes 
of the simulations  presented.  Of the thirty-two  coefficients that  jointly 
give the effects of changes in interstate  banking arrangements,  only 
eleven are individually  significant.  Of the eight coefficients  that  jointly 
give the dynamics with which these interstate  effects occur, only two 
are individually significant. The authors  report  the results of tests for 
joint significance across broad  classes of variables  in their model, but 
these tests merely reconfirm  that  changes in within-state  regulation  and 
interstate  privileges do have effects. They do not show that  the effects 
are of a specific magnitude  or that they occur according  to a specific 
pattern  of timing. 
To cite these empirical limitations is not to minimize the authors' 
contribution. Their model is clever, and their handling of difficult, 
detailed data matters  has clearly been thoughtful  and painstaking.  But 
whether,  in the end, to accept their  quantitative  estimates  of the extent 
of further  bank consolidation, or of the further  shift in lending away 
from small firms and toward large ones, or especially, the claim that 
these changes will mostly play out by the end of this decade, is another 
matter.  I am more  inclined  to accept  the authors'  qualitative  conclusions 
and leave it at that. 
The one aspect of the analysis that  I would challenge more seriously 
is the attribution  of the slowdown in commercial  and  industrial  lending 
by banks  during  the most recent  recession, and  especially the failure  of 
C&I lending to recover significantly  since, to the effects of bank con- 
solidation. The authors' hypothesis addresses two familiar questions 
about this experience. First, as to whether the absence of growth in 
business loans was a supply- or a demand-driven  phenomenon, the 
authors  identify it as a backward  shift in banks' willingness to lend. 
And second, they ascribe this shift to bank  consolidation. 
I am dubious on both counts. Notwithstanding  the discussion in 
connection with tables 8 and A8, the slowdown in U.S. business bor- 
rowing since 1989 has been more general than  just in borrowing  from 
banks. The Flow of Funds Accounts show that all credit market  debt 
owed by U.S. nonfinancial  businesses grew by 10.6 percent  per  annum, 
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1989;  by 1.0 percent  per annum,  on average, during  the recession years 
1990-91; and by 1.6 percent  per annum,  on average, during 1992-94. 
The same firms' credit market  debt, not including  bank  loans, grew by 
11.5 percent  per annum  during 1983-89,  1.7 percent  per annum  during 
1990-91,  and 1.5 percent  per annum  during 1992-94.  The slowdown 
in business  borrowing  since 1990-including,  in particular,  the absence 
of any significant  pick-up during  the recovery-is  therefore  a broader 
phenomenon,  not confined  to small or bank-dependent  borrowers.  It is 
true that bank lending has slowed more than other forms of credit, in 
percentage  terms. But because bank loans comprise  only a small frac- 
tion of total business sources of credit (see, for example, table A8), 
nonbank  forms of credit have accounted  for most of the slowdown in 
total business borrowing  during  recent years. 
What might account for such a broadly  based slowing of credit ex- 
tensions? I and others have often emphasized  the extraordinary  nature 
of the corporate  borrowing  wave of the 1980s: not only did U.S.  cor- 
porations  borrow  in record  volume, but they did so, to a great extent, 
to pay down equity by means of acquisitions, leveraged  buy-outs, and 
stock  repurchases,  rather  than  to finance  new earning  assets. As a result, 
by the end of the 1  990s corporate  America  was seriously  overleveraged. 
Especially  once the recession  had  demonstrated  that  the earnings  growth 
of the 1980s could not be extrapolated  indefinitely, some borrowers 
chose to  "deleverage" voluntarily (not necessarily by issuing new 
equity, but by refraining  from further  borrowing), and others had de- 
leveraging forced upon them by reluctant  lenders (including not only 
banks, but also investors  in bonds, commercial  paper,  and  other  market 
obligations). Indeed, since bank  loans accounted  for only 24 percent  of 
the corporate  business sector's credit market  debt at year-end 1982 and 
only 18.5 percent  at year-end 1994, open market  investors  have played 
a much larger  role in this deleveraging  process than have the banks. 
Further,  to the extent that  the banks  have been an important  influence 
in the corporate  deleveraging since 1989, the authors' consolidation 
hypothesis  is only part  of the explanation.  The need for banks  to restore 
their capital positions has been an important  factor, especially in the 
context  of the Basle system under  which loan assets  require  more  capital 
than  do securities, so that portfolio shifts from loans to securities  are a 
substitute  for building capital. 
To return  to the central  thrust  of the paper, I certainly  agree  that  the 210  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
U.S. banking  industry  will continue  to consolidate, and  that  this process 
will further  skew bank lending away from small firms toward large 
ones. But  what  do these developments  mean?  Is there  reason  for concern 
about the shrinking base of  lending to small, bank-dependent  busi- 
nesses? Will banks  still be "special" if they increasingly  lend to large, 
rather  than small, firms?  And if monetary  policy affects real economic 
activity primarily  through  borrowers  who are either wholly or partly 
dependent  on banks as their sources of credit (as Anil Kashyap  and  his 
earlier coauthors have often argued), but these small firms are now 
becoming  quantitatively  less important  as recipients  of bank  loans, how 
far can this process go before monetary  policy must either  evolve new 
ways to affect real activity, or cease having  any  quantitatively  important 
real effects at all? The authors  do not address  such broader  questions, 
but these would usefully make the subject  for a further  paper. 
General Discussion 
James Duesenberry  warned  of the uncertainty  inherent  in trying to 
predict the future of the banking industry  by looking at past trends, 
especially in light of the rapid  changes in the technologies available  to 
banks  and in the ways in which their services are provided. He offered 
the evolution of the grocery industry  as a case where change had not 
been predictable  from an extension of past trends:  Initially, national 
chains such as A&P, which were basically buying up conventional 
neighborhood  stores, were expected to dominate the business by ex- 
ploiting some economies of scale. Then innovative  local chains domi- 
nated  as self-service supermarkets  took over. Today  specialty  stores  are 
becoming increasingly  important.  Duesenberry  found it perfectly  con- 
ceivable that the banking industry would evolve beyond its current 
institutional  framework, departing  in important  ways from historical 
trends. As an example, he suggested that small business lending might 
become entirely divorced from banking, with small investment  houses 
specializing in relationship  lending on a local basis and raising their 
funds from sources other than bank deposits. Duesenberry  also sug- 
gested that, in evaluating  the prospects  for small business lending, the 
paper should have discussed the impact of the Community  Reinvest- 
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Robert  Shiller suggested that the recent literature  on herd behavior 
could help in understanding  the effects of bank  consolidation  on small 
business lending. In a small bank, the president  often makes the ulti- 
mate decision of whether  to award  a loan to a small business, while in 
a larger  bank this decision is made by a loan officer and is subject to 
review by the officer's superiors. Since many intangibles enter into 
whether  a small business is a good investment  opportunity,  while for a 
large company  there is a lot of objective information  available  to guide 
a loan  decision, loan officers  will find  it easier  to justify a large  company 
loan and thus may be biased against small business lending. To make 
such loans would be to break  away from the herd, and a reluctance  to 
break  away will reduce such loans even further. 
George Akerlof applauded  the study  of California  as a way of antic- 
ipating  the future  of nationwide  consolidation,  since California  is bigger 
than most countries and has had statewide branching  for most of this 
century. However, he wondered  whether  the authors  had any explana- 
tion for the unusual  pattern  of small business lending in California  and 
whether  the low overall level of small business lending had disadvan- 
taged  the state's economy in any identifiable  way. On the first  question, 
Allen Berger responded  that the structure  of the banking industry  in 
California  is somewhat  different from that of the rest of the nation, in 
that  both the very large and the very small banks are actively involved 
in small  business lending, while banks  of intermediate  size do relatively 
little. He speculated  that this might be due to the fact that the Bank of 
America  likes to be big in everything  it does, including  small business 
lending. Berger acknowledged  that such an institutional  peculiarity  of 
the California  banking  system may reduce  the usefulness of California- 
based simulations  for the nation as a whole. 212  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
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